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Bankers in the Central Great Plains region of western Kansas played a significant part in 
transforming their communities from frontier outposts into components of a modern region. 
Between 1870 and 1940, country bankers came to see themselves as reformers and advisors in 
the process of transforming their towns into viable parts of a regional economy, and their 
influence was considerable. This dissertation contextualizes bankers’ multiple functions within 
rural communities and adds nuance to popular portrayals of predatory moneylenders. Bankers 
representing towns typically less than 5,000 in population served as economic, social, and 
political leaders instrumental in their development. The decisions they made shaped the fortunes 
of a specific set of rural communities as they navigated severe economic, social, and political 
challenges, but this story of country bankers driving development efforts while balancing the 
cultural and social traditions of rural America replicates trends from around the U.S. West and 
the nation. Contrary to the reputation of businessmen as heartless usurers, these bankers operated 
instead as cultivators of economic, political, and social power within their communities and the 
region. They shared the interests of farmers and other rural businesspeople in facing the changes 






 A dissertation represents both the beginning of a career as a fully-fledged academic and 
the culmination of years of professionalization. I recently discovered just how long I have been 
on this track when I found a note from myself in about fourth grade commenting that history was 
my favorite subject and that I wanted to become a teacher someday. At the same time, a 
collection of treasured childhood artwork revealed, first, a small totem made of colorful paper 
and a Pringles can, and second, a high school genealogy project consisting of a family tree in the 
shape of a Chinese checkerboard. The first object, surprisingly, revealed the deep roots of my 
fascination with some of the themes presented in this dissertation. A tier of the totem symbolized 
the wheat-farming heritage of my family, which began homesteading the Great Plains in the 
Nebraska panhandle in the 1880s. Another tier included symbols of my nuclear family, including 
a dollar sign to represent my father’s career as a banker and a bookmark which suggested my 
already deep love of reading and narrative building. These tokens of my childhood, viewed again 
in my last year of graduate school as my father prepared to move from our longtime home in a 
rural town on the Great Plains, humbled me and renewed my sense of purpose as a scholar of 
community history. I wish to thank those educators who nourished my pride of place and love of 
history all those years ago.  
 Teachers have been among my favorite people all of my life, and my professors at 
Nebraska Wesleyan University were no exception. I cherish my liberal arts education from an 
institution that has hosted at various times ten members of my extended family. Those in the 
history faculty provided a strong model of historical education and challenged me constantly. 
Elaine Kruse, Sandra Mathews-Benham, Patrick Hayden-Roy, and my advisor Meghan K. 
Winchell offered opportunities for intensive research at an early stage, including a stint at the 
v 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library that served as my first introduction to archival 
research. NWU was generous in offering a collaborative faculty-student research grant to support 
this experience.  
 As I transitioned to graduate study at the University of Kansas, I was again the recipient 
of tremendous financial and academic support. While funded by the History Department as a 
Graduate Teaching Assistant and Assistant Instructor, I have gained valuable teaching 
experience while learning the ropes of professional academic research and service. The office 
staff of the KU Department of History was always friendly and willing to help. Research grants 
from the Department of History, the Office of Graduate Studies, the KU Center for Research, 
and the Hall Center for the Humanities aided in the completion of my doctoral research. 
Additionally, this research was funded in part by an Alfred M. Landon Historical Research Grant 
administered by the Kansas Historical Foundation. The Agricultural History Society has 
provided financial support for travel to its annual conferences on multiple occasions, and has 
served as a collegial forum for presenting my ideas. Meanwhile, Virgil Dean of the Kansas 
History journal has proven a helpful and encouraging guide to the community of agricultural and 
regional history, as well as to the publishing process. 
 I have been blessed with an extraordinarily wise and friendly committee. Kim Warren 
and Ann Schofield both presided over my first venture into this dissertation project. In their 
colloquium on gender history, I conducted research that uncovered some of my absolute favorite 
stories, and began to conceive of ways to theorize bankers as both paternalistic and pragmatic 
figures within their communities. Paul Kelton also oversaw an early seminar paper. In his 
classes, I gained some of the best training for becoming an academic. Sara Morris, a librarian in 
the KU Libraries, has proven the inestimable value of these professionals. Not only did she allay 
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the fears of a first-semester graduate student writing her first historiographical essay, but she 
routinely met with me in every subsequent term. A fellow historian of rural America, she 
encouraged me to attend the meetings of the Agricultural History Society and to make it an 
intellectual community of my own. She has gone above and beyond the ordinary duties of 
librarians in joining my committee and constantly providing sound research and life advice to 
me. Sara Gregg’s contributions to my development as a scholar are unquantifiable. We met when 
I served as a GTA for her introductory U.S. History survey, and by happy accident, we happened 
to find that our research interests overlapped a great deal. My co-advisors Kim Warren and Sara 
Gregg, each with a wide range of scholarly interests, have contributed substantially to my 
professional development and to the shaping of a dissertation itself diverse in historical 
perspectives. Any errors, of course, are mine.  
 On a personal note, I must thank the many friends from all walks of my life who have 
continued to support me through the challenges of graduate school. They visited or called even 
when I didn’t always returned the favor, understood when I was mentally more ready to chase 
adult responsibilities than to continue as a student in my late twenties, and believed in me when I 
still chose to stick it out and finish my degree. I appreciate that they let me continue to share in 
their life trajectories, from new jobs to marriage, home-buying, and children. They, in turn, have 
been incredible companions in my own life changes. Special thanks to Alyssa Silhacek, Krista 
Barger, Pam Schollett, Jessica Modrell, and Justin Modrell. My fellow graduate students—
Amanda Schlumpberger, Irene Olivares, Harley Davidson, Sarah Bell, Scharla Paryzek, Nick 
Cunigan, George Klaeren, Adam Newhard, Alex Boynton, John Hess, and many others—have 
proven to be good friends and colleagues. Among my peers, I want to thank Claire Wolnisty, in 
particular, for her companionship, modeling of hard work, and example of service to others. We 
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entered the program together, both directly from our undergraduate careers, and have faced much 
of the uphill climb together.  
Another graduate student friend turned into much more than a colleague—my husband, 
Rob Miller. It is impossible to say just how much he (and our dog, Clark Gable) has helped me 
to find personal balance within the demands of a graduate school experience he has shared. 
Rob’s family—including Gladys Park, Rob Miller, Sr., Diane and Wendal Mitchell, Edith and 
Carl Jones, and Christee and Carlie Bentley—have been wonderful and encouraging in-laws. 
Their warmth and graciousness signifies their southern heritage, and their wit and humor is 
always entertaining. In addition to opening up his own life and family to me, Rob has provided 
valuable service to this dissertation as one of its chief critical readers. Our conversations and 
exchanges of our writing constantly provoke deeper and sharper thinking, and he deserves much 
credit for the effects on this project.  
Finally, it gives me great pleasure to recognize my extended family of Smiths and Hursts. 
It is their heritage on the Great Plains, after all, that inspired much of this research. All of my 
grandparents and generations further back lived in this region, in both Kansas and Nebraska. I 
can imagine that they would recognize many of the themes presented in this project about the 
region’s rural communities. My mom, Jo Hurst, has always set high expectations for my sister 
and me, and for some reason we have sought to meet them in exceedingly difficult fields. But her 
faith has not wavered, and I am thankful for her constant belief in my abilities. My sister, Carey 
Winans, has understood the challenges of breaking into an academic career and also encouraged 
me to just get done and get a job!  
My dad, Gordon Smith, inspired my earliest thoughts about community history and the 
subject of this dissertation. He is a country banker himself, and we share a fascination with 
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history such that stories about bankers past naturally filtered into our philosophical conversations 
about life and community survival in the Great Plains. Stories of the insidious or parasitic banker 
are repeated throughout much popular literature on the Plains, and indeed reverberated through 
my childhood growing up in a small town in the region. Rumors of an early town banker who 
shot himself when his bank failed and unsubstantiated tales of a banker in a nearby town who 
reportedly led the area Ku Klux Klan (storing the Klan robes in the bank basement for later 
confirmation) validate some of the worst characteristics bankers could possess.
1
 Yet 
paradoxically, some of the bankers subject to such reputations continue to exercise a positive 
economic influence within their communities even years after their deaths. The supposed KKK 
member who practiced stringent measures of social and economic control also organized a 
philanthropic trust to use in perpetuity to support projects toward economic and cultural 
development in the community. Funds from this trust, and others like it, continue to support 
worthy causes such as scholarships, and to sustain community buildings such as a historic 
theater, community center, and local ballparks. How do these paradoxes reconcile themselves? 
Somehow communities in the Great Plains have managed to survive through years and even 
decades of depression, and I would argue that bankers, not all of them driving their banks to ruin 
or joining their communities in racial rituals, played a substantial part in this survival. My dad’s 
example of the banker as a central member of a rural community shapes this perspective in no 
small part, and for this reason I dedicate my dissertation to him. 
 
                                                 
1. It seems that the first banker who committed suicide did not actually do so upon the failure of his bank. 
According to local historian Jean Gray, George W. Gordon later in his life succumbed to illness and “melancholy,” 
which caused him to steal a gun from a tenant of the local hotel and end his life. See Gray, Homesteading Haxtun 
and the High Plains: Northeastern Colorado History (Charleston, S.C.: The History Press, 2013), 128-129. The 
latter stories have reached the author anecdotally only, but again Gray’s work confirms that the KKK had a visible 
presence in the county in 1924 and 1925. See Gray, Homesteading Haxtun and the High Plains, 100.  
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Introduction. Country Bankers as Cultivators of Community 
 
Twenty-three-year-old banker Jerome W. Berryman arrived in Pond Creek, Oklahoma 
Territory in 1893, to open a community bank with the financial backing of his Kansas and 
Missouri banking family. An October 12, 1893 article in the Pond Creek Tribune welcomed 
Berryman by touting his experience in banking and the financial power of his backers, as well as 
noting his approbation of the “splendid town,” its “salubrious” climate, and its “solid, 
substantial, enterprising” people.
1
 The banker soon assumed a role in local politics and in June of 
the next year, played an important part in leading the town’s battle with the Chicago, Rock 
Island, and Pacific Railroad.  
 The conflict between Pond Creek residents and the “Rock Island” revealed common 
tensions of the western United States in the late-nineteenth century. Locals aligned themselves 
against the railroad while many regional newspapers, politicians, and even the financiers in 
Berryman’s family condemned their actions. The territorial government had officially designated 
Pond Creek the county seat when the Cherokee Strip lands in north-central Oklahoma opened to 
white settlement in 1893. Settlers had purchased lots and built the town confidently, but the 
railroad then attempted to construct its own town three miles to the north, past the Salt Fork of 
the Arkansas River. The railroad established a stop at its townsite even though it failed to reach 
the size of Pond Creek, and then refused to place another depot at the more populous town 
despite its status as county seat. Over the course of several months, the people of Pond Creek 
appealed to railroad officials and to the federal government. The U.S. House of Representatives 
                                                 
1. “Has Faith in Pond Creek,” Pond Creek Tribune, Oct. 12, 1893, Box 6, Berryman Family Collection, 




passed a bill requiring the Rock Island road to make stops at Pond Creek, but the railroad’s 
lobbyists were able to prevent its passage through the Senate.
2
  
Meanwhile, Pond Creek issued an ordinance requiring trains to slow down through the 
town limits. As local newspapers reported indignantly, the Rock Island engineers defied the law 
blatantly, barreling through town with “throttle wide open.”
3
 As the editor of the Pond Creek 
Tribune put it, “The Road seemed mocking at the people’s distress.” He added, “Human 
endurance has a limit, and at that limit with the brave, earnest and law-abiding men who form the 
population of these western towns, there is danger of a catastrophe.”
4
 That catastrophe indeed 
occurred. As the Democratic Voice (Pond Creek) reported, on the morning of June 6, 1894, a 
train failed to stop for a crossing wagon and smashed it to splinters. Later that day, “four or five 
hundred citizens” charged on the railroad and tore up nearly 1,000 feet of track. Their leaders 
attempted to flag down the incoming train, but the engineers ignored the warning and again put 
on speed. When the train hit the torn up track, the second accident of the day resulted. No human 
injuries were reported, but the townspeople had to rescue a large number of cattle from the 
wrecked train cars. In the following weeks, the presence of Pinkerton forces, sent in by the 
railroad, and the explosion of the rail bridge north of town inhibited efforts to reestablish order. 
Several witnesses gave evidence toward a conspiracy instigated by the railroad itself, and this 
naturally fueled the flames.
5
  
                                                 
2. “A Brief Review,” The Trainwrecker (Pond Creek, O.T.), July 4, 1894; and “Memorial,” Pond Creek 
Tribune, June 14, 1894, both in Box 6, Berryman Papers.  
3. “It Stopped! Uprising of Indignant People,” Democratic Voice (Pond Creek, O.T.), June 7, 1894, Box 6, 
Berryman Papers. 
4. “Memorial,” Pond Creek Tribune, June 14, 1894, Box 6, Berryman Papers. 
5. “That’s the Way to Do It,” and “Some Pinkerton Work,” Cherokee Sentinel (Pond Creek, O.T.), June 14, 
1894; “A Brief Review,” Trainwrecker (Pond Creek, O.T.), July 4, 1894; and “Who Caused Explosions,” The 




 Throughout these events, the town’s newspapers defended the local citizens involved.
6
 
The righteous language of the local newspapers emphasized the bravery of the local citizens who 
rose up against the abusive railroad and mirrored common populist complaints about railroad 
corporations in the U.S. West. Local news coverage referenced previous American political 
movements, arguing that the attack on the railroad was no different from the Boston Tea Party. 
One editor defended the locals by noting that the event “was no rabble’s work, it was the work of 
indignant, law-abiding men, who suppress lawlessness; it was the work of good citizens, 
unmasked, in broad day-light and fearlessly [sic].” As defenders of justice, they were “the 
descendants of the heroes of Valley Forge, of New Orleans and of Gettysburg.”
7
  
Berryman’s role in the railroad fight is noteworthy, for although he represented a 
typically conservative profession, he sided with the town and ultimately earned the respect of its 
people for doing so. As The Voice Extra commented, the banker was “looked up to as a leader in 
the town fight.” In fact, just as had happened in Pullman, Illinois one month earlier as the result 
of a railroad strike, Berryman was arrested along with two other town leaders and charged with 
the obstruction of the U.S. mails.
8
 The editors defended Berryman, one noting that he was an 
honorable “young man of considerable promise.” When the community was accused of blowing 
up the railway bridge in late June, the Voice Extra reported: 
No one dares to say that [Berryman] uses any dark means to win what the people 
of [Pond Creek] regard a just cause. He is a careful, conservative business man. 
He does not believe in radical measures and has no faith in the power of powder, 




                                                 
6. “Our Defamers,” Pond Creek Tribune, June 14, 1894, Box 6, Berryman Papers. 
7. “It Stopped! Uprising of Indignant People,” Democratic Voice (Pond Creek, O.T.), June 7, 1894, Box 6, 
Berryman Papers. 
8. “Latest News! Arrests and Counter Arrests,” Pond Creek Tribune, June 14, 1894, Box 6, Berryman 
Papers. 




Berryman’s profession lent him a sturdy and reliable reputation, but his commitment to 
protecting the community’s interests, even resorting to vigilante-style justice, endeared him to 
the town. He united the financial interests of a community banker reliant upon the local economy 
with the protests of the farming classes against an oppressive corporate target.
10
 
 Despite the community’s belief in the fairness of their argument and the bearing out of 
justice in national legislation, Berryman’s friends and family disapproved of his involvement in 
the battle carried out through “lawless” means. Berryman’s uncle W.S. Woods, the president of 
the National Bank of Commerce in Kansas City, Missouri and one of his prominent financial 
backers, wrote to Berryman twice requesting that he remove himself from the fray. He noted that 
Kansas City newspapers and business interests had been commenting on the matter and wrote to 
Berryman, “It will reflect upon your personal reputation, and do you no credit . . . any reflection 
upon you is a reflection upon me, and on my account, I hope that you will be very particular in 
this and other matters.” He even threatened the young banker with reducing his financial 
backing, “I can’t afford to furnish you money, and sustain you in your business unless you 
pursue methods which I have found to be the best.”
11
 A month later, Woods continued in an 
exasperated and paternalistic tone to admonish Berryman: “You know my principal [sic] in 
business, Jerome, is to help young men who help themselves, and I have no patience with 
anything but the most prudent, straightforward and correct conduct . . . economy, caution and 
integrity.”
12
 Woods and Berryman’s cousin Charles Q. Chandler, another prominent Kansas 
                                                 
10. Ultimately, populists and local businesses alike scored a victory with the U.S. Congress’s approval of a 
bill requiring railroads to build stations in all townsites through which the line passed. Pond Creek citizens finally 
obtained their depot. Even though the Western railroads frequently subverted the nation’s political system through 
the corporate lobby, the Pond Creek situation pointed out how local citizens could challenge the railroad developers 
when they united in opposition and deployed their political influence at the national level. For more on the anti-
railroad animus in the West, see Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern 
America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), xxiv-xxv.  
11. W.S. Woods to J.W. Berryman, June 28, 1894, Box 6, Berryman Papers. 




banker, both expected Berryman to pull out of the battle and attend to his banking business 
alone, to secure risky loans in the “hard” and “tough,” newly established community and perhaps 
even to prepare to sell the business.
13
 These city bankers had a particular version of community 
banking in mind that did not suit the raw Oklahoma settlement. While Berryman would maintain 
connections with his financial backers, he did not take their advice in Pond Creek. He had begun 
to develop a sense of how best to accommodate local communities’ interests and at the same 
time to buttress his own authority through displays of leadership. Time after time, Berryman’s 
community affirmed his understanding of local needs by supporting his business and electing 
him to numerous local and state offices. 
  
The foregoing story of banker Jerome W. Berryman defending his community on the Oklahoma 
frontier against powerful railroad interests raises several questions that shape this dissertation. 
How did country bankers negotiate between the financial interests of investors in far-away places 
and the interests of their clients in the local community? Did bankers’ participation in popular 
issues on the local level earn them a degree of economic power, and how did economic power 
give them legitimacy in political and social arenas? In what ways did bankers shape the 
development of the frontier and the region’s responses to later challenges such as out-migration, 
farm crisis, and drought?  
I argue that the incident between Berryman’s community and the Rock Island Railroad in 
1894 evokes a larger transition from an era when country bankers depended on financial backers 
in Eastern and Midwestern cities to an era when they exercised more power of their own. This 
case also illustrates the motivations of country bankers to protect not just their own livelihoods, 
                                                 
13. W.S. Woods to J.W. Berryman, July 26, 1894; and C.Q. Chandler to J.W. Berryman, July 28, 1894, 




but also the broader economic vitality of the communities on which they depended. The unity of 
their interests with local causes earned bankers the approbation of their communities, which 
granted them additional economic, social, and political power. Over time, country bankers 
cultivated these diverse modes of influence and simultaneously nurtured their communities 
through difficult transitions in the development of the Great Plains. They supported both 
maintenance and change within their rural communities. As leading citizens of small towns, 
bankers felt called to modernize infrastructure so as to retain rural populations. Meanwhile, they 
urged the most successful farmers of their region to adapt to the market pressures of the modern 
agricultural system: to mechanize, consolidate, and produce efficiently. Yet they still worked to 
retain some of the traditional elements of the region’s culture and economy, based on 
commercial family farms. 
These arguments are borne out through a composite portrait of country bankers on the 
Central Great Plains, between the settlement of western Kansas in the 1870s and the depression 
and Dust Bowl of the 1920s and 1930s. In addition to Berryman, my subjects include Frederick 
J. Atwood, a Vermonter who moved to Concordia, Kansas to run a bank established by eastern 
investors; W.D. Ferguson, a banker born to an established banking family in Colby, Kansas who 
had to balance his community’s ideological commitment to family farming with his own desire 
to invest in industrialized agricultural ventures; Thad Carver, a Pratt, Kansas banker who led 
civilian fundraising efforts in his community during World War I; and Albert A. Doerr, a 
merchant and lender from Larned, Kansas who demonstrated the role of capitalists in the 
region’s transition to modern farming patterns. A mixture of these case studies and references to 
a larger set of qualitative data about prominent bankers in western Kansas communities—




demonstrates bankers’ complex and sometimes conflicting interests. These complexities offer a 
sharp contrast with the stereotyped portrayals of country bankers in American popular culture 
from around the turn of the twentieth century. This dissertation offers multiple examples of these 
popular representations, including the nineteenth-century political tracts of farmers and populists 
as well as novels by Sinclair Lewis and John Steinbeck. Doing so illustrates some elements of 
truth within cultural understandings of this class of businessmen, but also a great deal of false 
perception by the public. Whereas stereotypes might portray bankers as inflexible, aloof, 
avaricious, and predatory, the realities of community life on the Great Plains often revealed that 
bankers embodied elements of civic-minded leadership.  
This project highlights banking’s place in the process of developing the economy, 
political culture, and social institutions of rural communities.
14
 Bankers on the Central Great 
Plains ultimately performed many functions in their local communities as towns grew from 
frontier outposts to centers of rural development around the turn of the twentieth century. 
Contemporary bankers asserted that “the very nature of the banker’s occupation—his relations 
with all classes of people, with every variety of business, [gave] him an insight into and a wide 
outlook upon all phases of life and industry.”
15
 Bankers perceived themselves to be reformers 
and advisors concerning the social and economic development of their communities. They 
leveraged their social and economic power to gain positions in local governance as well as in 
state legislatures, where they advocated for local agricultural interests, among other issues. 
While country bankers had to be pragmatic about what parts of community life they could 
preserve in the face of growing challenges to rural lifestyles, they exhibited a strong concern for 
the well-being of their communities. 
                                                 
14. William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin speak to this phenomenon in their introduction to Under 
an Open Sky (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).  




Banking and the History of Great Plains Communities 
 
As a rural community study set during a period when the Great Plains frontier matured 
into a region with a distinct set of economic, political, social, and environmental challenges, this 
dissertation draws on a diverse body of historical scholarship. The late historian Craig Miner 
offers perhaps the most nuanced interpretations of the community leaders of the Great Plains—
farmers, bankers, attorneys, newspaper publishers, and merchants among them—who helped to 
sustain the region not just until “next year,” but into the modern era.
16
 His books capture the 
essence of the Plains spirit of both agrarianism and entrepreneurialism, values that brought the 
residents who “stuck it out” into accord with present forms of industrialized agriculture and with 
the modern community infrastructures that supported them. Miner’s understanding that 
historians need to describe communities at the level of their own observations and opinions, 
through the medium of manuscripts, newspaper reports, and oral histories, underscore his 
reasoning that local changes occur against the backdrop of state and national trends, but certainly 
on their own timelines. His style, methodologies of community research, and perspectives on 
both the optimism and pessimism embodied by the Plains people at different periods of its 
settlement and development all inform this dissertation.
17
  
Miner’s perception of the need to unite local events with broader contexts corresponds to 
what rural scholar Orville Burton calls the “horizontal and vertical dimensions” of community 
                                                 
16. Craig Miner, West of Wichita: Settling the High Plains of Kansas, 1865-1890 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1986); Miner, Next Year Country: Dust to Dust in Western Kansas, 1890-1940 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2006); and Miner, Harvesting the High Plains: John Kriss and the Business of Wheat 
Farming, 1920-1950 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998). Pamela Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust: 
Surviving Drought and Depression in Southwestern Kansas (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994) takes a 
similar perspective. 
17. Some other ruminations on regional studies include Brian W. Dippie, “American Wests: 
Historiographical Perspectives,” American Studies International 27, no. 2 (October 1989), 3-25; Frederick C. 
Luebke, “Regionalism and the Great Plains: Problems of Concept and Method,” The Western Historical Quarterly 
15, no. 1 (January 1984), 19-38; Rita G. Napier, “Rethinking the Past, Reimagining the Future,” Kansas History 24, 
no. 3 (September 2001), 218-247; and Allan Pred, “Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the 





history. Burton, in his 2002 presidential address to the Agricultural History Society, describes the 
rich details of ordinary lives inherent in community studies:  
One reason to study communities is to gain new knowledge of behavior, to learn 
how people lived, how they reacted to and treated others, and what their lives 
meant to them. Local studies deal with all the people in the community, all their 
ambiguities and contradictions, all their negotiations across lines of race, class, 





Burton adds that comprehensive studies serving as microcosmic portraits of American society 
“must include the culture and daily existence of elite and ordinary people. One needs to know 
about daily routines of household, work, play, church, and school.” Another function of 
community studies, however, involves situating the interactions of micro-history within 
“transregional networks” of ideas and values.
19
 The case studies offered in this dissertation fulfill 
the functions of community history Miner and Burton outline by drawing on several large 
themes: banking history; the histories of regional and national events affecting local 
communities, such as populism, progressivism, the Country Life Movement, and the Great 
Depression and New Deal; and the environmental history of the Great Plains. 
This study reinforces the idea that economic institutions were central to frontier 
development, and continues that thesis through the middle of the twentieth century. It builds 
upon the work of Allan Bogue, an historian who pioneered the use of social and economic 
history to understand the role of capital in the development of the frontier and during periods of 
                                                 
18. Orville Vernon Burton, “Reaping What We Sow: Community and Rural History,” Agricultural History 
76, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), 644. 
19. Burton, “Reaping What We Sow,” 645-46. Some of the foundational community studies include Lewis 
Atherton, Main Street on the Middle Border (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954); and John Mack 
Faragher, Sugar Creek: Life on the Illinois Prairie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). Atherton’s 
monograph is a somewhat impressionist portrait of rural communities of a general typology, based primarily on 
literary accounts. Faragher’s work is a social history intimately tied to a particular place. His methodology is useful, 
but the departures between the Illinois frontier of the early-to-mid nineteenth century and the Great Plains frontier of 
later in the century are substantial. Faragher describes an insularity and subsistence culture that was not entirely 




economic crisis. Many historians had accepted farmers’ complaints about the scarcity of credit 
and the predatory nature of bankers and other mortgage lenders at face value, or otherwise 
marginalized the role of banks within regional development.
20
 Bogue’s work, however, offers 
remarkably clear insight about the motivations of financiers in the processes of extending and 
sometimes contracting credit among farmers.
21
 He lays the groundwork for economic historians 
studying the role of finance in the settlement of the frontier and ultimately for many targeted 
studies about the role of mortgage debt in later crisis periods, such as the 1920s and 1930s.
22
 
Bogue’s study of the J.B. Watkins Land Mortgage Company of Lawrence, Kansas and other 
                                                 
20. Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901, Essays and Documents (New London, 
Conn.: Connecticut College, 1946), 25; Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle 
West, 1900-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951), 102-3, 15-17; and Fred A. Shannon, The 
Farmer’s Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1945), 185-86. One example of 
how narratives of Western development have marginalized banking history is Rodman W. Paul, The Far West and 
the Great Plains in Transition, 1859-1900, The New American Nation Series (New York: Harper & Row, 1988). 
Though this text recognizes that businessmen in cattle towns, farm communities, mining districts, and market cities 
tended to establish banks early on, it does not provide detail of how credit functioned in these industries.   
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While biographies of individuals and particular lending institutions have proliferated, 
another major component of historical scholarship on banking is a consideration of long-term 
changes in banking structure and policy throughout the nation.
24
 The best scholarship concerning 
banking in the western U.S. places economic institutions firmly at the center of the “new 
Western history”—that is, history centered on the communities and institutions behind the 
development of the frontier. Lynne Pierson Doti and Larry Schweikart’s Banking in the 
American West: From the Gold Rush to Deregulation uses a wide range of subjects, and both 
qualitative and quantitative sources, to consider themes such as bank security through a number 
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of lenses: physical bank design, anti-theft efforts, and bank regulations.
25
 A few monographs 
explore banking policies within the framework of a single state, a useful approach considering 
the uniqueness of state banking rules before the mid-twentieth century. An emphasis on powerful 
commercial banks on the West Coast and in the Southwest, however, leaves the banks of the 
interior West understudied.
26
 Two exceptions are a dissertation by economic historian Wayne D. 
Angell, “A Century of Commercial Banking in Kansas,” and Michael J. Hightower’s recently 
published monograph, Banking in Oklahoma before Statehood.
27
 
The dynamics of banking in small Great Plains communities were different than in the 
thriving mining and merchant centers of California and the Southwest, for example, and merit an 
intensive regional study. Bankers who owned or worked in financial institutions in small Great 
Plains towns were much more closely integrated with their clients in daily life and business than 
those in bigger cities. In these towns, the reputation of bankers and their ability to establish 
successful social and economic relationships with their fellow citizens were paramount in the 
maintenance of individual banks and the communities themselves. Banks on the Great Plains 
also differed from larger institutions in the Far West in their capitalization and configuration. 
Other local banks and groups of partners tended to provide capital for the small banks, and while 
they depended on urban banks for the provision of currency, usually the latter institutions did not 
control the activity or finances of local banks. Furthermore, sources such as the Kansas Bankers 
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Association Proceedings suggest that bankers from rural areas and small towns on the Great 
Plains tended to advocate for different regulatory policies than those working in more urbanized 
settings in the East and West. Kansas bankers, for example, opposed branch banking vehemently 
through the first decades of the twentieth century because it tended to agglomerate a great deal of 
capital within one controlling bank. By contrast, more industrial and urban locations in the West, 
such as California, supported branch banking and facilitated the growth of well-known national 
bank chains such as the Bank of Italy (now Bank of America).
28
 Focusing on the Great Plains 
region covers new ground in the field of Western banking history.  
Looking at the realm of banking within the U.S. West allows for a more accurate 
perspective on U.S. economic and political history writ large. Economic histories featuring the 
West have tended to focus on relationships of dependency and power between the hinterland and 
an eastern metropole or gateway city such as Chicago.
29
 Manuscript records do draw connections 
between banks in rural western Kansas and capitalists in New England and the Midwest. These 
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records make it clear, however, that over time the flow of capital became more of an exchange of 
funds, rather than a one-way transfer. Furthermore, various levels of hierarchical relationships 
developed among Western banks themselves. Thus, banking did not simply confirm common 
depictions of unequal power relations between a dependent West and a dominant East. Beyond 
shedding light on the complexities of financial networks among regional and national banking 
institutions, this dissertation emphasizes the centrality of local people within economic history. It 
adds to understandings about negotiations of power specifically among bankers and their 
surrounding communities, and considers bankers as members of a class of business people 
exercising the functions of economic, social, and political power. Excellent models for 
understanding the roles of such actors within community development include Alan Taylor’s 
William Cooper’s Town and Sven Beckert’s Monied Metropolis.
30
  
This dissertation demonstrates some of the unique aspects of banking in rural 
communities of the Great Plains. Broadening the scope of inquiry to include country bankers’ 
interests in social and political issues suggests that their stories shared important characteristics 
with the narratives of rural Americans throughout the nation. Social and cultural values 
transcended different regions, uniting country bankers in western Kansas with the largely white, 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant classes of elite Americans in their affinities for social clubs and 
paternalistic community leadership. The lives and businesses of country bankers intersected with 
the dominant movements of their era, including populism, progressive politics, the Country Life 
Movement, nationalism inspired by World War I, and the New Deal. 
Populist rhetoric against bankers, found in political memoirs, pamphlets distributed to 
Farmers’ Alliance and People’s Party constituents, and even in elements of popular culture such 
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as dime novels and Western films inspire questions about whether these antagonistic portrayals 
truly fit the characteristics of Great Plains bankers. This study incorporates sources which 
illuminate the anti-banker sentiments of popular culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, particularly memoirs, fiction, and political tracts. My sources suggest, however, that 
bankers were not always opposed to the causes of the populists; Berryman, for instance, joined 
his community in opposing the railroads. Country bankers’ affiliation with the platforms of 
progressivism and the Country Life Movement—which often followed directly upon the earlier 
proposals of populist farmers—further demonstrated the unity of their interests with rural 
reformers, even with populist radicals who were sometimes the most vocal in decrying bankers.
31
 
Interpretations of the content, leadership, and limits of progressivism have varied widely, 
proving unable to definitively untangle diverse strands of moral and institutional “reforms.” It 
was both a businessman’s movement and a movement upholding the longtime demands of 
farmers and laborers to correct the economic maladjustments of the modern era. The movement 
represented the culmination of decades of domestic and transnational demands for government 
reform, and resulted in the increased study of American society as well as a growth of 
government bureaucracies intended to correct some of the nation’s ills.
32
 A few characteristics of 
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Kansas’s brand of progressivism, especially as embraced by country bankers, deserve further 
definition. First, moral issues often took precedence over the urban, industrial platforms of the 
national movement. Kansas was a frontrunner in causes such as prohibition, and this, combined 
with its reputation as the “free state,” led its politicians to consider the state highly progressive. 
Second, the rural-oriented platforms of the People’s Party influenced progressivism in Kansas. 
During the early years of the twentieth century, the state legislature revisited and adopted several 
key issues of the populist platform, including reforms to reduce the influence of railroads on 
politics and increase the political power of the people. Later on, politicians even considered land-
distribution schemes as a means of improving the balance between family farms and large 
estates. In this sense, reform-minded Kansans did represent the spirit of progressivism as it 
entailed redressing the dangers of industrial or corporatized society upon the body politic. Third, 
Kansas politicians showed interest in the scientific or managerial elements of the progressive 
agenda in better organizing the state’s bureaucracy, expanding its regulatory powers, and 
ultimately alleviating some of the growing pains of a society both agrarian and industrial. 
Finally, although the timing and focus of Kansas’s reform efforts sometimes varied from other 
states, the ascendance of many professionals, including bankers, into positions within the state 
government signaled strong correlations with the national movement.
33
 Country bankers 
                                                                                                                                                             
within which Kansans viewed it, and to offer it some legitimacy as a valid representation of the political goals of this 
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expressed similar commitments to the progressive mindset, despite differences in political 
affiliations and social ideas, and this commitment drove their efforts of community development. 
The Country Life Movement was an outgrowth of progressivism that affected the 
agendas of country bankers and their communities particularly strongly. Capitalizing on the 
mission to study and present bureaucratic solutions to common problems of American life, 
Theodore Roosevelt organized a Country Life Commission in 1908. Headed by L.H. Bailey of 
the Cornell Agricultural College, the commission instigated a flurry of activity, including 
legislative attempts to further organize extension work and improve rural credit, conferences on 
country life, and voluntary movements outside of government.
34
 Some reformers were motivated 
by nostalgia for the rural life of bygone days, or by the need to ensure food production for 
growing urban populations.
35
 But more importantly, the Country Life Commission’s vision also 
created a new drive for conservation and ecological sustainability. As Scott J. Peters and Paul A. 
Morgan remark, its members encapsulated the “emerging ecological sensitivity and a particular 
variant of Progressive Era reform devoted to the pursuit and realization of key American civic 
and economic ideals in an increasingly scientific, urban, and industrial age.” The Commission’s 
goal was thus twofold: “to meet material demands to ‘feed the hungry nations,’ while also 
meeting ecological demands to restore, protect, and even improve the fertility of the soil.”
36
  
Reformers and land use planners adapted the ideal of scientific management of 
agriculture in order to conserve land quality, modernize farming methods, revitalize the social 
community of the countryside, and generally make it easier for producers to remain on the land. 
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In practice, however, scientific management practices often led to industrialization and 
consolidation of farms, owned by fewer individuals or corporations and farmed by tenants or 
managers.
37
 Tenancy did not suit the democratic vision of agrarianism the Country Life 
Commission supported, so although its increase was one unintended consequence of agricultural 
and rural development schemes, reformers filled the pages of trade journals and farm newspapers 
alike with ideas to redress the problem.
38
 Country bankers were among those who sought to 
partner with farmers to make changes to the rural landscape and society, and to preserve the 
agrarian way of life upon which their communities relied. 
A periodical dedicated to farm solutions, published and distributed nationwide by the 
agricultural committee of the American Bankers Association (ABA), served as the figurehead for 
what contemporaries called the “banker-farmer” movement. B.F. Harris, the scion of a family of 
banker-farmers from Champaign County, Illinois, was among the first to envision the movement 
and develop it beyond the mere discussion of rural life issues in the occasional association 
meeting. As chairman of the agricultural committee of the ABA, Harris began publishing The 
Banker-Farmer as a monthly periodical in 1913. The Illinoisan wished to provide a forum not 
just for more conversation, but also for reporting about bankers actually working to support 
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agricultural development around the country.
39
 He propounded the idea of the good citizen 
banker, not just pursuing the dollar but also the public good. Given the keen economic interests 
country bankers held in agricultural production, such sentiments might have struck some 
contemporaries as disingenuous.
40
 Yet Harris’s conception of altruism did not recognize any 
problem in business leaders promoting agricultural and rural life reform and in fact encouraged 
these activities. Echoing attitudes common among progressive reformers, he considered business 
professionals uniquely suited to leadership in the rural life movement for social and structural 
change. Harris remarked in an editorial:  
Good government, like any other serviceable and practical institution, is a matter 
of good business and business methods. Business men, with a vision broadened 
and heart warmed by the public interest, must shape, direct and dominate, if we 




Countless country bankers embraced this vision of themselves and of the changes they could 
promulgate as community leaders.  
Over the course of its publication between 1913 and 1927, the Banker-Farmer supported 
efforts to modernize rural life through such methods as infrastructural development and home 
and farm improvements. Its pages also supported changes to farm credit structures that would 
allow more tenant farmers to purchase land, though its contributors did not always agree on the 
method for delivering expanded credit to farmers.
42
 Commenting on the many legal changes in 
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the national banking structure, such as the formation of the Federal Reserve Banks in 1913 and 
the Federal Land Banks in 1916, the magazine served as an effective medium of debate for more 
than 20,000 country bankers in the U.S., as well as their farmer clients.
43
 Comments from other 
publishers, from local and regional newspapers to large circulation magazines such as The 
Economist and The Financial Age, and even from a few farmers, indicate a wide circulation and 
acceptance among other groups of business professionals.
44
 
Economic interests, altruism, and indeed a general desire to redeem an unpopular public 
image, all underlined bankers’ activism in the country life movement. As one early contributor to 
The Banker-Farmer argued, the banker’s understanding of community needs and extension of 
his service “beyond the confines of the bank—out through the community and its general 
welfare” in a spirit of “active citizenship” that would help redeem the “misunderstood” 
reputation of the occupation.
45
 The rhetoric surrounding bankers’ involvement in the reform 
movement took on tones as spirited in their positivity toward the businessmen as the popular 
literature was in its vitriol. Popular accounts of the era, rife with anti-banker rhetoric, 
overshadowed strong evidence of bankers’ community-mindedness where agriculture was 
concerned. 
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Bankers’ interests in progressive and country life reforms—economic, political, and 
social—also influenced their functions within Great Plains communities. Integration with a 
broader community of bankers through state and national banking associations and through 
publications such as the Banker-Farmer exposed country bankers in western Kansas to national 
concerns. The banking associations helped to organize members not only for country life 
programs, but also for patriotic efforts during the First World War and for debates over political 
responses to ongoing malfunctions within rural banking—such as low reserve rates and a lack of 
effective deposit protection in state banks—which eventually caused high rates of foreclosure 
and bank failure in the 1920s and 1930s. Bankers formed a strong interest group within state and 
national politics, while exercising immediate influence over the economic, political, and social 
directions of their local communities. The values of bankers and rural communities transcended 
the local setting, and so this study of the Great Plains is representative of the issues all rural 
Americans were facing after the turn of the twentieth century. 
The regional setting is nonetheless significant, and not only because country bankers in 
the nation’s interior created specific parameters for the practice of their profession. The 
agricultural and environmental circumstances of the Great Plains also produced a particular form 
of economy and regionally specific challenges during such tumultuous periods as the 1920s and 
1930s. Craig Miner, once again, helps make the case for pursuing regional history encompassing 
Kansas counties “West of Wichita,” or the 98
th
 meridian. He acknowledges that Euro-American 
settler societies throughout the West brought with them the baggage of culture, technology, and 
resources. Certainly, extra-regional social and political influences have become apparent. 
Examining the influential features of regional environments and cultures, however, helps combat 






 On the Great Plains, economic trials caused by environmental factors produced a 
distinct experience. Environmental history, thus, dovetails with the study of Great Plains history 
in important ways. The environment is an essential feature of my study; because agriculture and 
ranching formed the centerpiece of local economies, the forces of nature could easily influence a 
community’s historical path. Settlers and bankers on the Central Great Plains encountered unique 
topographies and climates that affected the crops, machines, and capitalization needed in their 
specific locations, but the sub-region’s dependence on agriculture and its general aridity unify 
it.
47
 Studies of humanity’s efforts to adapt and survive on this landscape, especially during the 




Chapter Outline: Cultivating the Lending Tree 
The influences of the intra-regional environment and agricultural economy, as well as of 
trans-regional economic, political, and social values, are evident within the chapters that follow. 
Using a metaphor of the community bank as a “tree,” I present bankers as the “cultivators” of 
several specific forms of capital: financial, political, and social. One point of analysis concerns 
the role of finance within the lives of rural people. The first chapter describes the credit building 
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functions of bankers’ work within their communities. It considers bankers’ development of 
financial connections with eastern institutions and regional banking networks—the “roots” of the 
community’s financial development. The analysis draws upon the memoirs of bankers 
transplanted from the eastern U.S. and those who rose up from the class of merchants to become 
money-lenders on the Kansas frontier in the 1870s and 1880s. Bank advertisements represent the 
ways banks forged connections with local communities by building on the reputations of strong 
financial backers and bankers of sound character.  
 The dissertation also addresses the broader political and social values at stake within 
rural communities, especially as mediated by country bankers’ brokerage of power as elected 
officials and civic leaders. The second chapter details the ways bankers sought to create and 
preserve laws beneficial to the continued growth of their banks and communities. Such laws 
provided “fertile ground” for community development. Using Jerome W. Berryman as a key 
subject alongside news reports on legislative affairs, it represents the ways bankers transformed 
economic power into political capital. The third chapter concerns the ways bankers and their 
families carefully preserved a “canopy” of social and moral values within their communities. 
Manuscript records, as well as newspapers from such towns as Concordia and Pratt, Kansas, 
illustrate these business leaders’ interests in issues such as temperance, suffrage, patriotism, and 
“100% Americanism.” 
The final two chapters link finance to the agricultural development of western Kansas 
and interrogate the ways bankers established a foundation for the continued stability of the 
regional economy, despite strong economic and environmental trials during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Chapter four highlights the decisions bankers made about extending “branches” of credit on their 




bank within a downwardly spiraling financial system. The records of the Farmers National Bank 
of Oberlin, Kansas detail the roles played by bank directors in making lending policies. Letters 
between Colby banker W.D. Ferguson and his wealthy client and business partner offer an 
intimate perspective on the individualized relationships of credit on the Great Plains, which had a 
material impact not only on the survival of the bank, but of the region’s agricultural economy. 
Chapter five positions Albert A. Doerr, a merchant and bank director from Larned, 
Kansas, as a landlord within a system where banker-landowners became “stewards” for a system 
of farming that sustained the community livelihood into the modern era. It interrogates the deeds 
for Doerr’s land purchases during the 1920s together with correspondence with the tenants who 
farmed his land, and uses agricultural production records to trace the origins of a farming system 
still supporting rural Great Plains communities today despite the continually challenging 
environment. The dissertation thus extends its focus to the role of the Great Plains environment 
within country bankers’ efforts to uphold the agricultural economy upon which their 
communities relied. An arid and cyclically droughty climate supported particular forms of 
agriculture—namely wheat and cattle raising—and fostered gradual trends toward mechanization 
and consolidation of farms. 
As is clear in the consideration of bankers’ financial, political, and social roles within 
their communities, those who participated in the agricultural economy of the region had a strong 
stake in regional sustainability and served vital functions in maintaining the prosperity of the 
Great Plains. The stories of individual bankers, woven together with data representing the 
broader class of lenders they represented, present a narrative of rural banking rather unlike what 
literary representations would have us understand—and I argue that this evidence more closely 




uncompromising, disinterested, greedy, or predatory, country bankers instead represented a 
complex mix of economic, social, and political interests. Understanding their values within the 
context of rural America leads me to conclude that bankers shared the interests of farmers and 
other rural businesspeople. They faced together the challenges of growth and retraction within 
the credit structure and agricultural economy, as well as the social and political changes 
attendant with modernization, rural-to-urban migration, and the increasing role of the nation 
within the lives of ordinary Americans. The story of country bankers like Berryman is one worth 
reclaiming—not only for understanding the history of the Great Plains, but also for adding to 
historians’ understanding of the complex social and economic patterns that have altered the 
course of U.S. history. 
26 
 
Chapter One. The Roots of Credit: The Development of Frontier Banks and 
Their Communities 
 
The market orientation of settlers who sought to leverage their property into credit for 
purchasing seed, equipment, and more land necessitated a strong field for credit as the frontier 
opened in western Kansas. Between 1886 and 1890, a period when the towns and counties of 
Kansas’s westernmost tier developed, settlers mortgaged their lands at a rate higher than any 
other state in the Union: from 60.3 to 72.7 percent of all farm lands in the state were mortgaged.
1
 
In spite of the frontier mythology of the individualist homesteader carving out the Western 
empire, economic institutions were central to regional development. Bankers’ power within this 
process served as a foundation for their extensive influence within rural communities.  
Capital from the eastern U.S. was never absent from the “frontier.” Representing the 
earliest established “roots” of the regional financial system, eastern institutions supplied much of 
the credit for the early financial boom in western Kansas. Many investors bought mortgage 
bonds from trust companies operating in the West, while others sent agents to survey credit 
needs and establish commercial banks on the frontier. As small towns developed in western 
Kansas, however, local capital gradually began to supplant some of the influence of eastern 
financiers. Merchants, farmers and ranchers, and other professionals built on their experiences in 
the developing western economy to establish new banks. They and their cohort of regional 
bankers—in small towns and cities—formed additional “roots” which tied together the national 
financial system. The growth of a local class of bankers signaled the development of a more 
stable regional economy. Although western banks remained linked to eastern financial networks, 
they became somewhat less dependent upon the East for expertise and capital. Country bankers, 
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including the first generation of eastern capitalists and the later generations of local financiers 
operating within communities of less than 5,000 population, wielded substantial power over the 
local economy as well as considerable influence upon the political and social lives of developing 
towns.  
Residents of rural America would have been familiar with the type of banker who 
established channels for bringing capital into town, and whose opinions on his fellow citizens’ 
credit worthiness could make or break a business or farm. Bankers’ economic power, many 
concluded, often made their place within local society and within the national mythology of 
frontier development rather uncomfortable. No commentator captured the unease Americans felt 
about the country banker quite like the novelist Sinclair Lewis. His novel Main Street (1920) 
offered a candid portrait of the economic, political, and social life of small-town America. The 
banker was an influential player in the town. Lewis described him:  
Ezra Stowbody was a troglodyte. He had come to Gopher Prairie in 1865. He was 
a distinguished bird of prey—swooping thin nose, turtle mouth, thick brows, port-
wine cheeks, floss of white hair, contemptuous eyes. He was not happy in the 
social changes of thirty years . . . nobody was impressed in this rotten age of 
automobiles by the ‘spanking grays’ which Ezra still drove. The town was as 
heterogeneous as Chicago. Norwegians and Germans owned stores. The social 
leaders were common merchants. Selling nails was considered as sacred as 
banking . . . But his brick house with the mansard roof was still the largest 
residence in town, and he held his position as squire by occasionally appearing 
among the younger men and reminding them by a wintry eye that without the 




The elderly, conservative banker became something of a trope for Lewis, whose next novel, 
Babbitt, included a similar figure.
3
 George Babbitt stood in utter awe of William W. Eathorne, 
and upon visiting the banker’s stately old mansion, he marveled, “That little fuzzy-face there, 
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why, he could make me or break me! If he told my banker to call my loans—! Gosh!”
4
 The 
reading public of the 1920s could be excused for stereotyping local bankers as old, conservative, 
aloof, and yet powerful entities within a community.  
 Further characterization of the financial elite as a whole hit even closer to the mark for 
many readers. The “aristocracy” of Gopher Prairie, the setting of Main Street, included “all 
persons engaged in a profession, or earning more than twenty-five hundred dollars a year, or 
possessed of grandparents born in America.”
5
 Yet those with the most considerable power were 
Stowbody; Jackson Elder, the mill owner and town hotelier who owned “quite a share in the 
Farmers’ National Bank”; and Luke Dawson, “the richest man in town” as well as a “lender of 
money on mortgages, [and] owner of Northern cutover land.”
6
 A wide chasm existed between 
these elites and the farmers of the surrounding community. Carol Kennicott, the novel’s naïve 
and idealistic protagonist, overheard a farmer complaining:  
Stowbody and Dawson foreclose every mortgage they can, and put in tenant 
farmers . . . the lawyers sting us, the machinery-dealers hate to carry us over bad 
years, and then their daughters put on swell dresses and look at us as if we were a 




Meanwhile, the townspeople expressed decidedly unsympathetic views on the farmers. At a 
women’s social event, Ella Stowbody, the banker’s unmarried daughter, commented:  
There isn’t any real poverty here. . . . Papa says these folks are fakers. Especially 
all these tenant farmers that pretend they have so much trouble getting seed and 
machinery. Papa says they simply won’t pay their debts. He says he’s sure he 




The other banker in town, appropriately named “Gougerling,” cemented the image of the 
uncaring and powerful town elites. No amount of sympathy from Carol, who suspected that the 
                                                 
4. Lewis, Babbit, 175. 
5. Lewis, Main Street, 74.  
6. Ibid., 42-43.  
7. Ibid., 229. 




town actually depended upon the farmers as “parasites” upon their productive wealth, could 
convince her husband or anyone else of the true merits of the farming class. Dr. Kennicott 
merely scoffed, “Parasites? Us? Where’d the farmers be without the town? Who lends them 
money? Who—why, we supply them with everything!”
9
  
Although Lewis’s depictions of country bankers mirrored the common stereotypes of 
popular culture, the historical record suggests that bankers’ roles within their communities were 
most often developmental rather than destructive or parasitical. In order to demonstrate this 
feature of rural banking, this chapter examines the relationships newly established banks in 
western Kansas maintained with investors in the eastern U.S. and in Midwestern cities such as 
Chicago, Kansas City, and Wichita. While investors enjoyed the ability to profit from the credit 
needs of settlers trying to increase their stake in the capitalist economy through continual 
expansion, local communities benefited from the successful management of these financial 
networks. As local institutions and the communities around them matured, strong financial roots 
continued to connect banks to their supporting institutions in the East, while other roots spread 
across the region to banks in other communities. Ties with other banks ultimately became 
profitable for all parties, so although western bankers never gave up their connections with larger 
financial institutions, they gained a surer role in the management of their own financial 
institutions and of the regional economy.  
The administration of banks involved providing physical and fiscal security for 
operations and, most importantly, attracting depositors and borrowers. In the early years of 
development, conditions such as isolation, lack of infrastructure, competition between banks 
operating under different rules, and the variable market for farm mortgages created problems of 
physical insecurity and financial instability for new banks. Connections with financial investors 
                                                 




who sent both money and banking expertise to the developing communities of the West allowed 
rural banks to navigate such challenges. Country bankers developed creative solutions to security 
threats and, over time, the construction of up-to-date banking facilities helped them to 
demonstrate their institutions’ structural and financial soundness. As security matters became 
less pressing, competition among banks for customers and their deposits led them to participate 
in the growing field of advertising. The medium of the local newspaper offered a primary way 
for bankers to attract new clients and establish financial relationships with the community. 
Exploring the relationships of bankers with other capitalists in national and regional 
capital networks, as well as the ways they used these financial roots to establish credit 
opportunities for community development, uncovers an important narrative within the history of 
American capitalism. The motivations of banks and bankers within the largely agricultural 
economy of western Kansas deserve further exploration, which I believe will ensure that the 
rural financial class does not remain mired in the tropes of literature. I argue that country bankers 
worked with the community’s broader economic interests to attract capital investment from 
throughout the nation, create growth in their own institutions and within the regional banking 
structure, and develop a sound basis for the prosperity of their region. This process earned 
successful bankers the respect of their communities and the continued business of local residents. 
Thus, it granted them a preeminent position within the economic power structure of the rural 
West.    
 “The Web of American Finance” Reaches Western Kansas 
The settlement of western Kansas in the 1870s and 1880s benefited from the 
development of a national banking system during the Civil War. The state followed the patterns 




When investors moved into banking in Kansas, they could either choose to charter national 
banks with $50,000 in capital, or pay much less capital (usually around $10,000) to charter a 
state bank. State banking was less regulated than the national system, but still operated within the 
newly developed “pyramid” system of banking that established what economic historian Howard 
Bodenhorn called “the web of American finance.”
10
 Risks were inherent in the process of 
developing new banks, but investors could also make substantial profits. Ultimately, banks 
formed the backbone of regional development as they supported ranchers and farmers, 
merchants, and town companies in their quest to stabilize the frontier. Finance was an essential 
component of the community-building process. 
Frederick J. Atwood, a New England banker who moved to Concordia, Kansas in 1878, 
offers an unusually rich portrait of how frontier banks were established in his memoirs, and his 
later experiences in establishing banks in several Kansas towns demonstrate the functions of the 
pyramid system linking the finances of banks of all sizes and locations in the nation. Atwood’s 
upbringing illustrated some common ways of entering banking as a profession, and showed that 
it was a desirable field for a young man wishing to move up in the world. Atwood grew up in 
central Vermont in a middle-class household that inculcated the value of hard work but also 
allowed him the means to attain some higher education. He attended a normal school (a college 
designed to train teachers) and spent several months at the Troy Business College.
11
 Having 
concluded his education, Atwood set out to find a job, “Something that would satisfy my thirst 
for knowledge and my desire for financial independence.” In July 1876 a cousin offered him a 
job in the First National Bank of Brandon, Vermont. The job, paying five dollars per week, 
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consisted of “a conglomerate of heterogeneous duties ranging from janitor to assistant cashier,” 
and provided Atwood the chance to move up in his social and economic status. He noted about 
his new living circumstances, “I found a high-class boarding house in an equally high-class 
neighborhood and paid four of my five dollars for bed and board.” He added, parenthetically, “I 
deemed it essential that my environment harmonize with my aspirations!”
12
  
 As Atwood learned the banking trade, he observed those around him, and the qualities of 
the bank officers and directors made particularly strong impressions. His portrait of the bank 
president, Mr. Sprague, demonstrated the diversity of bankers’ professional interests, as well as 
the economic and political rivalries of country bankers and other local professionals. Besides 
serving as bank president, Sprague was president of a local manufacturing plant and the owner of 
several experimental farms. His social situation confirmed some of the characterizations of local 
bankers about which Sinclair Lewis would later write. Sprague lived in the finest neighborhood 
among the wealthiest citizens of the town, but political rivalries meant that he did not associate 
with many of them and took every opportunity to “accost” and “irritate” the other bankers.
13
 
Sprague nonetheless “sought local popularity” as he “aspired to political honors.” The bank 
president largely abstained from the “routine work of the bank” and treated the “bank’s directors’ 
room as his private office” for his political purposes. Atwood added, “Because he was rich and 
politically ambitious, and perhaps for other reasons, he had both friends and enemies. He was 
conceited and arrogant but with all that he had fine qualities that were not always recognized as 
they should have been.”
14
 The banker’s character was complex, and offered Atwood an early 
perspective on how bankers should and should not function within their communities. He 
disliked the impact of Sprague’s political feud on the Brandon community, but did admire the 
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wealth and aspirations of the bank president. Sprague, and later Atwood, showed how the 
financially powerful nurtured relationships with many community members and often 
successfully parlayed their success into other avenues of political power.  
 Atwood also recalled what two of the First National Bank’s directors taught him about 
the benefits of active and broad-reaching investment. These men, T.B. Smith and S.W. Harrison, 
“were wealthy and loaned to their neighbors as opportunity offered-but the demand was not 
equal to the supply and so they had too much idle money.”
15
 Atwood noted that the two banks in 
Brandon “were over capitalized. The First National had a capital of $100,000 and a surplus of 
$150,000; The Brandon National a capital of $200,000 and a surplus of $50,000, thus making the 
working capital of each a quarter of a million.”
16
 These figures were well above the $50,000 
capitalization requirement for national banks in towns of this size, about 3,500 people in the 
1870s. This abundance of capital relative to the needs of the Vermont community opened up a 
search for new opportunities to invest in western banks. Smith and Harrison “had heard of the 
high rates of interest ‘out west’ where the country was being settled rapidly and the rich virgin 
soil was being put under plow.” The directors’ agricultural backgrounds and Harrison’s family 
connections aided in the decision to pursue prospects in Concordia, a farming community in 
north-central Kansas. Upon visiting the town, Harrison found that a young cousin had been 
loaning his income earned as a lawyer at three percent per month, but wanted to start a bank with 
ample investment to meet the needs of more potential borrowers. Harrison put the proposition up 
to his friend T.B. Smith. Atwood described the decision-making process: “Mr. Smith was 
conservative; it looked like a gold mine but he must see it with his own eyes. He, too, went west 
and to Concordia.” Smith discovered they could obtain “3% per month on short time paper and 
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12% per annum on first mortgage farm loans, with a cash commission of 12% which would 
accrue to the bank for obtaining the funds. It appeared to be all that Mr. Harrison had pictured.”
17
 
Thus, two Vermont bank directors decided to set up a bank in Concordia with Harrison’s cousin, 
C.W. McDonald, as cashier—the bank’s chief operating officer. Atwood, meanwhile, was 
appointed assistant cashier with a salary of $800 per year, nearly double what he had been 
earning in Brandon. S.W. Harrison suddenly passed away right as the charter for the Cloud 
County Bank of Concordia was obtained on December 20, 1878, but his son, Henry C. Harrison, 
assumed the presidency of the new bank’s board of directors. Another Harrison relative, R.J. 
Harper, who lived in Riley County, Kansas and served as a probate judge there, joined the 
operation as Vice President.
18
 The new bank showed how eastern investors could capitalize upon 
the profit potential of the frontier while establishing lasting institutions to aid in developing a 
prosperous community. The diversity of background among the various parties also represented 
a key fact about country bankers in developing towns: many joined the profession as a way of 
investing profits from farming or ranching, as a continuation of the land abstracting or notary 
services they might provide as country lawyers or real estate salesmen, and especially as an 
outgrowth of lending credit through mercantile businesses.
19
  
 The banking venture in Concordia, which would remain in the community until a merger 
in 1992, was only the beginning of the Harrison family’s investments in the Kansas banking 
scene. Although H. C. Harrison continued to make his home in Vermont, he sought further 
investment opportunities as settlement expanded westward through Kansas in the following 
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years. He learned about the prospects for loans and deposits in Great Bend, Kansas from a local 
resident named A.H. Adkison. Adkison was a railroad land agent, farmer, and rancher with prior 
experience in banking, so his outlook on the matter would have been valuable.
20
 In a letter to 
Harrison on November 18, 1881, Adkison wrote at length about the potential for successful stock 
raising in the area, as well as the loan-making opportunities concerning that business:  
Money can be loaned here on Chattle [sic] Mortgage very readily. It would 
require care in doing so, but I am satisfied a considerable sum could be placed 
safely and at satisfactory rates. A better class of loans however could be made to 
farmers and stock men for the purpose of investing in stock raising. Security 
could be had on land as well as on the stock, and their increase. Of course they 
could not afford to pay so large a percent for that purpose, as might be realized in 
certain other cases, but a large amount could be safely let out in that way at 12 to 




Loans on chattel goods (often animals themselves, as well as equipment), and even safer loans 
with land as collateral, would bring a highly profitable rate of return owing to the scarcity of 
money in the region. As Adkison added about the town’s existing financial institution, “The bank 
and what few individuals who have a little money for that purpose [were] entirely inadequate to 
supply the demand.”
22
 For a land agent, the prospect of attracting further avenues of credit for 
potential buyers would have been of great interest. 
Beyond the loan investment opportunities presenting themselves in Great Bend, the area 
seemed ripe for the chartering of another bank. Adkison wrote to Harrison, “I believe that a very 
fair line of commercial deposits could be worked up and that by paying especial attention to the 
stock interests the concern would in a year or two have a nice balance of country deposits.”
23
 
Although Harrison easily could have invested in one of the mortgage companies beginning to do 
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business in the area, he maximized his financial strength and experience in Kansas to open 
another full-service bank. Though mortgage companies such as the J.B. Watkins Land Mortgage 
Company of Lawrence, Kansas might advertise to investors in the eastern U.S. that its position 
close to the field allowed them to keep a close watch on borrowers, Harrison did not have to rely 
on another company to place his investments. He already had an extensive link to Kansas that 
permitted him to take on his own deposit and lending operations. Though Harrison’s banks in 
Kansas would continue to rely on the capital from his home state of Vermont, his decision to 
establish local banks represented, to a small degree, the beginning of more localized institutional 
development. The financial scene in western Kansas was becoming increasingly complex. 
Farmers now had local options for obtaining credit—from bankers who lived in their 
communities and risked their own capital more directly than did the mortgage companies pooling 




 After receiving a few more reports on Great Bend’s suitability for a bank, including its 
strong prospects for a railroad and the great need for money in the area, Harrison proceeded to 
set up a new institution.
25
 He appointed J.F. Rogers, formerly an assistant cashier at the Cloud 
County Bank of Concordia, as the cashier and on-the-ground operator of the new bank. In late 
December 1881, Rogers began the task of chartering the Barton County Bank in Great Bend, 
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securing an office for the bank, and establishing correspondent relationships with banks in New 
York and Kansas City. Networking with these city banks was important because they could 
provide capital for the Barton County Bank when needed, on the basis of the country bank’s 
periodic deposits of cash reserves in the city banks. The cashier did his research on the interest 
payments different city banks would provide based on certain deposit balances, and noted:  
The 1
st
 Natl N.Y. & Merchants Natl. Kansas City are the correspondents I would 
have suggested as both are I believe substantial. NY allows 2 ½% on daily 
balances. Merchants only allow 2% on all over $1000, nothing on first $1000, but 




In addition to offering interest to country banks for the favor of using their reserve funds as the 
basis of their own lending, these banks also served a central banking function in that they could 
provide currency when a country bank ran low on cash reserves.
27
 These connections through 
capital exchanges linked rural communities directly with eastern financial centers. Country 
banks, both state and nationally chartered, would continue to rely on larger city banks for the 
support of their credit operations.  
 Rogers reported positively about the bank’s prospects in letters to Harrison. The young 
cashier wrote to Harrison in December 1881, “I find the native banker here is not very well liked 
& am sure that just dealing will bring us a good share of the business.”
28
 He commented the 
following February that offering loans on farmland near Great Bend was just as feasible as near 
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Concordia, and suggested that they do so at an interest rate just below the highest rate offered by 
mortgage companies. Offering a rate lower than the seven percent (plus commission) charged by 
these companies would allow them to “compete successfully with other agencies here & add 
very materially to the earnings of the bank.”
29
  
Despite the strong initial groundwork in setting up the bank in Great Bend, it was 
difficult to keep banks operating competitively in the young towns of western Kansas. The 
Barton County Bank struggled over the next few years to maintain an acceptable profit margin in 
a town of only about 1,100 residents, despite the fact that it would more than double in 
population over the 1880s. George H. Young, an assistant cashier sent out from Vermont to 
assist Rogers, adopted a gloomier outlook about conditions in Great Bend than the cashier. 
Within only a month after his arrival to that town in January of 1882, Young wrote to Harrison in 
Vermont about the dismal state of Kansas banks, and of the railroad’s declining interest in 
Barton County. He also noted several times that the bank would have to lower its monthly 
interest rates on short-term loans from three percent to two and a half percent in order to be 
competitive.
30
 Young commented, “The other bankers have come down on their notes to the 
soundest of their customers (merchants). They make their note read 3% and then say here if you 
will keep [quiet] about it we won’t charge you so much.”
31
 To deal with this policy, the Barton 
County Bank would have to turn around and offer lower rates to borrowers. As Young explained 
it, the bank needed to establish relationships with borrowers, build its reputation for safety, and 
maintain even rates with its competitors in order to succeed. He commented, “It seems to me that 
we have first to get the confidence of the people by doing business safely and then keep our 
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notes about the same as the others and in this way gradually work up a [lot] of business.” 
Gaining solid inroads with potential borrowers was more important, however, than cooperating 
with other banks on rates, because as Young concluded, “Their word don’t amount to sticks.
32
 
Interest rate competition, then, constituted the first challenge of successfully operating a 
new bank in a young country town. Even the optimistic J.F. Rogers admitted a pair of other 
issues impeded the bank’s success. First, the reputation of banks in general tended to suffer when 
banks in surrounding towns failed. Rogers noted that a bank failure in nearby Larned, Kansas, 
for example, “Will probably effect [sic] our deposits for some time to come.”
33
 Second, it 
remained difficult for small country banks to get their hands on sufficient money despite their 
relationships with larger banks in regional and national “reserve” cities. As Rogers complained 
to Harrison, the Barton County Bank had been having trouble receiving drafts from their New 
York exchange bank.
34
 Given these difficulties, the investment in the Great Bend bank began to 
seem less worthwhile to the Vermont investor. Just as he had pulled stock out of the Concordia 
bank in 1881, Harrison decided to sell out his interests in the Barton County Bank in 1885.
35
 For 
this non-resident bank executive, already wealthy and established in Vermont, exploiting high 
interest rates in the early years of banking in western Kansas proved too much of a risk.
36
 
Bankers with stakes rooted locally in the growth of enterprise in Kansas would soon take over 
the major roles in Kansas banks.   
 Some of the investors who stuck it out in Kansas for the long term did come from the 
East, but had already established residence in the state. Vermont, although not the only state with 
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keen young entrepreneurs, sent a substantial number of agents to examine prospects in western 
Kansas due to a stagnant economy at home and high earnings potential for capital in the West.
37
 
Some of the more successful ventures, such as the Cloud County Bank, sent agents to establish 
banks in other regions. Although the Great Bend venture was a separate institution, another bank 
in Kirwin, Kansas had direct financial ties with the Cloud County Bank. The bank in Kirwin, 
founded in 1884, hired personnel from the Concordia bank, including cashiers from Vermont 
who had first gained experience in the Cloud County Bank.
38
 While not technically a “branch” 
bank, this financial institution shared stockholders and directors with the older bank, and the new 
bank would have held deposits in the larger one in function of a correspondent bank. This 
practice provided both institutions stability and the means to develop new lines of credit.  
Furthermore, investors from Brandon, Vermont, were not the only Vermonters to take 
stock in Kansas banks. Theo. Ackerman recalled, for instance, that Vermonter Edwin Copeland 
was a party to the opening of the first bank in Russell, Kansas. Copeland and Ackerman had 
been operating and expanding a mercantile interest in Russell, a town founded along the Kansas 
Pacific Railroad in 1871. As did many successful merchants in the early days of banking, they 
decided to open a bank as well. They sought the counsel of a group of bankers in the nearby 
town of Ellsworth, who assured the entrepreneurs “that such an institution would be of great 
convenience to the people of the County, and promised to be a source of profit to its 
promoters.”
39
 As had been the case in Concordia and Great Bend, the prospects of the town of 
Russell were important in determining whether to open a bank. To Ackerman and Copeland, 
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their previous success as merchants there undoubtedly influenced their decision. The fact that 
Russell was the county seat and the largest town in the county, with connections to a large region 
“south of the Solomon River on the north, and for thirty or more miles to the south,” suggested 




 The gamble proved worthwhile. Owing to Kansas’s lack of banking laws, Ackerman and 
Copeland were able to establish a bank in their store building on July 19, 1877, with capital of 
only $2,000.
41
 The Russell Bank grew to such an extent that the owners sold the mercantile 
business within a year and increased the bank capital to $20,000. They built a new bank across 
the street by 1879, and within a few years reached $50,000 in capitalization. By 1889 the bank 
operated with loans and deposits over $100,000.
42
 This growth owed to a combination of factors, 
including the original investors’ decision to sell out their other business and concentrate all of 
their capital on the bank, profits from high-interest farm loans converted into capital, and 
probably outside investment from wealthy stockholders.  
 It should be noted that New England investors and correspondence relationships with 
banks in prominent cities like New York were not the only sources of capital and connections for 
those wishing to establish banks on the western frontier in the late nineteenth century. Jerome W. 
Berryman’s efforts to establish a small bank in Pond Creek, Oklahoma underscored how 
important family and intra-regional financial networks could be in supporting such operations. 
Berryman had the financial support of his uncle, William S. Woods, and of his cousin, Charles 
                                                 
40. Ackerman, “Reminescences [sic] of Banking in the Early Days of Russell County,” 1. 
41. This is a surprisingly low capitalization in comparison with national banking rules. The national 
banking laws of 1863 and 1865 stipulated that national banks in rural communities had to pay in at least $50,000 in 
capital. Kansas’s first general banking law of 1891 established that state banks could obtain a charter with only 
$5,000 of paid-in capital. See Rothbard, History of Money and Banking,136-141; and Angell, “A Century of 
Commercial Banking,” 288-94.  




Q. Chandler. Woods was president of the powerful National Bank of Commerce in Kansas City, 
while Chandler was a prominent banker in the Wichita area.
43
 This family’s successful banking 
operations in Missouri, Oklahoma, and Kansas suggest that country banks in the West were not 
solely reliant on Eastern financial centers. Just as J.F. Rogers discovered in setting up the bank in 
Great Bend, country bankers could also capitalize upon the growing financial power of their own 
region, particularly in Kansas City and later, in Wichita. As the Kansas banking system matured, 
they did just that. The success of banking operations at Concordia, for instance, led Frederick J. 
Atwood and others of his colleagues into investment ventures in nearby towns. He helped charter 
at least six other banks, where he served as a director and usually as the president. These banks 
included the State Exchange Bank of Randall (established June 10, 1899), the State Bank of 
Miltonvale (April 25, 1902), the First State Bank, Aurora (July 30, 1903), the Wayne State Bank 
(September 17, 1903), the Kackley State Bank (January 4, 1907), and the Peoples State Bank of 
Courtland (June 21, 1911).
44
 The banks formed prior to 1903 would have been capitalized at 
one-tenth the rate of national banks, at merely $5,000, while those founded after 1903 still only 
had to provide $10,000 in capitalization.
45
 These smaller state banks formed part of the 
“pyramid” system by depositing funds with the First National Bank of Concordia and holding 
correspondent relationships with larger institutions such as the National Bank of Commerce in 
Kansas City. Regional networks of financial influence, then, soon emerged to compete with 
eastern investors in the development of western communities.  
                                                 
43. Billy M. Jones, The Chandlers of Kansas: A Banking Family (Wichita: Center for Entrepreneurship and 
Small Business Management, Wichita State University, 1983).  
44. Walter E. Wilson, Fifteenth Biennial Report of the Bank Commissioner of the State of Kansas, 
September 1, 1920 (Topeka: Kansas State Printing Plant, 1921). It should be noted that these banks were not 
considered “branch banks,” because banks were not allowed to invest in the capital stock of other banks, per the 
Kansas General Banking Law of 1897. Rather, these connections consisted of individual connections. Such 
overlapping or “interlocking” directorships were quite common. See Angell, “A Century of Commercial Banking,” 
210, 312. 




The “root system” for the banking institutions of western Kansas became increasingly 
complex by the turn of the twentieth century, as bankers maintained ties to eastern investors and 
city correspondent banks while forging new links to other banks within their own vicinity. A 
hierarchy of financial institutions developed, and large institutions in cities did constitute an 
important source of capital for rural western banks. Bankers in Kansas communities, however, 
exercised a degree of choice in forming relationships with city institutions, and often expressed a 
preference for those in Wichita and Kansas City, places that already boasted strong market 
connections. Banks wishing to cultivate correspondent relationships with rural banks had to 
remain competitive on the services they offered those banks. Meanwhile, country banks also 
operated within a regional system where state banks had to cooperate with one another and 
where each had distinct advantages. Nationally chartered banks had a monopoly on currency 
distribution, so state banks were forced to hold deposits in national banks in order to receive 
currency. National banks in rural towns extended state banks the same sorts of perquisites they 
themselves received from city banks: capital investment and interest payments in exchange for 
the deposits of state banks, which they used for their own lending. State banks, however, had 
greater freedom to lend on farm real estate than did national banks, and so national banks 
frequently formed corollary state banks with the same investors so that they might take 
advantage of the high interest rates and profits to be made from the mortgage market.
46
 This 
practice persisted even once the Federal Reserve Act began to permit national banks to lend a 
small proportion of their reserves on farm loans. The Federal Reserve Banks, meanwhile, added 
one more financial “root” to the complicated system of rural credit—an additional source of 
necessary capital that bankers often simply added onto their existing city bank relationships. 
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“The Banker Had Need of the Best that was in Him”: Banking in the Early Days of 
Settlement 
 
Maintaining financial connections with investors served a vital function in preserving the 
flow of credit to western communities, but this was only one part of the process of administering 
country banks. J.W. Berryman’s trials in establishing a bank in the environment of a newly 
settled community in Oklahoma replicated some common difficulties of founding banks on the 
frontier during the late nineteenth century, including the lack of an assured railroad outlet and the 
associated threat that posed to the community’s future. J.F. Rogers’s experiences in setting up a 
bank in Great Bend also suggested that it was difficult to persevere through the first few years of 
banking, owing to infrastructure problems as well as competition with other banks. Frederick J. 
Atwood of Concordia and Theo. Ackerman of Russell also witnessed some of the early 
challenges of frontier banking, although each man was lucky enough to work in a banking 
institution that stood the test of time. Getting banks established on the frontier involved moving 
past temporary setbacks and assuring the local community of the security of the bank’s physical 
structure as well as its operations and financial backing. 
Security was an important concern for these frontier banks. Banking historians have 
recognized the significance of a strong physical presence—namely a sturdy looking safe—for a 
banking operation’s demonstration of success. At first founding, though, a bank would be lucky 
to have any semblance of a working safe.
47
 Atwood described the Cloud County Bank’s first 
safe, set in the back of a small room with only a pine partition to separate it from customers: 
It was old; it had no time lock; the doors were so loose they would rattle loudly 
when shaken. It was more or less artistically repainted and so presented a 
formidable appearance to a child—possibly so to a frontiersman who had never 
seen a modern safe designed to resist the force of a skilled cracksman.
48
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The safe may have looked deceptively secure, but the reality necessitated that Atwood sleep in 
the back room with it, an “old unreliable revolver” his only means to deter potential thieves.
49
 In 
order to develop a more solid stature within the community, in time the bank would have to get 
new accommodations and a safe that more appropriately served institutional security needs. 
 Security concerns extended from the bank itself to the actual security clients offered as 
collateral for loans. Ackerman remembered several times when he had to chase wrongdoers out 
into unsettled territory to regain the chattel on an unpaid bank loan. One colorful example 
follows:  
The writer recalls following the chase into Colorado in search of a span of 
mortgaged mules and when he finally located them, what do you think he found, 
the owner had endeavored to disguise his property, and had entirely changed the 
original color from grey to brown, by using a paint brush from head to heels, and 




Although Ackerman found his mules on this occasion, the bank sometimes failed to recoup its 
security. In another case, a loan client “who had pledged his wheat stacks for a loan, refused to 
thresh until the price met his views.” The client waited for two years, by which time the wheat 
was unsalable. Ackerman discovered this the hard way as, when invited “to climb to the top of a 
stack . . . he fell [up] to his neck into the rotten heap, which being water soaked was only fit for 
hog feed.”
51
 Probably the banker learned to exert a little more pressure on his borrowers so as to 
avoid a repeat of this ordeal. Such tales of guarding safes with revolvers, discovering check 
forgers and turning them over to the law, and chasing livestock across the countryside show 
some of the serious challenges of frontier banking that moderated over time as communities 
grew more settled and as banks invested in more permanent structures.  
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Even dealing with deposits and withdrawals could open a bank up to security breaches. 
Although the era of numerous local currencies was ended with the National Banking Act of 
1863, the authenticity of checks and notes was not always guaranteed during the 1870s and 
1880s, when western Kansas remained an unevenly settled cattlemen’s frontier. Ackerman 
recalled that banks risked “paying forged or raised checks,” and that checks written in pencil, a 
common practice among cattle buyers out on the trail, were especially susceptible to forgery.
52
 
Even handling government vouchers for payment of veterans required extraordinary care, “For in 
case of loss in the mails the duplicate could not be issued for three months.” The banker noted 
that “at one time a bunch of six miscarried and the Bank lost the use of the money for ninety 
days.”
53
 Maintaining the bank’s cash flow against fraudulent withdrawals and even temporary 
losses was a full-time preoccupation for a bank’s cashier. The ability to do so was a crucial part 
of developing the institution’s image of financial strength within the community.  
The banks in Russell and Concordia managed to overcome their earliest security 
challenges and to take advantage of the opportunities of the developing frontier. From the benefit 
of hindsight, the founders of the Russell Bank could point to these early years, made difficult by 
poor crops and low prices, as fundamental in the establishment of the bank’s mission of 
community development. Ackerman reflected that these years steeled the bank and its 
community: “It was during those precarious years, that the Russell Bank steered on its course 
trying to fulfill its mission, to serve the people, to aid the settler in the development process, to 
build up the country, often extending aid when on account of the risk it would have pleased more 
to decline, often furnishing seed which at harvest time could not be returned, only the [tears?] 
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 Even if the bank did not always function as altruistically as its owner would 
remember thirty-five years later, it was clear that the Russell Bank and others like it had an 
important role to play in advancing credit and providing a place for depositing funds safely in 
western Kansas. 
 Credit needs remained high, and the banks had to learn how to accommodate applications 
in a professional and secure manner. As Atwood reflected on conditions in Concordia, 
“Borrowers came a running. We put out 3%-per-month money rapidly and it was not long until 
we advised the folks back East that business was so good that we would soon want more funds if 
we were to meet the demand.”
55
 Rates soon moved down from twelve to eight percent per year 
for longer-term real estate loans as capital came in from the eastern U.S. and Europe, while 
short-term money fell from three to one-and-a-half percent per month. According to Atwood, 
however, “This loss to banks was largely off-set by the steadily increasing line of deposits.”
56
 
Higher deposit levels meant that the bank could loan out more money and recoup the losses from 
lower interest rates. Although most borrowers came from Cloud County in north-central Kansas, 
some came from surrounding counties and from as far as “twenty-five and thirty miles away.”
57
 
This wide-ranging field of credit meant that the bank had to put into effect a strict policy for 
evaluating loan prospects. C.W. McDonald, the cashier, “Took plenty of security for the loans 
made,” and limited the amount of credit loaned for farms. The bank loaned “from $400 to $1000 
on a quarter section, improved.”
58
 Atwood noted, as well, that “unless we were familiar with the 
land on which we planned to make a five-year loan one of us would drive out and look it over 
carefully and make written report which would accompany the completed set of papers sent to 
                                                 
54. Ackerman, “Reminescences [sic] of Banking in the Early Days of Russell County,” 1-2. 
55. Atwood Reminiscences, em12-13.  
56. Ibid., em28.  





the person for whom the loan was made.”
59
 Although all mortgage lenders likely would have had 
agents perform this task, local knowledge gave community banks an advantage in determining 
the best prospects for a loan. Atwood, as a young assistant cashier, thereby learned the skill of 
evaluation, necessary in the creation of land abstracts, titles, chattel and real estate mortgages, 
wills, and other kinds of paperwork. He meanwhile provided much-needed professional services 
for the developing region. 
 The Cloud County Bank of Concordia soon settled into its place within the maturing 
system of banking in Kansas, despite some changes in the leadership of the bank. J.W. 
McDonald left first, to form a competing bank in town that soon ran afoul of new state banking 
laws and closed. Upon his exit, Atwood became Cashier, the bank’s chief operating officer, and 
J.F. Rogers was hired as assistant cashier. Within the next couple of years, H.C. Harrison, R.J. 
Harper, and J.F. Rogers left with their investments and talents to form the new bank in Great 
Bend. Their exits opened the way for more long-term stability in the Cloud County Bank. T.B. 
Smith, now the bank’s chief stockholder from Vermont, became president of the Cloud County 
Bank. Smith’s brother-in-law, E.L. Warren of Orwell, Vermont, became vice president. Two 
brothers from Orwell came out to Concordia as assistant cashier and bookkeeper of the expanded 
bank, which now held $100,000 in capital.
60
 The new leaders of the bank understood that even as 
interest rates fell, the bank could remain profitable and provide a valuable service to the 
community. The construction of a new two-story bank building in the early 1880s signaled the 
new officers’ commitment to the bank. Both Smith and Warren came to Concordia from 
Vermont to supervise the construction, and despite being “well advanced in his 70s,” Smith 
                                                 
59. Ibid.  




joined in on the excavation and foundation work.
61
 Atwood remarked, “The bank when 
completed was the finest building in town. . . . It was a proud and happy day when we moved 
into our up-to-date banking home.”
62
  
  The Cloud County Bank within four years doubled its capital as “more and more eastern 
friends were attracted” by the farm loans the bank offered for investment. It provided vital 
services to local settlers such as Hiram H. Young, whose journal recording his day-to-day 
activities between 1886 and 1895 noted his frequent use of nearby banks for loans, personal 
deposits, and the deposits of town and school organizations for which he volunteered. Young had 
moved to Cloud County from Indiana in 1873. As a former Union soldier, he represented a large 
population of veterans who took advantage of liberal homesteading laws in Kansas.
63
 The editor 
of his journals argued that “the diary refutes the popular impression that farmers in that portion 
of the West lived isolated lives,” and indeed, the many references to banking activities suggest 
just how integrated settlers were within the financial networks of the nation.
64
 In the course of 
just thirteen months between October 1890 and November 1891, for example, the busy farmer 
noted his use of bank services no less than nineteen times.
65
 The bank allowed for a smooth 
operation and accounting of farm business and domestic needs for cash or checks, and also 
facilitated Young’s management of his local school fund and the dues for his Farmers’ Alliance 
and other fraternal obligations. Young’s business with the bank, even while he participated in 
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populist political organizations critical of financial institutions, indicates that country banks like 
this one could avoid general disapproval.  
 The longevity and success of such banks, financed by capitalists from points east, began 
to inspire envy among Kansans who wished to open banks on their own account. New banking 
laws established by the populist Kansas legislature in 1891 promoted this development, as 
Atwood noted. The law “made it necessary to have more local directors in order to have a 
quorum of the Board available to take action if and when necessary.”
66
 This made a great deal of 
sense, considering the fast-changing nature of financial conditions in western Kansas. 
Knowledge of local weather, prices, and other matters of dealing with Kansas farmers and 
ranchers would be useful to the successful management of a bank’s loan portfolio. The new law 
would be hard to meet if the cashier were the only bank officer present in the town. Initially, the 
Cloud County Bank accommodated Kansas law by appointing “the most influential men in the 
community” to the board of directors.
67
 The bank’s owners did not allow these local men to 
purchase stock in the bank, which was then paying high dividends at around 25 to 30 percent, 
however, and the local directors began to chafe at this restriction. Atwood remarked:   
Their new relationship to the bank gave them an opportunity to know the earning 
power of the stock. Naturally it created an appetite for ownership. No stock was 
for sale. This made them only the more anxious to buy. They talked to some of 
their friends-’It was too bad that the thick cream that was being skimmed should 




Some of the directors soon planned to open a bank of their own. The competition of a new bank 
organized by local stockholders posed a great threat to the Cloud County Bank. The influence of 
the powerful businessmen and farmers leading the exodus to a new bank would carry away many 
customers. Not only would these founders’ relationships with the community make a difference, 
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but a bank owned by locals would also appeal to westerners’ desires for independence from 
eastern financial control. As Atwood put it, “The prestige of a home-owned bank would be 
great.”
69
 The founders of the new bank even convinced Atwood himself to join their venture, 
when it appeared that the stockholders of the Cloud County Bank were unwilling to pay his 
$2,000 cashier’s salary any longer. The new bank assured him that salary, and offered him 
$5,000 in stock.
70
 In just a few years after moving to Kansas to help establish the Vermont-held 
capital operation, and after helping it to thrive and move to its grand new headquarters, Atwood 
resigned and moved on to the First National Bank of Concordia. It was a sign of the times, of the 
competitive forces of capitalism, and of Kansas’s growing assurance in its own financial power.  
 Concordia had grown large enough to support multiple banks over the long term. Like 
many towns of its size, just under 2,000 in 1880, it would come to support both a state-chartered 
bank (the Cloud County Bank) and several national banks. The Concordia banks would become 
especially profitable due to the town’s government land office. Farmers filing homestead patents 
after might immediately turn to the banks in town for mortgages to improve their newly “proved 
up” property. The First National, chartered October 12, 1883, employed Atwood through the 
1930s. One of its other cashiers, W.W. Bowman, would go on to positions of leadership in the 
Kansas Bankers Association.
71
 The bank proved both a profitable and a challenging venture as 
the “pendulum” of economic conditions “swung from grinding poverty to prodigal wealth,” and 
vice versa.
72
 The optimism of the 1880s led Atwood, a young man with considerable 
responsibility as the bank’s cashier and chief operator, to make loans that at the time seemed 
wise and well secured. The banker noted that the board of directors gave these loans the stamp of 
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approval, owing to the high interest rates banks could then require and the consequent profit 
return to stockholders.
73
 Nine consecutive seasons of poor weather and bad crops in the late 
1880s and early 1890s, however, meant that during these years “banking was neither pleasant nor 
profitable—bank managers grew old.”
74
 Atwood, who had a creative bent, many times turned 
lyrical in describing the grief induced by natural phenomena that cyclically destroyed crops in 
Kansas. One verse of his poem, “After Next Year’s Crop,” captures these problems, as well as 
the sometimes tongue-in-cheek optimism that kept farmers and bankers invested in the game: 
It is true sometimes things worry- 
Sure, the outlook’s mighty blue 
When the wind gets sou’-sou’westward 
And blows hot a whole week through- 
When the chinch-bug gets his work in 
And the ‘hoppers take the rest, 
When a cyclone or a hailstorm 
Knocks the wheat-fields galley west! 
But we soon forget these trifles 
For we know we’ll be on top 
When we gather in the shekels 
From the Next Year’s Crop.
75
 
   
The woes Atwood described were widespread enough to warrant a young colleague’s sending 
the poem along for publication in the Topeka Daily Capital.
76
 Even once banks had persevered 
through the trials of frontier banking, from poor facilities to the risks of accepting bad checks or 
making loans to disreputable characters, they continued to face new challenges, largely economic 
and environmental. In all this trouble, as well as in the better times to come, Atwood reflected, 
                                                 
73. Atwood Reminiscences, em69.  
74. Ibid., em72.  
75. Atwood Reminiscence, em51. The use of the term “shekels” is an interesting allusion to the anti-
Semitic popular culture surrounding Jews in banking. It is somewhat fitting considering Atwood’s tone of amused 
disparagement for the whole business of farming and banking during those hard times.  
76. The local newspaper also reported that Crane & Co, a Topeka business that produced much of the 
state’s official publications, printed this along with several other poems. See “Mr. Atwood’s Kansas Rhymes,” 




“The banker had need of the best that was in him.”
77
 The character of a banker—the nebulous 
qualities that led him to sympathize with a farmer experiencing heavy losses and carry him 
through until “next year’s crop,” as well as to carefully conserve the assets of the bank while 
investing in worthwhile community development projects—was central to his ability to keep his 
business solvent. A banker’s placing faith in the community through investing in its future often 
persuaded its citizens to compensate his institution through continued business. Thus, a bank’s 
reputation was built firmly on a tradition that balanced both conservatism and generosity.  
“You are Invited to Do Business”: Advertising and the Development of the Community-
Bank Dynamic 
 
Conservatism and generosity translated to mean that the banker had to maintain business 
by conveying financial soundness and develop new customer relationships through lending. 
Attracting the business of all types of community members would serve the bank’s reputation for 
security and openness. As Atwood reflected in an address before the Kansas Bankers Association 
in 1911, the banker in a small Kansas town had a somewhat different mission than a banker in a 
large city. He contrasted the “Jayhawker’s Creed” with the New York banker’s rule not to accept 
accounts from un-recommended persons who could not keep an average balance of at least 
$5,000 or who had a tendency to overdraw. Atwood advised Kansas bankers: “Turn down 
nothing; give everybody the glad hand. Most men are honest; treat them right and they’ll not go 
back on you. Take some chances—not too many—but don’t forget the golden rule.”
78
 The 
Concordia banker offered two anecdotes displaying his bank’s policy of magnanimously serving 
as a savings depository for children with only pennies to deposit and foreign-born widows with 
small pensions. A small amount of work to maintain a low-balance account was worth a great 
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deal in community accord, and there was no need to be snooty when everyone in the town knew 
one another. As the banker concluded his address, “The value of an account? In the case of a 
country banker, who can measure it? We know this, and no more: An account certifies good will, 
friendship, confidence, no less than dollars. True, good will does not buy flocks and herds, stocks 
and bonds; but is it therefore valueless?”
79 
Advertising for local banks emerged as a means to convey the honesty, security, and 
well-being of banks to customers new and old, and of course as a way of attracting new 
accounts. Statements of security and financial soundness became all the more important during 
and after economic depressions, such as in the late 1880s and early 1890s. During this period, 
bank advertisements in the local newspapers wooed depositors and borrowers, trying to assure 
the community of their bank’s longevity. Banks nationwide felt the impetus to do away with 
some of the secrecy and speculation that pervaded the image of banking. National publications 
such as The Commercial and Financial Chronicle urged banks to publish an account of their 
earnings, expenses, capital, and debt liabilities at least quarterly, so that local communities could 
hold banks accountable.
80
 Banks in small-town Kansas began doing this regularly by the late-
nineteenth century; in addition to undergoing audits and sending statements to the Kansas Bank 
Commissioner (an office established in 1891), banks began publishing statements of their assets 
and liabilities in local newspapers. 
The earliest bank advertisements adopted a direct and simple format, a style that many 
established banks maintained for decades. The banking community considered such advertising 
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dignified, as T.B. Brown reflected before the Kansas Bankers Association in the 1911 
conference:  
My idea of dignified bank advertising is the plain, simple announcement 
displayed by modest, dignified types, setting forth the name, location, the date of 
its establishment, capital, surplus, and the names of its officers and perhaps its 
directors. . . . Its solidarity and the personnel of its management, modestly stated 
and modestly displayed, generally sinks into the memory of the public deeper 




Naming the bank’s officers in the advertisements, along with the capitalization and reserve levels 
of the bank, allowed readers to draw connections between the bank as an institution and the 
character of the bankers themselves. Customers made decisions about where they banked based 
on the people involved, and the type of services they needed. If they needed a farm mortgage, for 
instance, they would be likely to visit a state bank with the capacity to lend on real estate. 
Consequently, listing names and assets remained a prominent feature of bank advertising despite 
other changes in design. Many established banks maintained “dignified” and simple stylistic 
preferences into the early twentieth century, but the options for bank ads began to expand. Along 
with adopting a more graphic and eye-catching style, some bank advertisements started to offer 
messages of advice to people about saving their money in banks or investing it soundly in bonds 
offered there. Advertisements’ styles and messages changed over time, but their overall 
intentions to open up the relationship between a bank, its officers and directors, and the 
community remained the same. 
 A sampling of advertisements from the banks of Concordia, Kansas from the 1880s to the 
1900s offers examples of these themes. Banks in this town got into the advertising business at 
the first opportunity; the Concordia Daily Blade newspaper began operation in 1884 and banks 
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began running ads that same year. Banks typically ran advertisements weekly, or at least multiple 
times per month. The earliest samples were quite simple. The ad featured the name of the bank in 
large font, while also printing the names of the bank officers and/or directors, as well as a listing 
of capital and surplus funds in smaller font. This allowed for transparency regarding finances and 
staked the reputation of the bank on its officers. A statement of the business’s mission or one of 
its virtues somewhere on the ad drew attention to its openness to a broad clientele, or to some 
other important facet of the business, such as its sense of responsibility, its size, or its longevity. 
In one example, the First National Bank of Concordia simply said, “Does a gener’l banking 
business” (Figure 1.1a).  
Compressed space called for brevity and even odd letter omissions, which in addition to cost 
considerations, possibly also suggested to readers a certain informality and openness. Another 
advertisement for this institution pointed out that it was “the largest bank in northwestern 
Kansas” (Figure 1.1b). These advertisements, coupled with a regularly published statement of 
financial conditions, told the public that the bank and its officers considered themselves 
Figure 1.1a and b. First National Bank advertisements, Concordia Daily 




responsible to the community for running a sound, 
financially secure business.
82
 If readers paid attention, 
they could also see that the bank continued to gain in 
deposits, loans, and capital.
83
  
 Banks varied in the message and style of the 
advertisements they chose. Newer banks, for example, 
wished to make a strong impact and gain more business, 
and thus used more graphic print and, increasingly, 
images. While the advertising commentator at the Kansas 
Bankers Association convention called these more 
graphic bank advertisements “undignified,” they were 
eye-catching and thus a reasonable strategy for a new 
bank or a small one wishing to expand.
84
 One particularly 
extravagant example by the Citizen’s National Bank of 
Concordia featured an engraved image of the stately 
Italianate bank building on the corner of an intersection (Figure 1.2).
85
 This stylistic choice 
reflects the perspective that in developing communities, banks’ most important symbols of 
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security consisted of the building itself, the vault, and even the cages surrounding early teller 
windows.
86
 The Citizen’s National Bank advertisement also shared common features with other 
bank advertisements of the era, however, including the names of its officers and its capital and 
surplus on hand. This indicates that above and beyond the physical infrastructure banks had to 
offer as security, the people who worked there and made decisions about how to invest in the 
community were equally if not more important factors in the bank’s success.  
 Still greater diversity in advertising choices prevailed after the turn of the twentieth 
century. Some remained utterly simple, as did the advertisement of the First National Bank that 
merely stated, “You are invited to do business at the First National Bank” (Figure 1.3a). This 
sentence was embedded within a fairly large white space, surrounded by a bold black border. 
The bank was simultaneously able to convey the simplicity of its earliest messages, while 
suggesting that they were secure enough to not need fancy bells and whistles in their advertising. 
The oldest bank in the region, the Cloud County Bank, maintained a similar sense of minimalism 
in its styling. Its ad stated, “This bank with ample capital and strong financial backing, offers its 
customers and the general public every facility consistent with good banking that their balances, 
business and responsibility will warrant” (Figure 1.3b). The ad kept the names of its officers in 
the text, as well. Other than adding a scalloped black border around the text, this piece 
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It was important to continue advertising because the practice maintained a bank’s sense 
of transparency, but the two older banks in the community were nonetheless able to do this in a 
low-key manner—they had already established their reputations. The officers and directors of 
these banks were prominent community members whose activities the paper reported frequently. 
Only on rare occasions did they promote their banks or themselves extravagantly, as when the 
town published a special edition of the newspaper featuring promotional material about the 
town’s businesses. In this edition, the paper featured the pictures of F.J. Atwood and W.W. 
Bowman, the president and cashier of the First National Bank, under the heading, “This Is a 
Mighty Strong Team.” The text went on to read, “No better business men, no more courteous or 
honorable gentlemen, were ever resident here and none have a wider circle of friends or more 
fully enjoy the confidence and respect of the people. They have made the First National one of 
the leading banks of Kansas.”
87
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Concordia’s youngest bank, meanwhile, placed the most complex ads of all, occasionally 
using images and frequently changing text. The first of this type by the Farmers and Merchants 
State Bank of Concordia capitalized on a recent report of the state bank commissioner, saying 
that the institution had “the greatest percentage of growth in the state.” The ad featured a sturdy-
looking locked briefcase and an inviting phrase, “We would like to have you start an account 
with us” (Figure 1.4). This advertisement and most of the others by this bank did away with the 
formality of including the names of its officers. One exception shortly followed this first ad 
placement. The bank did publish an ad proudly announcing that since opening on May 1, 1903, 
deposits had risen to $61,111.78 on September 9, 1903, and then to $135,275.60 on September 6, 
1904.
88
 The bank’s cashier, undoubtedly responsible for this rapid growth, affixed his name to 
the announcement. Still, this was a rarity for a new bank 
trying to make an impression with sage advice and the 
occasional graphic. A few examples demonstrate the 
style of the new bank. In two ads run on the same day, 
for different editions of the paper, the bank struck a 
friendly and inviting tone in suggesting to the reader, 
“You feel perfectly free in going to a dry goods store or a 
grocery store. We want you to feel just as free to come to 
us when needing the service of a bank.”
89
 Its next ad 
adopted the pose of a helpful friend: “It is hard to get in 
debt when once the habit is acquired of regularly banking 
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Figure 1.4. An example of the 
increasingly diversified messages 
and images of bank advertising. 
Farmers and Merchants State Bank 
advertisement, Concordia Daily 





part of your income. It is hard to keep out of debt unless that habit is acquired. Let us help you to 
keep out of debt.”
90
 Finally, one text-heavy advertisement read:  
You wish to save, then spend less than you earn and bring what you can to the 
Farmers and Merchants State Bank, Concordia, Kansas. We guarantee you 
absolute safety for your fund, and also prompt and courteous treatment at all 




The new marketing strategies represented in these ads, including graphics, more specific and 
targeted messaging, and a conscious effort to make the bank meet a mission for offering 
friendliness and advice, indicate that the consumer had more choice in banking institutions 
during the early twentieth century than ever before. New banks had to drum up customers in 
ways the more established institutions did not. Whereas the bankers at the Cloud County Bank 
and the First National Bank of Concordia had lived in the area since 1879, and had become 
prominent members of the community, banks like the Farmers and Merchants had to break into 
the market using the tools of the younger generation. Still, every bank had to make overtures to 
the community as a means of maintaining relationships with customers and attracting more. 
Transparency about the banking business, at least partially created through such advertising, was 
vital at all times, but especially when economic troubles hit the Great Plains and banks stood to 
take a great deal of criticism from the public.  
Conclusion 
The maturing system of banking on the Great Plains was central to the development of 
western Kansas during the 1870s. As evidenced by the high number of mortgaged farms in 
Kansas in the 1880s, farmers and ranchers in the largely agricultural-based economy demanded 
credit almost immediately in order to enact visions of capitalist expansion within the short-grass 
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prairies of the state. Certainly, with their own fortunes tied up in the community interests, 
bankers were keener than Sinclair Lewis’s fictional antagonists to recognize and meet the needs 
of farmers and other rural businesspeople.  
This study of the financial networks and relationships involved in establishing banks in 
rural communities such as Concordia, Great Bend, and Russell, Kansas, illustrates the 
complexity and dynamism of lending conditions. Western banks had tangled “roots” of capital 
interests in the East, in Midwestern cities, and increasingly, in their own communities and the 
sub-region around them. Gaining experience in banking from these financial connections and 
working within a new system of national banking that supported the “pyramiding” of deposits 
among banks of different statuses, country bankers were integrated into a system of finance 
recognizable across rural America.  
During the process of establishing country banks in the West, young cashiers like 
Frederick Atwood and J.F. Rogers (not to mention J.W. Berryman) had to act on the interests of 
investors in eastern and Midwestern cities and build relationships with a new, frequently unstable 
community that sometimes harbored wrong-doers as well as honest citizens. To be successful, 
they had to strengthen the bank’s infrastructure and local capital while competing with other 
banks for new customers. Good service and effective advertising certainly helped, as community 
banks began to set themselves apart from the institutions that had attempted to fill the financial 
needs of frontier communities. While in the early years merchants provided some credit to farm 
families, lawyers and land agents provided legal services, and eastern insurance and mortgage 
agents began to invest money in western enterprises, the roles of true community bankers were 
important. Conservative, reputable bankers intended to prove that they could do a better job of 




Such practices as careful abstracting of land and assessment of farm families and their property, 
combined with the fact that local bankers often invested their own capital in their businesses and 
could carefully oversee its return, made country banking often (but not always) a safe medium 
for financial growth. 
The features of rural banking suggest the interdependence of communities and their 
financial institutions. Banks were in the business of making a profit, based particularly on 
lending, and for that business they relied on customers entrusting them with their funds and their 
applications for financing. At the same time, communities needed the capital bankers could 
provide through their connections to regional and national financial networks. Bankers’ ability to 
direct the flow of capital and determine which operations merited bank credit gave them a great 
deal of economic power within the small towns of the Great Plains. Furthermore, in 
demonstrating economic abilities, bankers often gained influence within the community-
mediated political and social arenas. The next two chapters will illustrate why rural districts 
chose economically powerful country bankers to represent them in the state legislature and 
within a variety of civic projects. Even as Kansas bankers shaped the development of the 
financial system of the region, they also made substantial contributions to the political and social 
spheres of rural communities.
64 
 
Chapter Two. Fertile Ground: The Diplomatic Banker and the Kansas 
Legislature 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, populist pundits produced a great deal of vitriol 
against the “money power,” and recurring periods of financial distress in the early twentieth 
century revitalized this rhetoric. William Hope Harvey authored one popular tract, Coin’s 
Financial School, in which a young financial genius enlightens an audience of bankers, 
businessmen, and ordinary citizens about the evils of the gold standard.
1
 He challenges the 
fictional Mr. Gage, a banker from Chicago reluctant to accept the gospel of silver, and forces 
him to admit that the gold supply was limited and the grasp of British financiers on American 
credit was tightening. Ultimately, Coin urges his audience to beware the dangerous proclivities 
of bankers, operating in partnership with corrupt government policymakers. In the anti-
monopolist and conspiratorial rhetoric of the era, he warns them:  
Citizens! The integrity of the government has been violated. A Financial Trust has 
control of your money, and with it, is robbing you of your property. Vampires 
feed upon your commercial blood. The money in the banks is subject to the check 




These money lenders, according to Coin, were selfish, greedy, and simply out of touch with the 
needs of producers. They were not able statesman, who by definition “must have a 
comprehensive appreciation of the interests of all the people—especially the poorer classes.”
3
 
Lest the stained image of the banker stand for all the profession, however, one banker comments 
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at the end of Coin’s lecture, “All national bankers do not regard selfish personal interest, as 
paramount to love of country and the interests of the whole people.”
4
   
Residents of western Kansas were likely to recognize each of these representations of 
bankers: the corrupt and self-interested financier represented in popular culture and the 
community-minded steward of the people’s interests made visible through local advertising and 
booster publications. They often elected these very individuals to represent them in local offices 
and state legislatures, demonstrating that they considered local country bankers more responsive 
to their needs and in tune with the community than the financiers depicted in Coin’s Financial 
School and other circulating publications. They realized the necessity of banks as a source of 
capital for economic expansion and respected the bankers who lived among them for years and 
knew their customers well.
5
 Country bankers throughout the U.S. West consequently embraced a 
range of leadership roles within their communities and states. As one South Dakota banker put it, 
‘“A country banker is expected to be advisor, councilor, custodian, salesman and, above all, 
diplomat.’”
6
 Navigating the diverse interests of their profession and their rural communities, 
bankers embodied the role of the diplomat while shaping the political atmosphere of their region. 
The bankers of western Kansas exhibited a strong commitment to public service in their 
towns and across the state more broadly. In return, their communities recognized their ability to 
lead in electing them to numerous state and local positions, where they constituted an influential 
faction of interest. Between 1900 and 1930, 115 bankers and affiliated finance professionals 
served in the Kansas House of Representatives and Senate. Of these, forty-seven represented the 
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demographically small counties west of Wichita.
7
 Among this group, several had served as 
mayors of western Kansas towns.
8
 Some of these western Kansas bankers and politicians had 
held elected office as city councilmen, or as county treasurers or commissioners, while a great 
number belonged to county and state school boards.
9
 Their service to their larger communities 
spanned an era of intense growth in the region; most were country bankers who simultaneously 
held other jobs developing the region from a frontier into an agricultural heartland. Besides 
banking and loans, their business interests varied from farming and stock-raising to real estate, 
construction, insurance, and merchandising. Success in business and service at the local level 
helped to demonstrate a banker’s diplomatic abilities as well as the mutuality of their interests 
with those of their communities. When elected to represent those interests at the state level, their 
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legislative goals proved diverse yet well-suited to the needs of their developing region. As their 
financial acumen served to stabilize the community’s roots of credit and lending tree, so did their 
political power help to maintain a fertile ground of helpful banking regulations and laws meant 
to sustain rural communities through an era of change in their social, economic, and political 
landscapes.   
This chapter outlines bankers’ roles in forwarding certain progressive agendas in the 
legislature, while demonstrating why voters would choose bankers as their political 
representatives. Electoral politics illustrate the authority bankers held within the constellation of 
reform causes that characterized the first few decades of the twentieth century in Kansas and the 
United States more broadly. Robert H. Wiebe has provided convincing evidence of how bankers 
and other businessmen considered themselves the best representatives of the people’s interests 
due to their education and business abilities.
10
 Kansas bankers regularly expressed such 
sentiments in discussing their political roles at state conventions. Before the Kansas Bankers 
Association (KBA) in 1907, for instance, Ashland banker Jerome W. Berryman noted that 
bankers made good legislators since they had their own best interests and those of the people as a 
whole in mind, as well as sound business knowledge. Berryman argued that good legislation and 
not “unwise restrictions imposed by hostile or unthinking legislators” was essential, “For the 
bank is to a much greater extent than people can realize the creator of prosperity and business 
progress for the community.”
11
 For country bankers, especially, the duty to consider the people’s 
interests while acting as elected representatives was important in ensuring continued trust 
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between the bankers and their communities.
12
 Several sections of this chapter examine 
Berryman’s record as a political leader representing his town within the state legislature during 
the early twentieth century. His record as a Kansas state legislator exemplifies the negotiation of 
power and trust between communities and their elected representatives.  
With the exception of histrionic populist attacks on the “money power,” scholarship has 
often passed over the history of rural banking and has not considered the key distinction between 
the reputations of local and distant financial powers. The cases of many country bankers from 
western Kansas establish that bankers did not garner uniform derision from their neighbors, but 
rather earned a great deal of respect through their attention to issues of interest to their rural 
communities. They evidenced much complexity in their positions as local civic leaders, elected 
legislators, and civil servants in other capacities. Building on the reputations for political 
diplomacy in their home communities, bankers were frequently elected to the legislature, where 
they sought to expand upon their support base through participation in popularly inspired 
reforms. As such, many banker-legislators were at the vanguard in professionalizing 
governmental structure in Kansas and changing the relationship of the government to the people, 
even when reform favored the protection of the people from corporate interests they also 
represented as a class. Banker-legislators were interested not just in the laws governing banking, 
but as rural citizens themselves, they were attracted to popular issues. This chapter considers 
legislative issues such railroad and election reform, the bank deposit guaranty and other bank 
reforms, governmental economy, the reduction of farm tenancy, the good roads movement, and 
tax reform.  
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Bankers’ political leadership in Kansas was especially strong at the height of the 
Progressive Era in the early twentieth century. The election of many such professionals into 
positions within government was a significant feature of the national progressive movement, 
which relied on those with perceived bureaucratic skill, political connections with important 
interest groups, and wide knowledge of the social conditions in their communities. Most 
members of the banking profession in Kansas affiliated with the Republican Party, which gave 
them a strong footing within traditionally Republican Kansas politics. Of the twenty bankers 
serving western Kansas in the first decade of the twentieth century, all were Republicans, and 
one of them—John S. Simmons of Lane County—was the first representative from western 
Kansas to gain enough power within the party to serve as Speaker of the State House of 
Representatives in 1907 and 1908.
13
 In these years, the legislature revisited and adopted several 
key issues of the populist platform, including reforms to reduce the influence of railroads on 
politics and increase the political power of the people. In this context, reform-minded Kansans 
represented the spirit of progressivism developing throughout the nation, particularly as it 
entailed redressing the dangers of industrial society upon the body politic. 
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1905-1911; Ike W. Crumly (R-Thomas), Banker and Insurance Sales, House 1905-1909; Robert Findlay (R-Rice), 
Banker and Investment Broker, Senate 1901-1903; Robert Taswell Fowler (R-Russell), Banker, Senate 1909-1911, 
House 1919-1921; Harry W. Grass (R-Rush), Banker, House 1905-1908; John M. Gray (R-Phillips), Merchant, 
Farmer, Banker, and Insurer, House 1909-1911, 1915, Senate 1921-1931; Charles Edwin Hall (R-Russell), Real 
Estate and Loans, Abstractor, House 1905; Latham Edward Harrison (R-Cheyenne), Merchant and Banker, House 
1905; John Harry Hill (R-Russell), Farmer, Banker, and Merchant, House 1901-1903; John M. Kinkel (R-Reno), 
Insurance and Loans, House 1901-1903; William Willis Martin (R-Morton), Stockraiser and Banker, House 1903; 
John A. Morton (R-Osborne), Banker and Farmer, House 1909; Elhanan V. Peterson (R-Norton), Merchant and 
Banker, Senate 1901-1903; Peter Pyle (R-Smith), Real Estate and Loans, House 1909; John S. Simmons (R-Lane), 
Lawyer and Banker, House 1905-1908; and Everton T. Skinner (R-Lincoln), Banker and Farmer, House 1905-1908. 




The banking profession maintained strong representation in the state legislature in the 
1910s, although the party composition of the elected businessmen became decidedly more mixed 
during this period, when some progressives split into a third party and allowed Democrats to 
make political inroads in Kansas and the nation.
14
 During the second decade of the twentieth 
century, fifteen finance professionals served in the Kansas legislature, seven Democrats and 
eight Republicans.
15
 One of these men, Democrat Jouett Shouse of Edwards County, was elected 
to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served between 1915 and 1919, and later gained 
substantial power within the Democratic Party.
16
 The legislature in the 1910s capitalized upon 
the professionals in its midst by better organizing the state’s bureaucracy and expanding its 
regulatory powers.  
The ascendance of Kansas Democrats within the legislative branch of state government 
(and, briefly, in the governor’s office) coincided with the nationalization of progressive politics. 
In 1912, former president Theodore Roosevelt and Kansas newspaper editor William Allen 
White forged the new national Progressive (or Bull Moose) Party. As reform legislation became 
the order of the day among national politicians, including Republican Senator Robert La Follette 
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Cloud), Banker, House 1919-1921; P.D. Scott (R-Rooks), Banker, House 1919-1921; J.T. Short (D-Rawlins), 
Contractor and Banker, House 1917, 1925-1931; Jouett Shouse (D-Edwards), Banker and Stockman, Senate 1913-
1915; John Sechler Stover (D-Lincoln), Banker, House 1919-1920; and James Edward Uplinger (D-Cheyenne), 
Merchant and Banker, House 1913-1920. See the Kansas State Library web directory of past and present legislators, 
http://kslib.info/BusinessDirectoryii.aspx. 
16. Shouse served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury until late 1920, and went on to an appointment as 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Convention between 1929 and 1932, but opposed 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s candidacy for the Presidency and ultimately joined other conservative businessmen around 
the nation in the formation of the American Liberty League. His roots in western Kansas were strictly limited to a 
few years after his marriage in 1911 (he later divorced his wife), so although this political record is intriguing, he 




and Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, Kansans retreated from social reform-oriented 
progressivism on the state level. Although the legislature in the 1910s showed interest in the 
scientific or managerial elements of the progressive agenda, it ultimately took the post-World 
War I context to set in motion conversations about ways to stabilize shifting social and economic 
conditions in rural western Kansas.
17
  
The Kansas legislature did not always live up to the reputation of progressivism to which 
its politicians constantly alluded. One reason was that this body only met once every two years, 
and its actions were impeded somewhat by the usual political infighting. Yet the political 
rhetoric of the legislature and its representatives, bankers among them, strove to embody the 
reform mindset. Conscious of the connections between political issues such as rural credits, land 
tenancy reform, and good roads with the overarching principles of progressivism and the country 
life movement, I argue that the Kansas legislature in the 1920s maintained a certain sense of 
progressivism balanced with the business sense of the previous decade. During the 1920s, 
sixteen banker-legislators from western Kansas were elected to assist with this agenda.
18
 The 
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legislature continued efforts to make the state run more efficiently and to bolster key elements of 
society perceived to be in crisis, especially the dwindling farm population.  
Banker-legislators gained particular authority in rural western Kansas during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century based on their affiliation with the causes of popular 
political representation, bureaucratic efficiency, and modernization. Their leadership remained 
important even when the bottom fell out of the agricultural sector in the 1920s and 1930s and 
when many in the American popular and political press blamed bankers for the overextended 
farm economy. Voting returns provide evidence that rural citizens remained loyal to the types of 
men who did everything they could to boost the local economies in which they, too, had 
considerable investment. Bankers were able to participate in the transformation of the 
government’s relationship not only with banks themselves, but also with rural society more 
broadly. Through the decades following the turn of the twentieth century, banker-legislators 
contributed to the development of their communities and of the character of relations between 
the people and their governments, maintaining fertile terrain where communities could continue 
to thrive. The limitations of state powers, however, ultimately meant that by the 1930s more of 
the responsibility for social reform and governmental oversight of the people’s welfare had 
transferred to the federal level. While the number of bankers serving Kansas in the legislature did 
not diminish in the 1930s and after, the nature of their leadership changed substantially as this 
shift of power took place.  
Taking up the People’s Interests: Jerome W. Berryman in the Kansas Legislature 
A case study of Jerome W. Berryman, a banker and state representative from Ashland, 
Kansas who first gained local political power on the Oklahoma frontier, offers a remarkable 




Democrat in the early 1890s, when he was fighting railroads and bucking the interests of his 
conservative financial backers. He converted to Republicanism sometime after marrying and 
moving to Ashland in 1898; now belonging to the traditional bastion of party power in Kansas, 
he embraced the Republicans’ renewed affinity for reform in the early twentieth century. 
Berryman’s early experiences in Oklahoma represented the sort of power a banker could gain 
within a local community by sticking up for their interests. As his career in Kansas developed, he 
won election to the Kansas legislature for several terms.  
A leading banker in western Kansas with business interests throughout the state, 
Berryman also served the banking community for a term as president of the KBA. Speaking 
before this body in 1907, Berryman remarked on bankers’ worthiness as legislators. Many 
commentators throughout the banking community echoed these sentiments, and indeed, at the 
conclusion of Berryman’s tenure as president of the KBA in 1908, the annual meeting took the 
subject of bankers’ elected service as a theme. Willis J. Bailey, a former Kansas governor and a 
banker-farmer from Nemaha County in northeastern Kansas, spoke before the group of his belief 
that bankers were called to the highest acts of citizenship, including politics. With reference to 
the then-current controversy over a proposed bank deposit guaranty law—popular among rural 
communities and state bankers, but not among national bankers who would not be eligible for 
membership—he noted:  
You are a great potential power in the molding of public sentiment in your 
community, greater than any other class of business men in our State, and I trust 
that every banker in Kansas will take part and mix enough in politics to mold such 
a sentiment in Kansas that the man who dares to offer a bank guaranty law at the 
next Legislature will by laughed off the platform.19  
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As highly as the bankers considered their own strong influence over legislation, however, 
another presenter before the KBA that year alluded to the fact that elected legislators still stood 
accountable to the interests of the people. As W.A. Johnston put it:  
In most cases the duty of a representative in a legislative body is to be an 
exponent of the opinion of the people. If he has superior information on the 
subject he should assist in guiding his constituents to a right opinion, but when the 
subject has been canvassed, and they have arrived at a conclusion, whether it be 
for primary elections, corporate control, revision of the tariff, or a measure for a 
more elastic currency, there is nothing left for him to do except to voice the 
judgment of his people, or give way to someone who will.20 
 
Public sentiment seemed to favor each of these attitudes to a degree. As the era of populist 
political leadership in Kansas transitioned into the early twentieth century, the people began to 
elect bankers to represent them in the state legislature—and continued to do so. Voters believed 
in the notion that bankers’ expertise on economic and administrative matters would be useful in 
state oversight of the business community, but they also expected these professionals to enter the 
statehouse and support issues important to their constituencies. A legislator’s term in office 
clearly turned on this contract with the people, demonstrating that they could exercise a 
considerable amount of political power even over the most economically or socially powerful 
members of their communities.  
 Berryman’s district elected him to the Kansas House of Representatives in 1904 and 1906 
on the merits of his anti-railroad and anti-monopoly viewpoints.
21
 In the opinion of the local 
newspaper, his positions on popular issues helped him overcome the by-then-humorous stigma 
of being a banker. Editorial comments during his second legislative term confirmed that 
Berryman’s opposition to the railroads had continued since his days in Pond Creek and that it 
was a point of pride for his local community. He favored a reduction in fares and, like many 
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progressives in the state, he wanted to eliminate free passes for legislators riding on the railroads. 
The Clark County Clipper proudly reported that the elimination of passes “will not affect 
Jerome, for he has been in the habit of paying his way for a long time.”
22
 As an elector of U.S. 
Senators, Berryman supported anti-railroad candidates, unlike “railroad tools” or others whom 
the editor called the ‘“yaller dog’ kind.”
23
  
Indeed, Berryman’s alignment with popular interests was important in an era when the 
Kansas legislature engaged in an agenda reminiscent of the key platforms of the People’s Party.
24
 
As the most populist of populist states, Kansas continued to view itself as a leader in the march 
for reform, even as efforts to regulate corporate interests and increase the people’s direct political 
power became widespread in the West and in the nation more broadly.
25
 Efforts to regulate the 
railroads and institute a direct primary law—also a measure to curtail railroad influence in 
politics—cycled through each session of the Kansas legislature in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  
The railroad’s grip on the political system was one of the most troublesome issues to face 
legislators in the early twentieth century. Politicians’ use of railroad passes was particularly 
controversial, because as the state’s leading political newspaper, the Topeka Daily Capital, 
commented, the issuance of passes to legislators was “an instrumentality in politics used by the 
railroads to maintain their political power.”
26
 The 1905 legislature, in which Berryman served, 
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failed to enact an anti-pass bill, but it did create a board of railway commissioners to control 
freight and passenger rates, and the Topeka Daily Capital therefore complimented its record of 
reform.
27
 The proposal to restrict most classes of Kansas citizens from accepting free passes for 
railroad transportation remained a key issue in the 1907 legislative session. This time the 
legislature managed to enact a compromise bill that excluded politicians from receiving railroad 
passes, even though the State Senate attempted to impede the law at every turn.
28
 The issue of 
political passes created so much animosity—especially where the senators were concerned—that 
the public issued some strong rebukes to their elected servants. The senator for the district 
including Ashland, for instance, came in for some harsh criticism for his failure to vote for 
measures popular in the district. In a petition published by the Topeka Daily Capital, Ashland 
citizens warned him to fall in line with Berryman and threatened his ouster if he did not.
29
 
Berryman and others in the House even offered a resolution proposing to divide up the election 
of senators, half each at the general elections held every two years. This would limit the impact 
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of railroad rule throughout the whole legislative body by giving the people control over their 
Senate on a more regular basis.
30
   
Kansans believed that increasing the popular voice in primary elections would also help 
to combat the force of the railroads and “machine politics.” The Topeka Daily Capital 
commented that putting the power to elect U.S. Senators in the people’s hands was especially 
threatening to the railroads, because they could not then exercise control over the politicians who 
chose senators in the convention system.
31
 The primary bills introduced in 1905, 1907, and 1908 
became subject to a number of amendments and consequently faced difficulty in passing both 
houses of the legislature. Ultimately, the conscience of the legislature supposedly renowned for 
its forward-thinking finally caught up to itself, and the body passed a primary law during the 
special session of 1908.
32
 Once again, a legislator’s willingness to follow the wishes of his 
constituents on such vital measures was crucial to his continued electoral support. A Great Bend 
banker’s public switch to supporting the primary law in the 1908 Senate helped gain him the 
approval of his district for reelection that year, when many senators had come under fire for their 
adverse positions on the primary bill.
33
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 If controlling the power of the railroads was an important holdover from the populist era 
during the early twentieth century, an equally popular platform concerned controlling those other 
cornerstones of corporate power: the banks. One of the central ideas for banking reform 
legislation was the idea of a deposit guaranty. Kansas, along with a few other western states, 
forged new political ground in considering various forms of depositor protection beginning in the 
1890s and in instituting a deposit guaranty law in 1909. This suited its self-image as an 
enlightened and progressive state, but the law did not come into force without years of debate 
and several attempts to enact it. The idea first arose in 1898 from the imagination of State Bank 
Commissioner John W. Breidenthal. Breidenthal was a Democrat-turned-Populist banker who 
served eight years as commissioner and who had been a People’s Party candidate for governor in 
1896.
34
 He attempted to mediate between the interests of farmers and bankers, two classes who 
frequently maligned the other. He believed that each could contribute valuable ideas to the 
functioning of society and government, and noted that bankers especially should “concede that it 
is just barely possible that some farmers may entertain some good ideas as to banking laws and 
systems.”
35
 The bank guaranty was one such initiative inspired by the interests of the people. 
Under the Breidenthal bill’s provisions, state banks would be required to submit five 
percent of their average deposits to the State Treasurer, who would redistribute the funds to 
official receiver banks paying two and a half percent interest on the funds. This interest 
comprised the fund out of which “losses resulting from closed banks shall be paid.”
36
 At the time 
of the bill’s introduction in December 1898, the state legislature was sitting in a controversial 
special session supposedly called by Governor John W. Leedy to keep the outgoing populist 
                                                 
34. “John W. Breidenthal,” History of Kansas State and People, Volume V, ed. William E. Connelley 
(Chicago: American Historical Society, 1928), 2275.  
35. John W. Breidenthal, “The Farmer and the Banker,” Kansas State Board of Agriculture Quarterly 
Report, March 1898, 44. 




majority in power longer and enact some pet legislation concerning railroad regulations. 
Tensions between the governor and the bank commissioner quickly arose as each seemed 
interested in promoting his respective project at the expense of the other and as the legislative 
session’s legacy seemed at stake.
37
 Furthermore, national bankers in Kansas did not support the 
bill and aligned themselves with the Leedy faction. While another faction urged populist 
legislators “to vote for the bill as a partisan measure,” the future of the law was in doubt.
38
 
Although the Senate passed the bill, the House of Representatives defeated it after several hours’ 
debate on January 6, 1899. While one representative attacked a legislator opposing the bill for 
failing to heed the interests of his community which had suffered losses from a local bank 
failure, the latter retorted that while he personally “had lost every cent. . . in that failure” he felt 
caution should be exercised before enacting such momentous legislation. He did not feel the 
extreme urgency of other populists in the face of their impending loss of power, and felt that the 
next regular legislature would be able to give the law more consideration. Ultimately, the House 




 The concept of a deposit guaranty fund entered the legislature again in 1905, but did not 
receive serious consideration until Governor Edward W. Hoch underscored the issue in his 
January 1907 Message to the Legislature. The governor framed all banking regulation in terms of 
a benevolent relationship between the government and the banks. In regulating the banks and 
creating such forms of security as the deposit guaranty law would provide, the government 
sought to protect not just the public but also the banks themselves. Though Hoch praised the 
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banking institutions of his state, he compared further banking regulation to peacetime 
preparations for war. Commenting on broader momentum for such reforms, Hoch stated, “Let 
Kansas, leader in every reform, the advance agent of every progressive movement, lead also in 
the wise provision for the protection of its banking interests.”
40
  
 Bankers’ attitudes about the proposed guaranty system were divided even as the 
legislature seemed to have a popular mandate to pursue Hoch’s plan for a guaranty fund. One 
group of bankers sought to establish a private and selective form of insurance that excluded 
“wildcat” banks and protected the secure banks of eastern Kansas from western bank failures.
41
 
The state-sponsored option remained the most acceptable one at this point, however. Bank 
Commissioner John Quincy Royce reported receiving many letters of support for the proposed 
state guaranty fund from bankers around Kansas. Yet most bankers affiliated with nationally 
chartered institutions opposed the state’s plan because they feared it would give an undue 
competitive advantage to state banks, who could make strong claims to safety under this 
system.
42
 Kansas citizens expressed support for the guaranty in the state’s most widely followed 
newspaper reporting on legislative action, the Topeka Daily Capital, but bankers in the 
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 By early 1908 the national economic situation had deteriorated owing to a financial panic 
in October of 1907. Governor Hoch found it necessary to re-prioritize the idea of a deposit 
guaranty fund in a special session he called in 1908. The nation had undergone a financial crisis 
that caused bankers to call in their mortgages, limit new loans, and keep larger reserves of cash 
in their banks than usual. These measures largely assured the public of the banking system’s 
stability, but the bankers’ reticence to invest in new loans prevented the economy from resuming 
its vigorous pace of growth. Politicians all over the nation, including the Kansas governor, began 
to think that bolstering confidence through the guarantee of deposits, rather than through the 
tight-fistedness of the bankers, was an important step in kick-starting the economy. The 
legislature of the new state of Oklahoma had recently managed to enact a bank guaranty bill, and 
various western states were considering following Oklahoma’s example. National politicians 
such as William Jennings Bryan and even the U.S. Congress were entertaining plans for similar 
guaranty laws.
44
 Arthur Capper, publisher of the Topeka Daily Capital, may have expressed the 
heart of popular opinion in asking why the people’s deposits should not receive the same 
securities as the money of the state.
45
 A prominent Topeka politician added that something was 
wrong in a system where the only security a bank offered depositors was its good name, and 
where each bank acted as a single unit rather than as a system in times of distress.
46
 
Despite such sentiments, which stimulated a renewed movement for central banking in 
the U.S. that eventually culminated in the establishment of the Federal Reserve in December 
1913, the idea of a state bank guaranty system encountered continued opposition from the 
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bankers in the Kansas legislature who had different ideas about how best to support the interests 
of both depositors and the entirety of the Kansas banking system. The deposit guaranty faced 
strong opposition from several camps. Atchison lawyer and banker Baile P. Waggener led the 
battle in the Senate and introduced a counter-measure that would legalize the incorporation of a 
private bank insurance company.
47
 The Kansas legislature debated and nearly passed several 
other deposit guaranty plans, but the private insurance proposal met more approval among 
bankers in the 1908 special session.
48
  
Representative Jerome W. Berryman and the Kansas Bankers Association also put up a 
formidable fight against the guaranty bill. Although Berryman’s advocacy for the people’s 
interests in reigning in the power of the railroads and in enacting election reform was notable, on 
banking regulation he staunchly upheld the interests of his business and maintained that bankers 
knew best how to control their own system. Speaking as the President of the KBA, Berryman 
expressed concerns about the proposed guaranty plan’s applicability only to state-chartered 
banks. He feared this would give undue advantage to those banks, as opposed to the national 
banks controlling half of the state’s deposits. Berryman denied that the people of Kansas had 
much interest in the matter and that the national economic situation mandated the measure. 
Instead, he proposed a “wait-and-see” approach, arguing that the next regular legislature would 
be better prepared to draw reference from the record of the recently established Oklahoma 
deposit guaranty fund.
49
 As the legislative session moved forward, however, Berryman became 
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more and more vocal in his opposition to any sort of guaranty bill. The Topeka Daily Capital 
reported on several occasions about squabbles centering on Berryman as the key voice of the 
minority opinion in the House of Representatives.
50
 At one point he attacked Governor Hoch 




 With the special session moving toward adjournment, both houses passed the Waggener 
measure for the establishment of a private deposit insurance company. Governor Hoch vetoed 
the bill, however. He noted that on its own, the private insurance plan did not meet the demands 
of Kansas citizens, and he recalled the legislature in order to reintroduce the suite of guaranty 
bills he favored.
52
 Legislators once again tried to pass the insurance plan to the exclusion of the 
state guaranty fund, but Hoch refused to allow it. In spite of fears that the guaranty law would 
become a negative campaign issue for legislators later that year, the session failed to enact a 
single bill concerning the protection of bank deposits.
53
  
  The 1908 election served as a referendum on the bank guaranty issue, and both Waggener 
and Berryman were ousted from their seats. Nonetheless, when the idea once again arrived on 
the legislative docket in 1909, they continued to lead the oppositional forces as lobbyists, rather 
than legislators. Waggener introduced a new idea about how to raise the fund, while Berryman 
concentrated on criticizing certain elements of the bill against the bankers’ interests. The latter 
still exercised a great deal of power over the state’s banking community as a member of the 
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KBA’s legislative committee. The chief part of his critique now rested on an element of that 
year’s bill allowing for the guarantee of interest-bearing deposits. He thought this provision 
would allow unsafe bankers to offer unreasonably high interest rates on depositors’ money to the 
detriment of their more conservative but safer competitors. Such had already happened in 
Oklahoma. Although Kansas’s new governor, Walter Stubbs, thought the attack on this particular 
feature was merely “an effort to mutilate the bill,” this point of contention along with some 
others continued to influence the legislative debate throughout the session.
54
 Although the 
legislators produced much debate on the guaranty bill’s provisions for protecting interest-
bearing, time-based deposits, whether membership would remain voluntary for state banks, if 
national banks and trust companies could participate, and other issues, opponents finally had to 
concede the point, keep their pledge to voters, and enact the law.
55
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J.W. Berryman’s stance on the bank guaranty issue led him to lose his legislative seat, but 
he maintained that bankers had a right and a duty to serve in the lawmaking body, and believed 
they could best represent their particular interests in that institution. Berryman was a respected 
public servant on matters where his interests did not conflict with his constituents’, as with the 
railroad and election legislation considered in these years; when he followed his own interests on 
the issue of the bank guaranty law, however, it naturally followed that the public might revoke its 
electoral support.  
The Turn to Bureaucratic Reform: The Kansas Legislature in the 1910s 
The Kansas legislature’s continuing battle over the bank guaranty law shows that 
regulating the banking industry was not just a temporary concern of the populists, but also an 
issue of long-term significance. Moving into the next few decades, Kansas bankers regularly 
dealt with new regulations even as they sought to influence the forms this authority took. In fact, 
regulation and governmental administration represented the chief concerns of politicians during 
the 1910s. As the state and nation entered a largely prosperous era, Kansans became more 
interested in tightening the ship than in expanding the state’s commitments to popular needs. 
State officials were chiefly interested in refining the administration of public utilities and state 
institutions, such as colleges, prisons, hospitals, and charity boards. In 1911, the state legislature 
made a step in this direction by establishing the Public Utilities Commission, which oversaw the 
practices of “natural monopolies” like the railroad and electric companies.
56
 By the 1915 and 
1917 legislatures, consolidation had become an important part of the Republican platform. 
Principally, this change in legislative focus toward efficiency, along with efforts to control 
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spending, represented a spirit of “economy” within the business of the state. As newly elected 
Governor Arthur Capper put it, the state needed to avoid unwise expenditures on brash new 
political schemes as a means of preparing for any eventuality, such as wartime stringency. As the 
stage for progressivism shifted to the national sphere, where the expansive mission continued in 
the first years of the decade and where the needs of the wartime government eventually offered 
the ultimate experiment in progressive administration, Kansas witnessed the decline of the 
overtly people-oriented platforms of progressives in both parties. Although issues of political and 
economic reform became less central to, if not entirely absent from, the state’s mission, bankers 
and other professionals within the state legislature nevertheless maintained certain elements of 
the progressive spirit in undertaking the bureaucratic tightening generally associated with this era 
of reform.
57
 Indeed, these men were well suited for this sort of work.   
 Arthur Capper, the publishing giant with an undeniable pulse on popular opinion, defined 
the state’s core principles in the mid-1910s. He stated to the people of Kansas in his 1915 
inaugural address as governor:  
I have no pet schemes nor fads to introduce; no political panacea to propose; no 
revolutionary methods to try. I shall simply endeavor to do my duty thoroughly 




Capper commended the “progressive, forward-looking spirit of the Kansas people” who had 
supported the “constructive laws” of the previous era, including the anti-pass law and the bank 
guaranty law. But although it was time to embrace the “scientific methods which are working out 
so satisfactorily in private business,” it was not the time to propose a large number of new laws. 
It was time to economize.
59
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 Legislators in 1915 made efforts toward consolidating and making government functions 
more efficient. Banker-legislators, unsurprisingly, were among those making suggestions for a 
more streamlined and efficient government. Occasionally, such efforts could verge into dramatic 
and untested ground. Taking the spirit of the age to the extreme, Democrat J.C. Hopper, a banker 
from Ness County, suggested that the government could be entirely restructured. He proposed 
eliminating the state Senate and making the legislature unicameral, with sessions once every four 
years.
60
 Neither of these proposals was met favorably within the legislature, but business leaders 
were also behind less ambitious if more promising proposals to consolidate the management of 
various state agencies. For instance, merchant and lender A.A. Doerr, a Democratic 
representative from Larned and the House minority leader for 1915, introduced a bill to 
consolidate the management of the state’s soldier homes in Fort Dodge and Ellsworth under the 
state Board of Control.
61
 This plan would have furthered the previous administration’s initial 
efforts to move the management out of the hands of veterans and under the wing of the more 
professional central board. Kansas’s strong contingent of elderly Grand Army of the Republic 
members, however, expressed vocal opposition to this plan, and ultimately those in the House of 
Representatives upheld their commitments to the soldiers in rejecting Doerr’s plan and leaving 
the Old Soldiers’ Home in Fort Dodge and the Mother Bickerdyke Home in Ellsworth to the 
management of a few soldiers. The so-called “soldier state” could not see fit to abandon the 
spoils it had been granting to its revered veteran class despite the governor’s calls for economy 
and efficiency of management.
62
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In spite of the failures of these proposals, legislators did not abandon the economizing 
mission. In one instance, the House of Representatives opted to abolish an irrigation board it had 
established two years earlier because it had not accomplished anything, transferring its 
investigative and educational functions to the irrigation engineer at the agricultural college. 
Doerr and Hopper both supported this minimization of unnecessary and ineffectual 
bureaucracies. The Topeka Daily Capital quoted Doerr on the subject, “The people of western 
Kansas were said to be demanding it. But there is no excuse now that it is shown to be a failure, 
for keeping the useless board in existence.”
63
  
The fight put up in the Senate about the issue of dissolving the irrigation board and its 
experiments, however, showed that the business of streamlining was a controversial one, and that 
competing notions of government could interfere with the state’s current direction. Among those 
rejecting the House’s plan to leave the business to the agricultural college were bankers John M. 
Gray (Republican) and Jouett Shouse (Democrat), among other senators from western Kansas.
64
 
These opponents also put the issue in terms of economic advantage in reasoning, in the words of 
the Topeka Daily Capital, “That if the board succeeds in working out an irrigation system that is 
cheap and practical, it would benefit the western half of the state millions of dollars.”
65
 Even 
among the rural lenders of western Kansas, sectional interests and even party lines did not 
necessarily unite them in their attitudes about government. Ultimately, a conference committee 
had to resolve the differences between the two bodies of government, and the board was 
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abolished in favor of a single commissioner to do the work. More than a third of the board’s 




 As the legislature battled back and forth on the issue of consolidating management and 
reducing bureaucracy, it also endeavored to meet the governor’s challenge for budget cuts. 
Though not always popular among the special interests of the state, particularly the state’s 
institutions of higher education, and among the members of the Democrat-controlled Senate, 
restricted appropriations were an important component of the Republican administration’s 
economizing mission. Legislators battled for nearly a month over budget appropriations, with the 
House accusing the Senate of “pork barrel” spending and condemning the efforts of Minority 
Leader Doerr and his Democratic compatriots to compromise with the Senate’s considerably 
higher appropriations balance or to simply leave the matter to the governor for resolution.
67
 
Although the legislators did not take the latter tactic, and shouldered their responsibility of 
creating the budget for the next two years, Governor Capper did in the end also exercise his veto 
power over certain lines of the budget in order to maintain his vision of economy.
68
 
 The battle over appropriations in 1915 led lawmakers in 1917 to consider a more efficient 
method of allowing the governor himself to propose a budget and present it to the legislature.
69
 
Proponents of this plan suggested that it would allow the governor to “cut the pattern to fit the 
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cloth,” or to only fund those items that the state had the revenue to support.
70
 The legislature 
could cut from the governor’s budget, but could not add appropriations without making 
provisions for raising the necessary revenue in a separate bill. The goal was that no deficit would 
accrue. Members of the House of Representatives even proposed to ask Governor Capper to 
prepare a trial budget for that year’s legislative session. Although the governor agreed to make 
the effort if called upon to do so, the plan did not take shape due to the sense that it was “unfair 
to ask [a] budget on such short notice” and because it seemed that some of the legislators 
proposing the idea merely wanted the governor to fail.
71
  
 The legislature continued its mission to make the state government more efficient in 
1917, endeavoring to unite the boards of the state educational system, charitable institutions, and 
penal facilities under the management of one board of administrators and a state business 
manager. Legislators hoped that this would cut overhead costs as well as eliminate the politics of 
special interests that had dominated the boards in the past.
72
 As the governor explained it, the 
plan would imitate the successful business practices of city commissions popular around the 
nation as well as “the form of organization and management of the successful corporations.”
73
 In 
commending the bill, the Topeka Daily Capital pointed out that it would “place Kansas to the 
front in a movement towards ‘efficiency and economy’ in its extensive and rapidly growing 
institutions.”
74
 Kansas continued to assert for itself a progressive role: the management of state 
institutions had taken on a particularly Kansan spin with respect to groundbreaking “efficiency 
and economy.”  
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Businessmen played a significant role in enacting Governor Capper’s platforms of 
efficiency and economy. Albert A. Doerr represented the leadership of the business community 
on these matters, although he certainly did not agree uniformly with his fellow legislators from 
his profession or geographical section. He was well enough respected for his views that a writer 
for the Daily Capital suggested he might one day enter a race for the governorship.
75
 Although 
this was not meant to be, Doerr was later appointed to manage the unified board he had helped 
enact in 1917.
76
 The political leadership of bankers and business professionals in Kansas, even in 
an era when the legislature had more balanced party representation than usual, suggests that 
voters continued to view them as highly capable lawmakers. Indeed, their business sense made 
them all the more adept at a brand of progressivism which sought to make government 
responsible to the people’s needs, yet fiscally sound and able to provide for the future.       
In the Name of Patriotism: The Resurgence of Agrarianism in the Post-War Context 
 
The years immediately following the First World War presented a unique environment 
for lawmakers, particularly those representing western Kansas’s farming population. Farmers 
faced a combination of challenges as a result of the wartime growth in production, increased 
spending on land and equipment, and subsequent troubles with low crop prices and the 
repayment of mortgage financing. Although the state legislature had taken a step back from 
active intervention in the problems of individuals during the past few years, it seemed that the 
state (and ultimately the nation) would have to respond to the demands of an increasingly 
organized farmer class. Now that the farmers had proven themselves capable producers and 
defenders of democracy, their interests gained more attention than they had received since the 
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last major depression in the 1890s. The state even proposed to expand the bureaucracy again and 
appoint an agricultural commissioner to see to their needs.
77
  
One of the most substantial efforts of the era was the movement to reduce tenancy 
through the expansion of rural credits in a state-sponsored loan system. This approach 
foregrounded an issue key to the Country Life Movement, which had first materialized in 1908 
and which culminated with the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act in 1916. The problem of 
rural credits as a means of reducing high tenancy rates (between 40 and 50 percent for Kansas) 
featured prominently in the pages of bankers’ trade journals in the 1910s.
78
 Publications such as 
the Banker-Farmer served as a platform for a conversation over which agencies, public or 
private, national, regional, or state, would best serve the farmers’ credit needs.
 
Farmers 
themselves supported overwhelmingly the federal government’s plans for long-term, amortized 
loans that allowed them to pay gradually both the interest and principal on their mortgages. 
Paying constantly on the value of the land would deepen the farmer’s investment and reduce his 
incentive to “rob the soil” while making minimum interest payments and failing to pay the 
principal in a lump sum at the end of the mortgage term.
79
 Others recognized the potential 
material gains from offering farmers better credit. Short- and long-term mortgages could allow 
farmers to improve their operations through diversification: they could enter into livestock 
management, cultivate alfalfa and other soil-enriching crops, increase marketing power through 
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the use of silo storage during off-seasons, and even invest in educational programs.
80
 Among the 
bankers, though, some hesitation existed about the federal government’s plans to sponsor rural 
credit associations. The Banker-Farmer’s editor, B.F. Harris, undoubtedly expressed some 
common sentiments when he opined that state and national banks, with the new allowances for 
farm loans granted them under the Federal Reserve Act, could “solve their own rural credits 
problems as well or better than can the Federal government.”
81
 
Bankers at the state and local levels had to figure out how to best approach the changing 
conditions of the rural credits situation. Tenancy reform and other rural life improvement issues 
were important features of the KBA’s annual meetings during the 1910s, and the participants had 
a great deal to say about ongoing attempts to legislate change. Like the Banker-Farmer editor, 
Kansas bankers tended to favor local solutions to the credit problem, even if they disagreed about 
the best course to pursue. Some thought that simply correcting the tax structure to aid property 
owners might help, while others advocated loaning money from the state school fund for farm 
purchases by tenants.
82
 One speaker argued that the Building and Loan Association, as a 
“money-saving, money-making, money-lending, cooperative people’s institution” seemed to 
serve just as well as would an entirely new federal land bank system.
83
    
While the debate among bankers continued, Congress enacted legislation that officially 
brought the U.S. government into the farm loan business in 1916. The Federal Farm Loan Act 
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(FFLA) organized twelve regional land banks with bonded capital, which members of numerous 
local loan associations would pay back over time through the purchase of stock. Groups of 
farmers could put together these associations and issue loans to their peers on a long-term, 
amortized basis. The goals for the FFLA were numerous, and providing better opportunities for 
tenant farmers to purchase land was primary among them.
84
 Yet, it still proved difficult for the 
average tenant to purchase land under this act; FFLA funds could only provide loans on fifty 
percent of a farm’s value, while local bankers or the sellers (usually landlords) were expected to 
issue second mortgages for the balance of the purchase.
85
 Such impediments led some observers 
to seek alternatives to federal interventions on the local and state levels, even as national 
legislators continued to tinker with rural credit options.    
Despite the activity on the rural credits issue in the national legislature and its continued 
discussion in the bankers’ press and associational meetings, it took several years for the Kansas 
state legislature to make significant strides toward reform.
86
 The struggle to improve the state’s 
rural credit structure years after the height of the country life reform movement underscores 
several trends about lawmaking conditions unique to the state context, including the limits of a 
biennial legislature, the political power of country bankers within the state, and how they chose 
to exercise this power most effectively. Bankers had many purposes in entering the debate over 
rural credits, not the least of which was a patriotic attempt to fulfill the agrarian dreams of their 
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constituents and especially of world war veterans. More materially, increasing the number of 
individuals owning their farms, as opposed to operating them as tenants, was thought to boost the 
stability of rural communities, ensure better soil, and stimulate diverse agricultural production 
for a successful rural economy. These factors certainly would have appealed to bankers’ 
interests, because their economic success depended on the farmers’ ability to seek credit and 
invest further in agricultural development. Providing for increased farm ownership through rural 
credits reform undoubtedly improved the terrain for community success and financial 
opportunity. Nevertheless, it took more than a decade for the Kansas legislature to lay the 
groundwork for a state-sponsored rural credit system, and even then it came to naught. State 
legislatures are slow-moving bodies, but this is only a partial explanation for this failure to enact 
reform. The slowness of legal reform mechanisms, relative to the rhetoric about tenancy and 
credit reform swirling through professional and political circles in the previous decade, also 
undoubtedly speaks to economic trends toward farm consolidation and modernization. Other 
alternatives clearly existed, but as I argue throughout this dissertation, the activities of many 
bankers and other leading members of rural society both consciously and unconsciously 
supported the movement toward an industrialized agricultural system that would prove largely 
untenable in a traditional agrarian context.  
The economic realities of an industrializing farm sector made the political rhetoric on 
tenancy reform and rural credits in the Kansas legislature as late as 1923 somewhat surprising. 
When Kansas Governor Henry J. Allen addressed the Kansas legislature about the tenancy issue 
in 1919, however, the post-Great War context infused his message with a strain of patriotism that 
gave special urgency to aiding landless returning soldiers. In a blitz of publicity for his political 




land and resell it to the landless, as well as for taxation penalties for speculators and landlords.
87
 
The plan created a great deal of buzz, and even garnered the support of Gifford Pinchot, a friend 
of both Allen and Theodore Roosevelt.
88
 In a monumental move, the Kansas legislature 




Voters passed the amendment in 1920, thus giving inducement to the state legislature to 
enact actual instruments for assisting farmers to purchase homes. Once again, Governor Allen 
highlighted the need to give preference to those who had served in the war, and the state press 
shared this attitude. Allen had recommended a commission to analyze the tenantry (or tenancy) 
problem and make recommendations for a “constructive land policy in Kansas.” As the Topeka 
Daily Capital opined, “The steady increase in tenant farming can not [sic] be satisfactory to this 
state, which is interested in production and in a well diffused land ownership.” The editor added, 
“There is a special reason why such an inquiry should be made at this time in Kansas, and that 
relates to the duty of the state to assist its ex-service men to become home builders and 
homeowners.”
90
 Wrapping reform in patriotic language added even more force to a proposal that 
already supported a cherished ideal in the American agrarian mythology, but this did not ensure 
that the plan would move beyond rhetoric to implementation. 
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Allen agreed to postpone any action during the 1921 legislative session, awaiting the 
report of the special commission.
91
 The issue had not died by the meeting of the next legislature 
in 1923. Instead, a prominent country banker elected to represent his southwestern Kansas 
district was still agitating for a bill that would authorize the state to buy lands cheaply, and then 
appoint a supervisor to administer a system where tenants could buy the lands on credit. 
Interestingly enough, this banker—the recently re-elected Jerome W. Berryman of Ashland—
throughout his career expressed strong feelings against government intervention in matters of 
credit and banking. His plan would operate based on the long-term, amortized mortgage model 
of the federal land banks, but in this case he made a fine distinction between the functions of the 
federal land banks and the proposed Kansas-based entity. Berryman’s ideal agency would offer 
the full value of the land in credit instead of the fifty percent the FFLA authorized. The banker 
also placed parameters on the funding source for his plan: although the state would technically 
purchase the lands, the funds would derive from privately purchased, bonded capital rather than 
from the state itself.  
Berryman’s proposed bill retained the rhetoric of agrarianism and patriotic fervor central 
to the previous campaign for providing credit for the purchase of rural homes. Berryman wrote:  
Instead of a prosperous home loving citizenry, residing on their own land, which 
self interest induces them to improve and keep in its highest state of efficiency by 
the conservation of the fertility of the soil and the building up of the property, 
making it more valuable, we have here the reverse condition of a shiftless, 
dissatisfied, impoverished tenantry without ambition for the present, or hope for 




He added:  
This serious condition would probably have not received our consideration for 
some time to come, had not the return of our soldiers from the world war forced 
upon us the problem of adequately showing our appreciation of their great 
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sacrifice, by trying to devise methods and means whereby they can be taken care 
of and placed in a position to establish homes for themselves and rear families, 





The banker pointed to criticisms of tenants’ destruction of the land and rural communities while 
appealing to the patriotic considerations of supplying veterans with homes. These were both 
popular appeals for banker-reformers and for Berryman’s constituents. His local newspaper, the 
Ashland Clipper, printed the bill in full for its readers to consider, and the same paper had earlier 
re-printed reports from Topeka and Kansas City newspapers that his tenantry plan might earn 
Berryman a position as Speaker of the Kansas House of Representatives.
94
  
Neither this position nor the bill amounted to anything, despite the idealistic appeal of 
credit assistance for buying “farm homes.” This led the Topeka Daily Capital to editorialize that 
the emergency had passed and that “the state has forgotten the issue.”
95
 Berryman’s belated 
appeal for land-credit reform may have simply been a rhetorical strategy to gain favor with his 
constituents. Still, his approach to the problem fit well within the milieu of the reform-oriented 
country banking community to which he belonged. Beyond his political authority on questions of 
banking and economic development, Berryman’s affiliation with reform causes helped give him 
credibility as a political leader.  
Berryman and other bankers in the legislature might have exercised the power of their 
lobby as they did for matters related to the affairs of banking, but they were content to leave this 
more broadly-based reform in the talking stages. As with other issues central to the progressive 
platform, the Kansas legislature seemed to have higher expectations for advancing reform causes 
than it could realistically fulfill. Bankers and their fellow legislators did not wish to change the 
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nature of the nation’s economic culture, even as they sought to influence the direction of the 
conversation about rural credits and tenancy reform. Ultimately, their stake in a capitalistic 
agricultural system, as well as the nation’s liberation from post-war emergency conditions, led to 
the abandonment of such high-minded ideals.    
Good Roads: Legislators Bring Kansas into the Modern Era, 1925-1928 
 
The Kansas legislature continued to struggle in balancing progressive idealism and the 
status quo of state governmental operations in the late 1920s. Indeed, following the less-than-
popular gubernatorial administration of Democrat Jonathan M. Davis, Kansans in 1925 returned 
to a Republican business-as-usual character with Governor Benjamin S. Paulen, a banker from 
eastern Kansas. The Topeka Daily Capital editorialized at the start of Paulen’s term that he “has 
no radical ideas, and none are needed.”
96
 In language reminiscent of the late 1910s, the writer 
added, “What the state hopes from this administration is that the state will go forward as a better 
functioning, better co-ordinated mechanism, all the organs and parts of the state government 
performing in a more efficient way.”
97
 Tightening up government administration had once been 
considered a trademark for progressivism. Now, organizing bureaucratic functions was simply 
standard, and Kansas had begun to fall behind the national curve of other reform causes. In 
proposing to bring the state into the national roads system, the Paulen administration aimed to 
rectify that backwardness. Kansas had surrendered the groundbreaking spirit of old, but was still 
trying to take positive steps in the direction of a liberal relationship between the people and a 
functioning state government.  
In a state that would boast the first construction of homegrown President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s federal interstate highway system during the 1950s, it may seem strange that 
                                                 





federal aid for the construction of adequate roads linking Kansas to a national highway network 
took so long to orchestrate. Owing to a constitutional provision that restricted the state from 
spending money on internal improvements, however, the state in the 1920s was hard pressed to 
meet the matching funds requirements to receive federal highway aid. Between 1925 and a 
special session of the legislature in 1928, debate over a proposed constitutional amendment to 
allow the state to construct and maintain highways was fierce. Representative Berryman led the 
forces for the amendment as the Good Roads Committee Chairman in the House of 
Representatives. Another leading banker from western Kansas, Senator John M. Gray, led the 
Senate Committee on Good Roads. The leadership of veteran politicians and businessmen from 
western Kansas signified the relationship of the roads issue with a desire to bring Kansas into the 
modern era through the improvement of its infrastructure and consequently, through increasing 
the economic capacities of the state’s producers. Although instituting a state system of roads was 
a controversial move for many Kansans, legislators like Berryman and Gray worked for this 
cause in the truest sense as solons: as respected statesmen and advisors to the people seeking to 
enact what best suited the needs of the state in the long term. In this case, by integrating Kansas 
into a nationwide structure of transportation networks, the good roads movement was both 
forward-thinking and economically rational. Ultimately, its supporters helped to shift the terms 
of Kansas’s relationship with the federal government. Such a partnership was vital to 
transitioning the state into a modern institution responsible for the needs of an increasingly 
mobile citizenry that demanded more from its government.  
 The Kansas legislature debated proposals for a “good roads amendment” and a series of 
administrative measures meant to structurally and financially support the new highway system. 




1925. Berryman was quoted in the Topeka Daily Capital: “Such an amendment is necessary if 
Kansas is to retain the benefits of federal aid.”
98
 Kansas could not afford to build modern roads 
without that aid, but movement toward cooperating with the national system of roads had been 
and would continue to be slow. Legislators had begun to motion for a more comprehensive state 
system of roads in 1917, and Kansas voters had finally passed an amendment to the constitution 
in 1920 which allowed the state to assist in the process of constructing roads.
99
 Under this 
system, however, control remained with the counties and local benefit districts, and the state had 
no authority to construct its own roads. Berryman suggested repealing the former law and giving 
the state the following powers:  
To plan, adopt, create, establish, improve, construct, reconstruct and maintain 
roads and highways. The state may raise funds for such purposes from the 
proceeds of a tax or registration fee imposed on motor vehicles and a tax on 
gasoline or other motor fuel. The state may reimburse benefit districts for the cost 
of permanent improvements of roads and highways adopted by the state which 
have been constructed after March 1, 1919.
100
   
 
This amendment received the approval of a substantial number of representatives, with the 
addition of a clause prohibiting the levying of property taxes or bond issues for state highway 
construction. In the end, however, the House fell seven votes short of the necessary majority to 
send the amendment to voters in 1925.
101
  
Opposition to the good roads amendment centered on the sharing of power between the 
state and federal governments, but also reflected familiar, deep-seated rivalries over control 
between the state and local governments. These battles for control dated back to the earliest 
efforts to improve Kansas roads, endorsed by bicycle enthusiasts and urban-dwelling nature 
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enthusiasts in the 1890s.
102
 As the legislature made its final approach toward revising the 
constitution, making it the last state to join the federal road network in the late 1920s, opponents 
argued over the need to connect Kansas with the national road system, commitments to repaying 
the investments of local funding campaigns, competing sectional interests that pitted farmers 
against eastern cities, and the power of the proposed state highway committee vis a vis the 
county commissioners.  
During the first serious debate about allowing the state to enter the highway building 
business, in 1925, a key point of attack was its allowance for federal aid. Many legislators and 
ordinary Kansans opposed federal aid on principle. A caucus of a small number of House 
members in February 1925 suggested that many legislators would rather “give up federal aid” 
than replace the county roads system with a statewide program.
103
 A few days later, the House of 
Representatives as a whole voted to adopt a resolution to the effect that the body was against 
federal aid.
104
 Arguing against the good roads amendment in a standing vote on the issue, 
Representative Frank L. Martin of Hutchinson represented the lengths to which opponents of 
federal aid would go. The Topeka Daily Capital quoted him: “I believe so strongly in home rule 
that I would stand here and destroy the chances of the state ever to get another dollar of federal 
aid.”
105
 He thought that if the amendment passed, “The state highway commission would lay 
such a burden on the state that ‘you won’t have any homes or have any farms.’” His major 
complaint against federal and state aid was that ‘“they delude people into believing they are 
getting something for nothing.”‘
106
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The opposing sides also disagreed about funding and the location of control for the 
highway system. The authors of the constitutional amendment resolutions in 1925 tried to pacify 
the counties and districts that had raised funds for paved roads under the 1920 amendment, and 
considered the distribution of licensing and fuel taxes more than fair compensation for rural 
counties.
107
 Further, the amendment would not allow the state to resort to property taxes or bonds 
as a basis for road funds, so the threat to “homes and farms” was small. Yet doubts persisted not 
just about the sources of funding for the roads, but also about how the distribution of those funds 
would suit local interests. The Topeka Daily Capital observed that “the county commissioners 
have a lobby at this session, working against an effective state highway system.”
108
 These 
lobbyists eventually submitted a bill “providing for a connected system of highways, almost 
entirely controlled by the counties,” with “very limited supervision of highway work and 
expenditures by the state highway commission.”
109
  
Although the legislature three times rejected resolutions supporting a good roads 
amendment to the constitution during the 1925 session, it did take smaller steps toward 
improving the highway program. In fact, the two houses proposed nearly 40 bills to support the 
creation of a new state highway department, headed by a state engineer of roads, and the division 
of funding for the state highways.
110
 The legislature also enacted a gasoline tax of two cents per 
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gallon, with funds apportioned among the counties for road building.
111
 Despite these actions, the 
Topeka Daily Capital reported that Berryman and the other committee members “feel that such 
enactments would be only a temporary makeshift.”
112
 Ultimately, good roads proponents would 
have to refight these battles in the 1927 meeting of the Kansas legislature.  
At the 1927 session, highways constituted a focal point of debate. It became clear that the 
Paulen administration and many lawmakers in Kansas wanted to get a good roads amendment to 
the voters, and that county control was becoming increasingly unpopular. The Topeka Daily 
Capital two years before had been supportive of some of the legislature’s concessions to the 
counties, but now declared that “county control has wrecked the state highway program.”
113
 Yet 
the amendment still faced stiff challenges, as the roads committee reported the resolution to the 
floor without recommendation and legislators seemed more content to continue passing minor 
road laws on a piecemeal basis.
114
  
Upon presenting his resolution to the House, J.W. Berryman spoke powerfully for the 
amendment he had been fighting to enact for two years. The Topeka Daily Capital quoted the 
House Chairman of the Good Roods Committee extensively. The amendment under discussion 
was ‘“the most important which has come before this legislature,’” Berryman argued. Speaking 
to the importance of the roads in bringing Kansas to the modern era, equal to all the rest of the 
states, he observed, ‘“Kansas is standing at the point where the proposition is clearly up to her. . . 
She is at the place where she may prepare for the future and prosperity or she may march at the 
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rear of the procession.”‘
115
 Using his business-minded philosophy, Berryman also appealed to 
the legislature’s sense of economy in pointing out that good roads would save Kansans millions 
of dollars in vehicle repair. Several of his fellow representatives supported these efforts. John C. 
Mack and Henry McGrew, for instance, spoke to the fairness of the funding basis for the road 
system, which consisted of usage taxes such as gasoline and licensing fees. McGrew added, ‘“I 
believe if we build an adequate roads system Kansas will be the hub of national highways.”‘
116
 
The same arguments that had surfaced in the previous legislative session came back to 
the mix in 1927. In a debate following Berryman’s introduction of the resolution, it became clear 
that this issue centered on the question of power and strong sectional divides in the state. Rural 
communities in western Kansas were particularly afraid of losing control of roads which would 
draw people away of small town markets and toward the larger regional centers. Opponents 
criticized federal aid, the proposed centralization of power within a small commission and the 
state government, and the building of a system that surpassed farmers’ market needs. Noah L. 
Bowman raised several key points for the opposition. He commented that Topeka officials are 
‘“not thieves and robbers, but they don’t know local conditions like the county officers do.”‘
117
 
He disapproved of federal aid because ‘“for every seven dollars we send to Washington we get 
back only three.”‘ F.B. Niles added with wit, ‘“The people have learned if they keep their money 
in the county treasury, they get to spend some of it sometimes.”‘
118
 Andrew J. White offered a 
point on behalf of the farmers: ‘“It’s the farmers that make Kansas, not the birds of passage, and 
the first road should be the one from the farmer’s gate to market.”‘
119
 Finally, in one of the most 
pointed statements of local and sectional disfavor for a state-controlled system, Vincent R. 
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Caster noted, ‘“I’m willing to trust my people in western Kansas, but I’m not willing to trust the 
people in eastern Kansas and they’re overwhelmingly in the majority.”‘
120
 This landslide of 
opposition buried good roads supporters and the resolution to submit an amendment to the voters 
failed by a large margin.  
Ultimately, the legislature made little headway toward moving the state into the national 
highway system. The Kansas House of Representatives that year even went so far as to petition 
Kansas’s representatives in Washington to discontinue federal aid projects, even if this meant the 
loss of tax money to federal debt repayment.
121
 Once again, the legislature’s efforts toward road 
development remained constrained by a broad unwillingness for counties to share too much 
control with the state and to receive funding from the federal government.
122
 At the close of the 
session, the Topeka Daily Capital rebuked the legislators: “One of the major questions before the 
legislature was road construction, and it made a weak effort to improve conditions . . . the 
legislature has only nibbled at state highway construction and until a constitutional amendment is 
passed Kansas will lag behind its neighbor states in state roads.”
123
 
The legislature’s rejection of federal assistance turned even more bitter for its supporters 
when it became clear that the state’s eligibility to receive any federal aid for road construction 
would expire in 1929 if it did not put forth an amendment allowing the state to enter the 
development business. Given these circumstances, the governor called a special session of the 
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legislature in July 1928 for the express purpose of writing and submitting such an amendment for 
the general election that fall. Governor Paulen noted in his opening address to the legislators, 
‘“Kansas is the only state which does not now comply with the federal highway act.”
124
 He 
intended “quick action” in a short session, and this time legislators complied. All debates on the 
proposed amendment were thrown onto the House floor for general discussion, and the Senate 
followed the tone set by the House in those debates.
125
 Lawmakers finally submitted two 
amendments to the people to bring the state into compliance with federal law. The first conferred 
power to the state to build and maintain highways, but rejected the use of property taxes or bond 
issues to fund them. The second amendment made clear the state’s power to levy taxes on motor 
vehicles and motor fuels specifically for the purpose of state highway construction, as this power 
had come under question.
126
 Despite quarrels over the language of the bill and more substantial 
questions about local control and reimbursements, Kansas voters finally had the option to move 
into the modern era on roads.  
A few years earlier, proponents of federal road aid had lamented Kansas’s road-building 
status in the prominent forum of the Topeka Daily Capital. Accompanied by a striking map of 
the transcontinental system of paved highways, which tellingly skipped over Kansas, one article 
argued that if Kansas did not make this change, it would be one of only three states denied 
federal funds for road building, and more symbolically, it would represent a failure in the 
completion of a national “Victory Highway.”
127
 Concerns about accepting federal aid and 
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supporting a state-directed highway program impeded Kansas’s participation in the first broad 
movement to unite the nation through automobile routes.  
As with many important pieces of legislation, Kansas’s lawmakers took several sessions 
to reason through their desired outcomes and make long-term change. This is in part a reflection 
of the limitations of biennial legislatures consisting of only fifty-day sessions. It also suggests, 
however, that representatives at the state level faced some limitations due to a lack of consensus 
over the state’s need to modernize and over the power of different sections of the state, as well as 
due to questions about the impetus for more centralized government that had begun in the 
Progressive Era. On the surface, fear of missing out on funding and losing face among the states 
shifted the balance to favor an amendment supporting a modern system of state roads. Yet the 
statesmanship of business-minded Kansans, elected for their economic stewardship, broad-
mindedness, and advising capacities, also played a role in transforming mindsets about state 
roads and related changes in the relationships between different units of government. Berryman’s 
support for a state-directed highway system, in particular, influenced this process of modernizing 
Kansas’s infrastructure and position within the nation-state. His interest in the economic 
betterment of rural communities superseded sectional differences and fears of centralized 
control. In the midst of a complex career that at times evidenced opposition to federal and state 
power when that authority challenged his own business, Berryman’s record on good roads 
reflected measured analysis and a strong sense of the broader needs of his community and state.  
Hard Times: The Changing Face of American Government, 1925-1930s 
Good roads proponents had grappled with an old progressive issue—a last vestige of the 
country life movement—and finally succeeded in gaining the people’s approval for 




While doing so, they also faced the growing challenges of a new era, when agricultural 
depression had returned to a once-prosperous region. One of the most important considerations 
for the good roads supporters, ultimately, was to remove the basis for funding roads from the 
general property tax that already overburdened land-poor farmers. Legislators had finally come 
to the conclusion that the state’s tax structure needed general reform. The State Tax Commission 
had predicted in 1924 that if current taxation trends continued, “Within the life of this generation 
. . . the value of agricultural lands will vanish and the farm owners will be reduced to the 
condition of tenants of the state.”
128
 Furthermore, the Department of Commerce reported in 1927 
that Kansas was “so far as modern taxation is concerned . . . the most backward state.” Whereas 
the revenue of other states averaged twenty-four percent from land taxes, Kansas raised fifty 
percent from this source.
129
 Continued reliance on property tax was an unacceptable solution, as 
were state-wide bond measures for the purposes of infrastructure development; thus, the solution 
for road funding fell to motor fuel taxes and vehicle licensing fees.
130
 The implementation of 
these new sources of revenue was consistent with the legislature’s larger efforts toward 
reforming the state tax structure and making non-land-based or intangible wealth more 
accountable to the state’s funding needs. The state’s enactment in 1925 of new taxes such as a 
millage rate on money and other intangible property, as well as a mortgage registration fee, are 
vital in characterizing legislative trends in this period.  
Proposals to tax intangible wealth, such as mortgages and other investments, improved 
the state’s ability to alleviate the burdens of an over-taxed farm sector by sharing revenue 
collection with the state’s growing business class. J.W. Berryman expressed concerns over this 
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plan, which may seem predictable given that this sort of tax would impact bankers’ wealth from 
investments, but it is surprising in light of the Ashland representative’s sentiments in favor of 
increasing state power over developing infrastructure.
131
 The complexity of the banker-
legislator’s opinions on these matters once again reflected the necessary balance between 
representing the constituents who gave him his political platform and the interests of his 
profession. In this case, Berryman’s willingness to follow the public mandate expressed in a 
1924 voter referendum to support tax reform and to participate in the ensuing conversations 
about classifying property and taxation rates, despite his qualms, allowed him to maintain his 
office. Indeed, as a representative of both the farm constituents of western Kansas and of the 
business community, Berryman offered important insight to the conversations about broadening 
revenue sources and best serving the state’s needs for modernization.  
Following the voters’ approval of an amendment permitting the legislature to classify 
new forms of property for taxation, legislators suggested mechanisms for imposing this new levy 
on intangible property, which the Topeka Daily Capital defined for readers as “money, 
mortgages, notes, and other evidences of debt such as stocks, bonds, annuities, royalties or 
copyrights.”
132
 The proposals split up money and mortgages, with the first owing millage taxes 
and the second being charged a fee upon registration.
133
 Legislators hoped that these new taxes, 
at rates below one percent in each case, would increase the amount of property listed on tax rolls 
from what had been represented under the general property tax rate of three percent or higher.  
The Kansas Senate and House of Representatives went back and forth on the terms of the 
new taxes and fees, including the rates and frequency with which they were to be paid. The 
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Senate was first off the mark in passing a mortgage registration fee, a fixed annual rate of 15 
cents on every $100 of mortgage principal, payable by the borrower at the beginning of the term. 
Meanwhile, the House considered several different bills that proposed different rates and such 
conditions as annual payments that raised the overall rates for holders of longer-term mortgages. 
One proposal, supported by Berryman and 42 other representatives, provided for differential 
rates on mortgages of different lengths, with shorter-term borrowers paying higher rates than 
long-term borrowers. The House ultimately adopted a bill raising the rate of the fee to 25 cents 
on the $100, “regardless of the duration of the mortgage.”
134
 Proponents of the bill argued that 
this would help the “long-time borrower who needs the most help” and who was contributing the 
most to Kansas’s prosperity and future by building homes.
135
 The Senate ultimately accepted the 




The Topeka Daily Capital heralded this new tax as a way to substantially raise revenue 
and allow Kansas “enough money to carry out a great highway improvement program, without 
burdening property that has up to this time borne the load of taxation for all purposes in the 
state.”
137
 Yet the newspaper’s editorial staff repeatedly questioned why the mortgage registration 
fee should be imposed on borrowers rather than on lenders. They thought the legislature should 
extend the coverage of the intangible millage tax to include mortgage papers owned by 
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 Accusations of special interests simmered as editorials accused some legislative 
members of “having their way about” the composition of the new revenue bills.
139
 The paper 
commented on the issue, “It would be a misfortune if in attempting to get revenue out of 
intangible property, of which mortgages are an important feature, owners of such property 
should be exempt and the state would land on the borrower for its revenue.” It added, “Why the 
owner of wealth in the form of mortgages should be tax-exempt in order to permit the state to 




Criticisms of the misapplication of mortgage fees aside, much of the taxation on other 
forms of intangible wealth would apply to lenders through the intangible tax law. The proposed 
law moving through both bodies of the legislature included provisions to tax the following items:  
Notes, mortgages, stocks, bonds, annuities, royalties, contracts, copyrights, claims 
secured by deeds, and every liquidated claim and demand for money or other 
valuable thing except notes or obligations secured by mortgages on real estate 
which mortgages have been recorded in this state and a registration fee or tax paid 




Lawmakers expected this tax, at a rate of two and a half mills (or .25 percent), to flush out 
property that owners had been unwilling to submit for taxation under the much higher general 
property tax rate (from three to five percent), and thus raise the overall revenue despite the lower 
rate of taxation. As the Topeka Daily Capital noted, “The excessive rate of taxation on intangible 
property has not been paid, except by exceptionally conscientious citizens, but the existence of 
such taxes has driven capital and wealth out of the state, kept wealth from entering the state and 
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hampered the development of the state.”
142
 Considering these inducements for change, the 
Kansas legislature successfully enacted this bill at the end of February in 1925.
143
 
The Topeka Daily Capital, complimented the 1925 legislature for completing “the most 
constructive legislation in more than [a] decade.” Although the newspaper routinely framed the 
legislature as conservative, it still deemed it progressive where it needed to be. On taxation, for 
instance, it had taken “courage to enact three revolutionary tax laws in one session, and the first 
session after adoption of the constitutional amendment” allowing the legislature to make such 
laws. The editorial staff added, “The legislature deserves credit for a conservative good sense. It 
was progressive enough and its progressivism was balanced by common sense.”
144
  
The tax laws passed in 1925 did not go without criticism and revision in future legislative 
sessions, but in principle they largely stuck.
145
 This is a testament to the changing needs of a 
state with modernized ideas about how to responsibly support a large class of farm constituents 
and simultaneously relieve some of their former burdens. As the Topeka Daily Capital 
editorialized, the state tax plan “was adopted to stay not to be wiped out because as an 
experiment, as many property owners judge it, the revenue was disappointing.”
146
 The 
newspaper reaffirmed the essential point of the tax reforms: “Lower taxes on the land are 
necessary before the farmer can keep up the fertility of the soil, which is steadily wasted, and 
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make such improvements as are necessary for farm prosperity and better living conditions.”
147
 
Kansas could not afford to backtrack on its commitments to tax reform, and the balancing of land 
taxes with intangible taxes.  
Thus, when the federal courts in 1929 found Kansas’s intangible tax law invalid as it 
applied to national banks, the legislature was not deterred from amending the law and trying to 
make it work.
148
 In the matter of revising the law to cover these institutions, the state appealed to 
national bankers to suggest feasible revisions so as not to deny the state a significant source of 
revenue.
149
 Bankers struggled to come to an agreement over how they should be taxed, with 
some agreeing to comply with any taxation placed upon the state bankers and others holding 
firmly to the national law that protected them from such taxation.
150
 The state realized that the 
U.S. Congress needed to act to allow taxation of national banks, but in the meantime the 
resolution of the issue came down to the legislature.
151
  
Not wanting to do away with the forms of revenue that allowed the state to rely less on 
the general property tax, the legislature delayed while soliciting opinions on the legality of a 
revised form of their current tax structure, even seeking feedback from individuals through the 
county commissioners. After receiving some reports that the counties would favor the repeal of 
the intangible and mortgage taxes in favor of sales and income taxes, legislators began to make 
proposals for such revisions of the tax code.
152
 Simple tax solutions, such as a suggested one mill 
tax (equal to one tenth of one percent) on all income, were not universally popular among those 
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who pointed out that the state had been making good faith efforts to diversify the tax base so that 
those with the ability to pay would pay more.
153
 The legislature continued this conversation in 
future sessions, pending the approval of the voters for a state income tax, some federal resolution 




Efforts to correct imbalances in the financing of government symbolized a state 
increasingly intent upon helping its agricultural class to survive. Doing so in some cases 
involved checking the fiscal advantages of the business class. Disgruntlement with the Kansas 
banking system was quite evident in the scrum over the intangibles tax, described above, as well 
as in the corruption scandal affecting an outgoing governor and the state bank commissioner in 
early 1925. This dissatisfaction lasted through the last years of the decade as the state’s 
regulatory authority faced continual revisions and as its earlier law to guarantee bank deposits 
failed.  
Kansas Bank Commissioner Carl J. Peterson’s collaboration with Governor Jonathan M. 
Davis in seeking a $2,500 bribe in return for the paroling of a convicted “bank wrecker” 
outraged the political press and solons of the legislature meeting in 1925. As revealed on the 
pages of the Topeka Daily Capital, Hutchinson attorney A.L. Oswald had sought the release of 
his client, Walter Grundy, from the Kansas State Penitentiary. Oswald had supported Governor 
Davis in an earlier political tour through the state, and applied to him as a friend for the favor of 
executive clemency. He was therefore surprised to be instructed that he must work through the 
state bank commissioner, and that he must provide a large sum of money in exchange for the 
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parole. Oswald and the state’s attorney general, C.B. Griffith, undertook a scheme to entrap the 
governor’s office and reveal this misdeed, and successfully unraveled a scandal that dredged up 
the wrongdoing of the “bank wrecker” and highlighted the extent of corruption within the 
regulatory arm of the state government.
155
 Threats against the bank commissioner’s job, his 
ultimate resignation, and the indictment of the former governor set the stage for a series of 
legislative reforms aimed not just at the state’s corruptible pardon and parole system, but also at 
state banking regulations that had allowed “bank wreckers” to thrive in the first place.
156
  
Meanwhile, by 1925, the shortcomings of the agricultural market in the post-war 
environment had produced a depression in the farming sections of the country which extended to 
the banks serving them. As Governor Benjamin S. Paulen remarked in his opening address to the 
1925 legislature, bank failures had increased due to bad internal management and excess loans, 
too many state bank charters, and problems within the state’s regulatory system. The state had 
been unable to cope with the demands on its bank guaranty fund, and the situation demanded 
revision. Paulen proposed that the guaranty fund should cease to pay interest on its certificates, 
that the power of the state bank charter board should be strengthened, that the banking 
department should become non-partisan and more dependent upon qualifications, and that a new 
banking board of five experienced bankers should serve in an advisory capacity to the state bank 
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 Each of these recommendations reflected the economic circumstances facing 
the state, as well as a general desire to bring bankers and their administrative system under 
greater control, especially in light of the recent corruption scandal. Bankers from the governor 
himself on down to the legislature and the state organizations for bankers would contribute 
substantially to these efforts. 
Some members of the legislature supported the outright repeal of the bank guaranty law, 
which had been enacted in 1909. They pointed to an insurmountable $8.5 million debt to 
depositors of failed banks and the fact that the guaranty fund as then set up could never raise that 
amount.
158
 Charles E. Snyder of Leavenworth explained on the Senate floor that the guaranty 
fund had been set up at limited level in the first place, with only $340,000 per year collected 
from member banks, and that the fund’s administrators had failed to collect these funds in the 
prosperous years following its establishment. Now that hard times had resumed, obligations had 
ballooned so high that the annual assessments could barely cover interest on the deposit 
certificates of failed banks. He stated unequivocally, “The bank guaranty fund is busted.”
159
 
Berryman, echoing his earlier battles against the enactment of the guaranty law, “led the attack 
on the state guaranty fund” in the House. He supported a Senate effort to remove public deposits 
from the liability of the guaranty fund and instead give municipalities and counties state bonds to 
cover their losses. This would have left only ordinary depositors under the fund’s protection, and 
many in the house objected to the idea of special treatment. Although Berryman argued “that the 
state bankers wanted to crawl out from under the load” of debt to the bank guaranty fund, the 
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Most legislators considered dismantling the fund an act of bad faith that the governor 
would never allow, and thus hewed to the administration’s suggestions for minimal change.
161
 
The Topeka Daily Capital thought repealing the guaranty fund “out of sympathy with the 
political work of the last 15 years” and opined that “there is nothing constructive about such 
legislation.”
162
 Furthermore, the current bank commissioner, Roy Bone, concluded that the debt 
estimates being thrown about the legislature were too high. By his calculations, the deposit 
guaranty fund in fact owed depositors around $2.2 million, plus interest, once failed banks’ other 
assets were figured into the equation.
163
 Honoring sentiments against repeal, the House banking 
committee killed efforts to repeal the bank guaranty law or to effectively cripple it in 1925.
164
   
The legislature committed to some of the governor’s other proposed solutions to the bank 
regulatory dilemma in 1925, as well. The Topeka Daily Capital noted that the American Bankers 
Association supported the changes in regulatory authority that Governor Paulen (a banker) had 
recommended, including lengthening the term of the bank commissioner so it was not such a 
politically-driven office, centralizing charter authority within the bank commissioner office, and 
requiring ample banking experience of office holders.
165
 The newspaper provided anecdotal 
support for better regulation and transparency about how the commissioner and the banks 
operated together. The editors commented that bank commissioners trying to “nurse weak banks 
along” in the effort to straighten them out did not necessarily have a proven track record, and 
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often were actually subverting well-placed laws in allowing banks to continue to make excess 
loans to clients and even to their own officers.
166
 The creation of a five-member banking board in 
1925 constituted one major improvement of regulatory strength.
167
  
Conversations about increasing the strength of the state’s oversight of the banking system 
and protections for depositors continued over the next few legislative sessions. At the beginning 
of the 1927 legislature, for instance, the Topeka Daily Capital argued that continuing 
“agricultural depression and a long series of bank failures” made the bank deposit guaranty fund 
all the more untouchable, despite its collapse over the last few years. The paper stated, “Kansas 
will rebuke any action by the legislature doing away finally with the bank guaranty policy.”
168
 
Governor Paulen’s message to the legislature signaled the importance of the banking situation by 
placing this issue before every other matter. He commended the previous legislature’s passage of 
the banking board bill, and reasserted the need to give this body stronger authority over bank 
charters. The message devoted several lines to the internal integrity of banks. Paulen argued that 
officers of state banks and trust companies “should be barred from borrowing money from those 
banks or trust companies of which they are active or on the salary list.”
169
 He added, “Safe and 
conservative banking should be encouraged and the reckless and speculative banker should be 
forced out of business.” The governor maintained the state’s ideological commitment to 
protecting depositors, despite the fact that the current guaranty fund “has proven inadequate and 
is hopelessly bankrupt, and of little value in its present condition.”
170
 Unfortunately, Paulen had 
to admit that he knew of “no way this [protection] could be done” except through the trial and 
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error process of granting the state regulators more power. In the end, it did not seem clear that 
even this action on the part of the state would prove sufficient; as Paulen concluded, “No bank is 
stronger than its officers and directors, and the best guarantee for a depositor is the honesty, 
integrity and ability of the managing officials of the institution.”
171
 Kansans maintained a 
commitment to the bank deposit guaranty principle; however, despite having elected a successful 
banker as governor and multiple bankers as representatives, the state lacked ideas on how to 
rectify the system to make it tenable over the long term. This problem reflected a gradual process 
of change through which the state came to terms with its limited capacities and the federal 




The House and Senate each proposed a number of revisions to the state banking laws in 
the 1927 legislative session. One lawmaker suggested that Kansas taxpayers might approve a 
bond issue to repay the deposit guaranty fund.
173
 Another proposed the creation of a new fund 
quite similar to the current one, but which forced all state banks to comply with the assessments 
and which essentially started over from scratch by excluding the obligations of previously failed 
banks. Still another idea was the prohibition of loans to bank officers and directors, and many 
additional regulatory bills were thrown into the hopper.
174
 Commentators in the legislature and 
on the editorial page of the Topeka Daily Capital evidenced sincere doubts about the merits of 
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these proposed changes, however. These observers did not deny the mess of affairs in banking, 
but argued that a lack of administrative laws was not to blame. Rather, regulatory laws poorly 
administered by a bank commissioner and board thinking mainly of the bankers themselves 
rather than of the depositors, were at the root of the state’s inability to secure the banking system 
adequately.
175
 Arguments over “taking the banking board out of politics” in a proposed law to 
amend the current board selection process, for instance, centered on whether allowing the 
bankers to nominate a list of candidates for commissioner was taking too much responsibility out 
of the hands of the governor.
176
 A general distrust for bankers was becoming more and more 
evident, even to the point that the Kansas House of Representatives approved a bill to support 
private banks going over the heads of the banking committee in seeking charters, because the 
board had a bias in believing the state already had too many banks.
177
 Observers approved of the 
legislature’s decision to enact harsher punishments for “inside bank wreckers” and prohibit 
officers of state banks from taking loans, but still seemed dissatisfied overall with a banking 
system that continued to witness failures across the state.
178
  
The state bank guaranty law itself finally came to rest in 1929. Economic conditions in 
Kansas created new anxieties that a slow-moving government limited to balanced appropriations 
and a muddled revenue system could not easily relieve. Taxation at the state level, a perennial 
policy issue in any modern legislature, would prove difficult to organize during an era of general 
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depression. Even the job of regulation, which the state had embraced in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, was becoming a burden the state could not bear, at least at this juncture. The 
larger job of regulating banks and protecting depositors ultimately came to rest with the national 
government; in the first year of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency he endeavored to reign in 
reckless institutions during a “bank holiday” and to shore up sound banks and their customers 
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  
Conclusion 
The state of Kansas in the 1930s, especially under the cash-basis laws of Governor Alfred 
M. Landon, could not accomplish much in the way of protecting its citizens from the perils of 
drought and depression.
179
 In the broader effort to shield residents from the effects of the Great 
Depression, the state government was largely restricted to cooperation with the federal 
government’s relief measures for struggling citizens, including farmers. That bankers and other 
political representatives of a state accustomed to taking care of itself would support this trend 
evidenced their pragmatism. Political leaders representing rural communities in western Kansas 
needed to ensure that their businesses and communities would be able to thrive into the modern 
era. Cooperating with the nationalization of support for farmers and their communities 
represented a continuation of the ways bankers maintained a fertile ground for their 
communities’ survival.  
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In spite of the limitations of the Kansas legislature in meeting the extreme emergency of 
the new era, it had successfully navigated through thirty years of a substantial and indeed 
progressive transformation in the way the people, their representatives, and their governments 
related to one another. Throughout the early twentieth century, legislators had maintained a high 
level of interest in protecting the state’s farmers. Bank and railroad reforms, rural credits and 
tenancy relief proposals, the movement for good roads, and tax reforms had all received 
justifications under a broad banner of agrarian support. Among the politicians working for these 
changes were bankers from western Kansas responsible to the rural constituents they represented 
as well as to the needs of their own profession. Although bankers as a class remained the targets 
of popular mudslinging, the individual banker-legislators of western Kansas demonstrated the 
distinction local lenders could receive among their communities not just for their local leadership 
but also for their service in higher offices.  
The banker-legislators of western Kansas were politically savvy in heeding the demands 
of rural communities. At the same time that they nurtured reform movements meant to sustain 
the basis of the rural social-economy, however, they also cultivated their own political influence. 
Constituents were careful to elect those who would best represent their interests. Bankers 
wishing to serve as legislators and to fulfill their visions of maximizing the advisory capacities 
and knowledge gained in their professional experience had to heed constituent demands or risk 
failure in the next election. Country bankers serving in the legislature continually proved capable 
of promoting popular reform causes, as well as the sorts of bureaucratic reforms and 
modernization programs for which their professions prepared them. In years of greater prosperity 
and even in years of renewed economic distress, Kansas communities elected the banker-




government would guard their communities’ and their banks’ economic interests, and over time 
came to support a more protective function within the national government. This prepared the 
state for a modern era when the federal government, more than ever before, would take a heavy 
role in supporting not only the nation’s economy, but also the social and cultural values 
important to rural Americans. 
125 
 
Chapter Three. A Canopy of Social and Moral Values: The Banker as 
Community Builder  
 
“The modern, up-to-date banker regards his position as a trust; he holds his position as a 
banker as a stewardship,” stated the Reverend W.W. Diehl before the Kansas Bankers 
Association’s (KBA) 1916 Convention. The minister spoke to an audience that purportedly 
shared his values as well as moral leadership within local communities. This leadership built 
upon not just economic status, but especially upon membership in elite social and religious 
circles. Diehl added that the banker “wishes so to invest his life as to realize the finest possible 
fruitage return. This return to appear, not so much in the form of dividends as in the form of 
community betterment. In other words, the modern banker regards himself as a community 
builder.”
1
 The language of stewardship and “fruitage return” spoke clearly to the issues of the 
agricultural economy intricately tied up with the future of farmers, banks, and whole rural 
communities. But even if farming was the lynchpin, it was not the only matter at stake in the life 
of the community. 
The 1916 KBA convention engaged broadly with the agenda of the Country Life 
movement, which concerned not only with the modernization of agriculture but also with the 
social challenges of life in rural America. The reforming tone of the meeting was not unusual 
during these years. In 1914, a representative of the Young Men’s Christian Association in New 
York outlined the need for better social conditions in the countryside. The speaker, Albert E. 
Roberts, had witnessed many young people journey to the city due to dissatisfaction with their 
rural homes. Roberts infused his call to bankers with millennial zeal when he told his audience, 
                                                 
1. Rev. W.W. Diehl, “The Banker and His Community,” Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual 
Convention of the Kansas Bankers Association, Held at Salina, Kansas, May 11-12, 1916 (Topeka: H.M. Ives & 




“When you give yourself and your time and thought to the moral and spiritual needs of the 
country as well as the economic improvements, the day shall come when the kingdom of this 
world shall literally become the kingdom of our Lord.”
2
 Lofty addresses such as James M. 
McKay’s “A Rural Civilization” and W.F. Benson’s “The Banker’s Helping Hand,” thus, 
followed an established pattern. Benson, the Kansas State Bank Commissioner, was conscious of 
the historical record when he made a wish for the future: 
We cherish a hope that the Kansas banker has so performed his allotted task that it 
may be written of him that he helped his State to meet its responsibilities; that he 
helped his people to study and solve the problems of education and morality, of 





The repeated references to “moral and spiritual needs” and “morality” suggested that country life 
reform went beyond agriculture and issues of economic and physical infrastructure, though 
bankers and lawmakers may have found these concerns easier to address.
4
 Bankers viewed 
themselves as the proper leaders in the moral development of their communities, and their 
convention speakers consistently affirmed that belief.  
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This chapter explores the canopy of social and moral values with which bankers engaged 
in their efforts to define the contours of rural society in western Kansas. Marriage to respectable 
women, church membership, and family participation in clubs that actively took on social causes, 
were signs of social and moral capital derived from class and economic power. In addition to 
illustrating the ways family relationships helped bankers attain social influence, the chapter 
considers a number of events and issues that demonstrate the ways members of the capitalist 
class within rural America sought to exert that power. First, it highlights the issue of temperance, 
showing how bankers in Concordia, Kansas united their religious and moral interests with the 
political power of their class to support “Law and Order” in rural Kansas. Such activities affirm 
the integral role bankers and their families played in the social upkeep of their communities 
during the early twentieth century. Next, the chapter shows that the status of banking families 
within their communities drove their contributions of time and funds in the patriotic causes of 
World War I, including the solicitation of government bond purchases and donations to the 
American Red Cross. The participation of elite rural women in war work reflected their interests 
in embracing the responsibilities of citizenship. Such volunteer work directly translated to the 
struggle for suffrage on the grounds that women could exercise a moral influence in politics. As 
before the war, however, concerns of morality and social control were not restricted to women. 
Rural society more broadly, including some leading businessmen, participated in postwar efforts 
to maintain the moral purity and social order of their communities. Building on the tactics used 
against so-called “slackers” during the war, these activities verged on coercion, especially when 
organized by the illicit Ku Klux Klan. I argue, however, that in uniting their economic power 
with social interests and moral values, elite rural Americans such as the bankers in this study 




outward image of the town and its people, after all, spoke to the strength of its financial roots and 
those making good on the bank’s credit to establish sound farms, businesses, and other 
institutions for communal enjoyment.  
Good Wives: The Role of Family and Class in Preserving the Reputation and Values of 
Country Bankers  
 
A banker’s personal reputation stood at the heart of his ability to manage his business 
affairs successfully and gain the trust of the public in political and social matters important to the 
community. That reputation derived in no small part from his family connections and association 
with the supposed best people of rural society. A banker just starting up in a community would 
take care in the relationships he formed, as Vermont-native Frederick Atwood recalled upon 
alighting in Concordia, Kansas in the late 1870s. His memoirs took note that among the first 
people he met in the frontier town were two clerks who invited him to the Presbyterian and 
Methodist Sunday schools. Atwood commented, “I had made acquaintences [sic] that I felt sure 
were the right sort.”
5
 These two congregations generally represented the pinnacle of Western 
society, and the men’s church memberships assured Atwood of their worth. The social and 
economic status of these men was reinforced when they later served as cashier and assistant 
cashier in a local bank. Although the young banker was doubtful about the merits of the “dirty 
little burgh” and compared it unfavorably to the Eastern communities where he had resided 
previously, he was conscious of the fact that he needed to “assume the role of a tenderfoot 
earnestly desirous of winning the good-will of the community.” He ultimately befriended 
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“people from the North, South and East who for one cause or another had come to this new 
country to make a new home.”
6
  
Atwood’s young wife aided him in the connections he sought to make in Concordia and 
in establishing his social influence in the town. He described his bride-to-be before their 
marriage: “She was quiet, modest, natural, sincere. It seemed that good-will radiated from her. . . 
. Withal, she had a mysterious moral strength that compelled respect.”
7
 Atwood went on to note 
that his wife, Jessie (Hawkins), went on to socialize with a large number of ladies of the “so 
called ‘best families’ of town,” especially those from the Presbyterian Church.
8
 
  Nettie (McNickle) Berryman’s story presents another example of the respectable women 
bankers sought to marry. She demonstrated the ways women could seek financial independence 
in the rural West, and how these qualities could be especially attractive to young country 
bankers. McNickle, the daughter of Nebraska farmers, set out to establish herself by making a 
homestead claim and buying space for a millinery shop in the frontier community of Pond Creek, 
Oklahoma Territory. In the period between 1894 and 1896 when she attempted to launch her 
fortunes, the territory confronted drought and tight financial conditions while roiling with 
conflict over railroad connections and other matters of community development. By 1896, 
McNickle was in debt and considering selling her business and farm. Since offers for farms on 
the Oklahoma Plains were not forthcoming, she decided to return to Nebraska and take up school 
teaching so that she could save the money to cover her debts. She described her condition in the 
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millinery shop as “near annihilation” and continued to worry about relieving herself of the 
business and homestead claim while completing a six-month teaching contract.
9
  
Although she met her future husband, Jerome W. Berryman, during these years, she 
opted to wait before marriage, even if that might have been an easier course. She felt the burden 
of debt keenly, as a symptom of her personal shame. When her fiancée sent her a bicycle as a 
birthday present in October 1896, she thanked him effusively for the gift, but also became 
introspective:  
I cried last night for the first time for a long time. I think it was because I felt 
unworth[y] of such lovely birthday presents, for my folks remembered me too. Do 
you know I believe the Lord did not let me prosper financially while in P[ond] 
C[reek] because I was so wicked. He knows I do things I should not do when I am 
where I can be having a good time so he made it necessary for me to stay out in 
the country where I will not be tempted to do wrong. I try to be patient but I will 




McNickle’s self-consciousness about her debts perhaps reflected some of the qualms her parents 
had expressed when Jerome proposed marriage. Although her father gave his blessing for the 
marriage, he did raise the point that the bride’s family had lesser “wealth and fame” than 
Berryman’s, which included illustrious reverends, doctors, and prominent bankers in Kansas City 
and Wichita. Berryman assured Mr. McNickle that class differences were meaningless to him 
and did nothing to discourage his feelings for the young lady. He wrote, “I belong to a family of 
plain honest broad [minded] people who with what ever measure of . . . distinction any of them 
may have gained have not gone on to assume false airs of superiority.” The young banker added 
that “one of the principles of our Democratic Commonwealth to which I most firmly adhere is 
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that every honest upright man is the peer of every other.”
11
 In the matter of the debt and its 
causes, Berryman clearly admired McNickle’s tenacity enough to overlook any minor financial 
indiscretions.
12
 He helped her as much as he could in managing the land she had been unable to 
sell in Pond Creek, renting it and hiring out the task of breaking the sod and raising a crop in the 
fall of 1896.
13
 Despite her temporary financial distress, the banker saw in this woman an 
independent helpmate for a successful future and a good example of persistence and 
responsibility. The two married in 1898 and moved to Ashland, Kansas. Nettie Berryman 
demonstrated her long-term financial stability as a stockholder and director in her husband’s 
Ashland bank. 
 The Berrymans resolved their personal debt issue before marriage, but finances still could 
become a source of tension within the families of western Kansas’s leading businessmen. A 
lender’s inability to control the spending of his wife and children could create status anxiety and 
disturb efforts to present a reputable, stable image of the family before the community. 
Arguments over budgeting between the Doerrs of Larned, Kansas reflected how desires for the 
trappings of the upper class—vacations, nice clothes, and higher education among them—
sometimes interfered with the patriarch’s efforts to teach his family the value of money. It was 
clear that Albert and Laura Doerr each had an idea of what their status in the community 
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demanded of them. For instance, Albert Doerr was pleased that his musical daughter would give 
concerts for the community, and expected the town to remark upon these events. On one such 
occasion he noted in a letter to his wife that one town newspaper had mentioned the event, while 
the other had not.
14
 He also seemed glad to be able to send the family on vacations to Colorado 
and off to school, provided his wife and daughters were not too extravagant while away from 
home. During the summer of 1922, while Laura and her two daughters vacationed in Boulder, 
Colorado, Doerr became exasperated about his daughter Pauline’s spending too much money. He 
told his wife to relay the message, “I will not send her to school this year[;] she might just as 
well apply for a job teaching as she must know the value of money before she can go to school 
again.” The irate father added, “Don’t let her write a check on me for I will have the same go to 
protest at the bank and turned back to the people that accepted it.”
15
 Doerr, a merchant, lender, 
and director of several banks and loan institutions, knew how to reprimand those living beyond 
their means. 
A truly stinging letter the following year suggested that the same problems with his 
daughter’s spending were not letting up, and provided the opportunity for Doerr to suggest an 
alternative set of values for his family. In his anger, Doerr blamed his wife for the family 
finances. He accused her:  
The trouble is that you simply act . . . to please yourself and principally the girls. 
They certainly will be miserable when they get homes of there [sic] own as the art 
of spending money has been thoroughly taught to them and instead of helping 
them on in life their practice will only make them miserable. There is more to life 
than a big show of clothes. And I see no reason why it should cost us so much 
more than other people. But you have always spent money lavishly not caring 
from where it came just so you had it to spend and then not care how I had to 
skimp to dig it up. I am certainly disgusted with this kind of a show [;] we spend 
and have plenty to be comfortable if we will just be sensible. Brains count more 
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This diatribe hit at the supposedly feminine vices of desiring “a big show of clothes” and 
consuming conspicuously. Albert also compared Laura Doerr’s spending with others of their 
class when he wrote, “It is queer that you feel that you occupy such an exhaulted [sic] station and 
to maintain it requires so much money. Other people have social obligations and seem to fulfill 
them with much less.”
17
 Albert Doerr clearly felt that “lavish” spending was unnecessary for the 
maintenance of their social station, and he wanted to promote different values—thrift and 
intelligence—to his daughters.  
This bitter reprimand of husband to wife moved beyond the internal tensions of family 
spending; economic conditions put external pressure on Doerr’s ability to deliver a stable income 
for the family and provoked defensiveness about his status as a provider. Doerr complained to 
his wife:  
That conditions are as they are is certainly no pleasure . . . for me and not a 
particle do you contribute to lighten the load and help out while waiting for the 
turn for the better. I am sorry I am such a poor provider but I am just as I am. I 





During the early 1920s, in the aftermath of the lending frenzy that accompanied World War I, 
economic conditions were poor in agriculture and the associated farm implements business. 
Doerr attempted to maintain his financial interests by purchasing land off of defaulting 
borrowers in the surrounding region, but considered selling his mercantile to increase his cash 
flow. The possibility of forfeiting a major part of his business interests, what was later described 
as “the genesis of his industrial empire,” undoubtedly disturbed the man’s sense of self, perhaps 
                                                 






as much as his lack of control over family spending.
19
 The Doerrs would continue to face 
challenging economic conditions in the 1920s and 1930s, but wisely chose to keep the mercantile 
business as farmers in southwestern Kansas continued to mechanize. Despite the financial 
difficulties of the maturing family in the early 1920s, husband and wife remained family-oriented 
in their accumulation of a sizeable estate.
20
  
 Disagreements over spending habits notwithstanding, Laura Doerr made a good wife for 
a leading businessman and politician. Born to an elite local family in the earliest days of 
Larned’s settlement, she helped her husband, who was raised as a farmer, cement his status in 
town as a successful merchant, an investor in real estate and banks, and a state politician. She 
herself owned farmland and town lots, and assisted in overseeing the mercantile business when 
Doerr was attending the Kansas legislature or serving as state business manager. She took 
pleasure in accompanying him on his many trips to review his farms in southwestern Kansas, 
which he leased out to tenants.
21
 Her obituary remembered her as an active participant in the 
social affairs of her town and state, including membership in the Kansas State Historical Society, 
a local women’s political club called the Portia, the American Legion Auxiliary, and the 
Presbyterian Church. The memorial concluded, “Mrs. Doerr enjoyed to the fullest extent the 
social and civic affairs of Larned.”
22
 Undoubtedly these commitments reinforced her and her 
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husband’s sense of status and duty, as well as magnified their personal values within the social 
sphere.  
Wives like Laura Doerr, Jessie Atwood, and Nettie Berryman, especially through their 
social connections, church affiliations, and club work, helped their husbands to establish a broad 
social influence in their communities. As small towns on the Great Plains developed, bankers 
and their families were often key proponents for retaining the wholesome social and moral 
values associated with rural America even as they embraced some of the advantages of 
modernization and the increasing connections of their towns with the nation as a whole. 
Upholding Morality in Local Communities: The Law and Order League of Concordia, 
Kansas 
 
Morality was central to Frederick Atwood’s estimation of others and to his perception of 
the purposes of citizenship. The Concordia banker reflected on the role of someone in his 
position in the community self-consciously and at length:  
In view of my then present position I felt it a duty—and a pleasant one—to take a 
definite interest in all that was for the good of the community; so I became active 
in participating in whatever seemed to be for the general welfare. If work was 
assigned me and I consented to undertake it, I did my best to do it to the limit of 
my ability. . . . In some degree I possessed moral courage. I never hesitated to line 
up, with no apologies, with those who stood for high moral standards—everyone 




Atwood’s conclusion that his hard work and strong moral principles led his community to endow 
him with “considerable work” and influence was a common theme among country bankers 
serving rural communities in western Kansas. In Atwood’s case, his continued social influence is 
important because he maintained it despite participating in a contentious local campaign to 
uphold temperance laws. Bankers were not always of accord with the entire community, but 
could retain their social capital and economic power due to character and moral principles. 
                                                 




 From 1902 to 1904, the town of Concordia experienced the resurgence of a Law and 
Order League. An organization first established in the 1880s when Kansas first passed a 
prohibition law, it re-convened to support “due respect” for morality laws, including prohibition 
of alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. The group formed during a local tent revival meeting in 
June 1902, and received the first donations to its coffers from the revival organizers. Its religious 
origins and the location of its meetings at the Methodist Episcopal and Presbyterian churches 
indicated that the group had firm connections with the established religious authorities in town.
24
 
Atwood became a member, and his bank cashier W.W. Bowman became the League’s Executive 
Secretary. Other local businessmen with strong moral compunctions filled out the Executive 
Committee, joining forces with churches and women’s temperance clubs.  
In the month after its organization, the Law and Order League orchestrated a sting on a 
local saloon as its first salvo against the liquor forces in town. Two young men, apparently allies 
of the League (one was employed by its president), went into a “joint” belonging to Ed. A. 
Frazer at Fifth and Broadway in Concordia, where they were served beer and whiskey. These 
witnesses helped file a warrant for a raid of the fixtures and contents of the place. The court 
forced Frazer to pay a $700 bond, while the owner of the seized equipment, the Ferd Heim 
Brewing Company, had to file an action to redeem its property. The Law and Order League 
rebuked the Company’s efforts by filing a redelivery bond to get the property back in the 
sheriff’s possession. This bond was signed by League President R.S. McCrary (a merchant), 
bank cashier and League Secretary W.W. Bowman, and League mayoral candidate S.C. Wheeler 
(a farmer and former populist state senator), among others. Banker F.J. Atwood served as 
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 The suit, which moved into the courts in August and September, ultimately failed, and 
this failure seems to have weakened the resolve of some members of the League. As the 
Concordia Blade-Empire reported: 
Some of the gentlemen who were conspicuous in the prosecution of E.A. Frazer 
as an initiatory step toward the rigid enforcement of the prohibitory la[w] in 
Concordia, are thoroughly disheartened and disgusted and inform the Blade that 
since the ending of the Frazer trial they have about reached the conclusion that it 
is impossible to convict a man for selling liquor in this community, where a 
preponderance of public sentiment is against the enforcement of the prohibitory 




The report added that these men were willing to support the licensing of a limited number of 
joints at a rate of $200 to $250 per month. This conclusion to their first major effort to support 
the temperance law was a blow to the Law and Order League, and confirmed that the local 
newspapers were unsympathetic to their cause. Still, the lawsuit had drawn attention to the 
League’s aims. It established the lines of the temperance battle: newspaper reports implicated 
several town businessmen in the defense of the saloon proprietor, and the pious representatives 
of the League formed the opposition. 
Over the first few months of its existence, the League made efforts to form local chapters 
across the county and began to organize a campaign for local elections the following year.
27
 
Rather than try for bold action again, the group sought to establish its goals and values among 
the public. With a sense of injustice rooted firmly in the failed legal action against the alcohol 
joints, the League began publishing a Bulletin to represent its views. One issue charged:  
For a number of years prior to the last city election, state laws and city ordinances 
relative to the sale of intoxicating liquors, to the operation of gambling devices 
and to the maintenance of houses of prostitution were flagrantly and brazenly 
violated. Insofar as notice of these infractions of law was officially taken, it was 
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done by the imposition of nominal fines which operated as a license rather than a 
restraint. . . . The situation gradually grew worse until chronic criminals were 




In his memoirs, Atwood recalled that these lax citizens and local political leaders were known as 
the “liberal element,” and that the League vowed to do “all possible to rid the town from the 
domination” of this group. Its main strategy was to organize a party ticket of law-abiding 
candidates for mayor, city treasurer, city attorney, and officers of the city wards.29  
The election was heated, to say the least. The League’s Bulletin accused the town’s main 
newspapers of favoring the “liberal” candidates and noted that “the belief was wide-spread that 
large sums were furnished by the wholesale liquor houses to prevent by any means the election 
of the Law and Order candidate.” It added, “Every artifice known to the resourceful politician, 
every technicality known to the shrewdest lawyer was employed to render the efforts of the 
League abortive.”30 There was some merit to this accusation; the newspaper took shots at the 
League’s nomination of a “Citizens’ Ticket” for the election ballot. Reporting on the League’s 
nominating convention, the Concordia Empire noted derisively that “the women were out in 
large numbers and formed fully half of the convention.” The newspaper took serious issue with 
League President R.S. McCrary deeming the opposing ticket (comprised of Republicans) the 
“whisky ticket.”31 In the next month, the town’s Republican newspaper accused the League of 
improper procedure in calling a nominating convention for a party that did not exist. They 
reported that the election managers would have to seek petitions for the nomination of their 
candidates under an independent category rather than have a whole party ballot. The Empire 
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accused the League leadership of knowing the proper procedure, but resorting to the convention 
as “a farce to arouse enthusiasm and fool some of the people.”32 The weekly Blade-Empire later 
admitted that the issue was not of much importance, and the Citizens’ Ticket was eventually 
allowed to go on the ballot.33 
The newspapers’ complaints on behalf of the League’s opponents were also warranted in 
some cases. The Blade-Empire was particularly forceful in its censure of the Law and Order 
League’s Bulletin, which they accused of near-constant libel and misinformation. The Blade-
Empire’s “Whittlings” column took its task of cutting its opponents down to size very seriously. 
On March 25, 1903, the writer commented dryly, “We were told that the Law and Order league 
was to have an organ [newspaper] and it turns out to be only a hand organ run by a crank.” On 
March 27, “Whittlings” issued another volley of attacks on the “Hand Organ” of the Law and 
Order League. This time it condemned the Bulletin for libeling a group of women residing in a 
particular area of town as prostitutes. Apparently apologizing for this mistake did not prevent the 
Bulletin from condemning “indecent foreigners,” such as the German- and Irish-Americans 
commonly associated with a drinking culture. On March 30 “Whittlings” called the League out 
for such name-calling. The column vowed to leave dealing in “dirty personalities” to the “mud 
slingers” of the Law and Order League, but did publish cartoonist Albert T. Reid’s drawings 
lampooning the League in the days leading up to the April 7 election (Figure 3.1). These 
cartoons cited the Bulletin’s wild accusations and pointed out that its efforts did nothing but 
malign innocent, hard-working people and prevent business from coming to Concordia. 
Combined with the “Whittlings” columns, these cartoons effectively slayed the high-minded 
ideals and low tactics of the League. 
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The drama surrounding the city elections in April reflected the extreme closeness of the 
race for control of the town of Concordia. The election of April 7, 1903 was still undecided two 
Figures 3.1a, b, and c. Albert T. 
Reid cartoons attacking the claims 
of the “mud-slinging” Law and 
Order League Bulletin, Concordia 
Blade-Empire, April 2, 1903, p. 1; 
and April 4, 1903, p. 1 & 4. Reid 
was a Cloud County native who 
became well known for his political 
cartoons skewering populists and 
“saloon smashers” like Carrie 
Nation. His drawings were 
published frequently in Topeka and 
Kansas City newspapers, and 
appeared in the Chicago Record, 
the New York Herald, and the 





days later, and both sides vowed to contest the results if the opposition were declared the 
winner.34 Though the League’s ticket came out barely ahead in a nearly 50-50 town vote, the 
opposition followed up on its threat and took a lawsuit over the election to the Kansas Supreme 
Court. The League Bulletin, remarking on this action, felt that the “liberals” were trying to 
“make it so damned expens[ive] for these meddlers that they’ll never try it again.” The group 
was forced to appeal to its members for funds to pay legal fees. The Bulletin put it this way: 
“Concordia will be what its people want it to be. Why not make it a town of which we may all be 
proud- a model town morally, socially and commercially? Is it not worth an effort? Is it not 
worth a little time and a little money?”35 The case persisted in the courts for months, with the 
League’s lawyers trying to get a jury trial that, according to the Concordia Blade-Empire, would 
only result in a divided decision and allow the sitting mayor to hang onto office.36 
While the legal case dragged on, the newspapers continued to criticize the League’s 
ineffectual actions against the vice industries in town. Though it had control of the mayor’s 
office and the offices of the city attorney and sheriff for the time being, the League evidenced an 
unwillingness to pursue its aims to completion. Just after the city election, the Blade-Empire 
reported that the Law and Order League had dropped its case in State vs. Frazer, the saloon case 
it had filed the previous fall. This action caused the newspaper to inquire, “Is this the manner in 
which the law is to be enforced since Concordia has gone ‘dry’?”37 Months later, the newspaper 
published yet another Reid cartoon, this one ridiculing the League’s ineffectiveness against the 
joints in an image that feminized the Law and Order man as a businessman in a derby hat and 
house dress uttering only an un-motivating “Shoo!” to a group of men sidled up to a bar (Figure 
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3.2). Though a committee from the Law and Order 
League, including banker Frederick Atwood, 
petitioned the County Attorney to finally start 
taking action against the saloons in November 
1903, it was not enough for the group to regain its 
standing with the general community.38 
 The campaign for upholding laws he felt 
morally justified took a toll on Atwood, despite the 
fact that he was not among the major political faces 
of the group and instead was one of those who took 
substantive action on multiple occasions. In a small 
town evenly divided on the matter, “honest and fair-minded neighbors” and even good friends 
would follow the town newspapers’ lead in calling the Law and Order League members 
“temperance cranks.” Atwood commented on the bitterness that developed as a result of political 
disagreements: “Many of my former friends were markedly cold and a number would not speak 
to me.” Perhaps most importantly, political disagreements had the potential to harm business. 
Atwood noted that “several of the directors of the bank were displeased by my activity and said I 
was injuring the bank.”  
Still, he took the advice of another director who told him, ‘“Mr. Atwood, you do what 
you think is right—don’t be troubled by what people say. It won’t hurt in the long run.’” That 
wisdom was confirmed. The banker became an influential member of the “Bull Moose” 
progressives and was a correspondent of William Allen White, the famed news editor from 
Emporia. Atwood’s social capital remained strong, allowing him to remain an active member of 
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the popular Knights of Pythias Lodge, “the most active and prosperous fraternity in town” 
featuring “many of the wide-awake young business and professional men,” and to become a 
founding member of the Concordia Rotary Club.39 Atwood’s banking institutions in Concordia 
and several nearby communities continued to thrive, and he was recognized for his statewide 
prominence as a banker with a term as the Kansas Bankers Association President in 1921-1922. 
Atwood was able to follow his belief and sense of personal duty “to discourage in every lawful 
way this fruitful source of crime, shame, heart-break and ruin” without detriment to his character 
and reputation. His zealous but politically honest and upright behavior allowed him to steer a 
straight course through a major political fracas and to maintain moral and social authority within 
his community.40 Though Atwood’s feelings on temperance and other issues of morality would 
not have been universal among all Great Plains bankers, his example certainly confirmed the 
general rule that the country banker would attempt to influence his community on a broad range 
of issues he believed to be in the community’s interest. Many were able to do so in the 
diplomatic fashion Atwood modeled, suitable to roles as financiers and elite members of rural 
society.  
“The Firing Line Is No Farther than the Nearest Bank”: Bankers and the Liberty Loan 
Drives of WWI 
  
The status of bankers within their communities and their involvement in local club work 
for political and social causes—even locally unpopular ones—prepared them especially well to 
fulfill the demands of the nation during wartime. Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs 
McAdoo, in speaking before the American Bankers’ Association in September 1917, noted how 
important were “men of your stamp and character, who must be leaders in the business life of 
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your respective communities” in responding to the nation’s needs and animating the American 
people to the cause of making the country “more than she has ever been in her history—regnant 
for right, for justice, for democracy throughout the world.”
41
 Their work in securing the national 
finances was “fundamental to war”: bankers had to urge their communities to save and invest 
funds with the country and ensure that ample credit could flow toward the government by 
limiting loans intended for “new capital expenditures” in the business and industrial sectors. 
Indeed, McAdoo felt that “the American banker must, because of his knowledge, experience, 
ability, and influence, become the first line of defense and offense.”
 42
  
Country bankers played a major role in financing the war and increasing the scope of the 
nation’s international obligations by way of their bond salesmanship during and after the war.
43
 
Their wartime service as civilian financiers objectively made them complicit in the broader 
agenda of financing the war, and helped shape the U.S.’s leading role in international finance.
44
 
Bankers’ participation in the wartime cause made sense when contextualized within their broader 
efforts toward social influence within their communities. The historian Christopher Capozzola 
places this phenomenon firmly within the context where Americans’ primary political 
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obligations channeled through local social groups. Community-based organizations such as Red 
Cross chapters and Councils of Defense served as the foundation for learning the obligations of 
citizenship. During the heated climate of an at-times unpopular war, however, obligations could 
lead to coercion. Failure to participate fully in a group’s functions could earn a man or woman 
the reputation as a “slacker,” what contemporaries called non-participants and dissenters. 
Americans had to work hard to maintain their reputations as helpful citizens and leaders.
45
 In 
small towns, the closeness of the community and the watchfulness of the local newspaper made 
wartime voluntarism especially important. The Pratt Daily Tribune, for example, expressed the 
responsibility to volunteer multiple times. Even before the official declaration of war, on March 
26, 1917, the newspaper commented that “every able-bodied man owes his services to the 
country.”
46
 On May 25, 1917, the editor declared in a headline, “Everybody to Give at Least 
Three Hours a Week to U.S.” This proclamation enlisted men and women and even children into 
the work of the “national service army,” which would solicit loans, organize Red Cross work, 
provide home industrial work, and produce and preserve food.  
Locals framed the leadership of financing campaigns in a fundamentally patriotic vein. In 
the moment of war, local communities as well as a grateful nation generally viewed bankers’ 
activities for the cause in a positive light. For bankers, the obligations for compliance with the 
aims of the wartime state were particularly high. In their official capacities as lenders in the 
agricultural economy, their first role was to promote farm production. Kansas’s main role in the 
war was to plant more wheat, and Governor Arthur Capper had warned lenders to cooperate. The 
Pratt Daily Tribune noted in its April 26, 1917 report, “The banker who refuses to finance the 
seeding and cultivating of Kansas fields ‘as liberal as prudence will allow’ will be branded by the 
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governor as a ‘slacker.’”
47
 Speakers at the annual Kansas Bankers Association meeting likewise 
admonished bankers that “speculative ventures must be discouraged and productive enterprise 
must be nourished.” This meant that lenders should encourage the farmer “to do all he can to 
produce all he can and assure him of our financial support.”
48
 In a statement of profound 
significance for the coming years, the bankers supported assurances to farmers “that there is no 
danger of any overproduction for the next ten years. Such a thing is inconceivable.”
49
  
Bankers’ involvement in the war typically did not end with financial support for 
industrializing agricultural production; this was not, after all, far out of the ordinary realm of 
business activities in rural western Kansas. As leaders of the business community and many 
social clubs, bankers faced considerable expectations for volunteer commitments, and 
participation in liberty loan campaigns was practically universal. Financing a war with a small 
federal budget required that the nation fall back upon a strategy implemented during the Civil 
War: bond sales. Whereas the latter campaign had laid the foundation for the figurative and 
literal bond between the federal government and banks which bought into the national debt, the 
World War I bond drive sought to engage the American people, not just the banks.
50
 As the Pratt 
Daily Tribune reported in May 1917, bond denominations from $50 to $100,000 with 
semiannual interest payments from the government would suit a wide range of Americans. The 
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Treasury Department’s decision to offer interest rates high enough to warrant ordinary citizens’ 
holding the bonds rather than re-selling them to the banks, and to tax the bonds, supposedly 
discouraged high levels of investment among financial institutions.
51
 The national bond office 
explained its strategy in a statement that argued, “It is earnestly desired that this loan shall be a 
popular loan, a loan by and from the people at large of the United States, and not alone from 
banks, trust companies, and financiers.”
52
 The bond drive espoused the high ideals of the 
wartime cause. Named “The Liberty Loan of 1917,” it was “a loan from a free people to be used 
in freeing the world” and “the loan of the great democracy of the New World to reduce the 
wrongs and support the cause of the democracy of the Old.”
53
 McAdoo’s office assured 
Americans that their purchases vouched fundamental support for the justice, honor, and freedom 
of their country: 
Every American who subscribes to the justice of the course of the United States in 
entering and conducting the war we are now engaged in should subscribe to the 
Liberty Loan bond issue to the extent of his or her financial ability.  
 
Every American who subscribes to the belief that an American should stand by 
his or her country should subscribe to the Liberty Loan bond issue. 
 
Every American who loves America and is jealous of America’s honor should 
subscribe to the Liberty Loan bond issue. The real success of the loan is to be 





The nation’s ability to embrace many of its citizens in the bond campaign—and thus represent 
their loyalty to the cause—was vital to its reputation abroad and for the success of its democratic 
values. The Treasury Department thus enlisted those closest to the economic heart of local 
communities to help the government sell bonds in campaigns for $2 billion, $3 billion, and 
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eventually $6 billion. Of an estimated $32 billion spent by the U.S. Government on the war, 
bonds provided fifty-eight percent of the total ($24 billion), during four wartime “Liberty Bond” 
campaigns and two post-war “Victory Bond” drives. Community bankers’ cooperation with the 
federal government was essential to the success of the fundraising.
55
 
As Concordia banker Frederick Atwood later suggested, the work was not easy. Serving 
as the appointed chairman of the Liberty Loan Committee of Cloud County, Kansas until a year 
after the war, he had to organize the raising of increasingly more funds. The time commitment 
alone was daunting, and a banker had to balance the demands of his business(es) with those of 
his government. In one case, Atwood had to explain to a supervisor an absence from his home 
base to attend to a bank in Miltonvale. Then, securing the donations was difficult in a community 
that had experienced crop failures in 1917-1918. Atwood commented, “Each of the numerous 
loans was harder than the one before it principally because our people had done so much before 
that they did not have the means to buy more.” He added, “As our task became more difficult we 
had to devise more effective ways to stir the various communities to greater interest and greater 
sacrifice.”
56
 Atwood recognized how difficult it was for citizens of Concordia County to give as 
much as the government asked, but he cajoled his fellow bankers and “Brother Patriots” to 




The fourth bond drive, which demanded an investment of $6 billion from the American 
people, proved the most challenging hurdle for the Cloud County Chairman. Disagreeing with 
some of the strategies proposed by higher-ups in Washington, Kansas City, and Wichita, Atwood 
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and his committee pursued some of their own localized strategies. Such was to be a trend among 
the bond sales committees of small-town Kansas. In this location, the strategy that ultimately 
worked was to have banks accommodate short-term loans to bond-buyers, providing them ninety 
percent of the face value of a bond, up to $200. While the loan would charge interest for a year’s 
term, the buyer would also receive interest from the government to cover the majority of the 
bank interest. A letter to the local committees illustrated this plan:  
A man wishes to buy a $100 bond; he pays the worker $10 and gives his banker 
his note for $90. If the note runs a full year without any payments having been 
made, he will pay the bank as interest $6.30-he will receive from the government 




Provided the purchaser could pay off the loan in the first year, he would owe no more interest to 
the bank and then would reap the benefits of the government’s bi-annual interest payments on 
the investment. To the volunteers Atwood added, “We recommend and urge that you make this 
very plain to everyone who hesitates to subscribe. We have made it possible to buy-how many 
will wish, or dare, to refuse? We think, not many, if the case is clearly and earnestly 
presented.”59 In this statement lay a hint of a challenge to the “slacker” citizen. It was 
unthinkable to Atwood that anyone could refuse such a logical, low-cost investment in the 
nation’s war effort. For the Chairman, much was riding on the success of his campaign 
leadership. He told the district chairperson in Wichita, “It will be a personal humiliation if the 
quota of Cloud county is not reached.” It was thus with great relief that he reported his county’s 
going “over the top” of their quota on October 23, 1918.60 
Atwood and many other country bankers complied with the government’s demands for 
their service quite willingly. Besides offering their time and financing loans for farmers, bankers 
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frequently donated heavily of their own funds, both to the Red Cross and to the Liberty Loan. 
When a prominent banker failed to comply with these expectations, however, the consequences 
could be dire. In one case, the high profile Topeka Daily Capital (owned by then-governor 
Arthur Capper) ran the president of a Wamego, Kansas bank through the mud for his “unloyal 
conduct.”61 Louis B. Leach’s charges included “failure to invest in liberty bonds” and “failure to 
subscribe to the Red Cross.” The paper reported that the banker’s failure to meet the $500 
commitment allotted to him by the local Red Cross committee had led to the “painting of his 
Apperson motor car a brilliant yellow, and a threat to tar and feather the owner.” The Kansas 
state bank commissioner went so far as to remove Leach from his position as bank president and 
director “as a protection to the stockholders and depositors of the bank, which narrowly escaped 
a run on account of President Leach’s persistent and continued unpatriotic conduct.” It was 
simply unacceptable that “Pottawatomie county’s richest citizen” and a prominent figure in the 
business community would fail to aid in the cause.62 This case made the coercive nature of the 
homefront eminently clear. A banker’s cooperation with community efforts to support the 
national cause could have substantial implications not just for his personal reputation, but also 
for the financial stability of his bank.  
In the case of the vast majority of bankers, wartime voluntarism enhanced their local 
reputations and served as capstones for their lifetimes of community service. Membership in the 
Council of Defense, Liberty Loan committee leadership, Red Cross work, and other activities 
earned mention in biographical profiles and in the memorialization of these businessmen after 
                                                 








 In some cases, war work was controversial owing to the lack of universal 
popularity for WWI. Latham Henry Harrison’s obituary in the Saint Francis Herald noted:  
For a period of two years during the World War, he devoted his full time to 
patriotic activities. He was president of the Cheyenne County Council of Defense; 
Chairman of the Liberty Loan; county supervisor of the food conservation 
program, and active in Red Cross work. In spite of the fact that some of his duties 
at this time were disapproved by customers and were inimical to his own business 




Despite local objection, Harrison took seriously the mandate of the broader nation, and specific 
calls by state and national leaders such as Governor Arthur Capper, President Woodrow Wilson, 
and Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo to take leadership in the organization of the 
home front. Even if in some towns this work was unpopular, obligations to the nation began to 
take precedence over local concerns. In many, if not most, towns in Kansas, bankers’ service was 
lauded. Pratt banker Thad Carver’s memorial in the town newspaper proudly commented, 
During the World War, Mr. Carver served as chairman of the Pratt county council 
of defense, member of the national council and county chairman of the War 
Savings Stamp committee. Under his direction, War Savings Stamps were sold to 
an average of more than $40 for every man, woman and child in the county, a 
record unsurpassed in the state. He was also chairman of the Tenth district for the 




Carver’s role in the organization of his town and district was representative of many country 
bankers during this period. Covered extensively in the Pratt Daily Tribune, the efforts of his 
town will serve to illustrate the common strategies for fundraising and voluntarism during the 
war.  
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 Carver’s case demonstrates the considerable attention a local community would give to 
the patriotic campaigns of its prominent citizens. One of the publishers of the Pratt Daily 
Tribune, Cecil P. Rich, was a member of the Kansas State Guard and otherwise highly involved 
personally and professionally in the promotion of civilian efforts for the war.
66
 These interests 
led the newspaper to join with national organizations in putting strong pressure on both leaders 
and citizens to meet the demands of federal subscription quotas as the period for the first bond 
drive drew to a close. The paper described creative salesmanship methods, as when the 
“celebrated woman aviator” and “darling female flyer” Ruth Law would drop liberty bonds over 
Wichita, Hutchinson, and other towns in an effort to “awaken the patriotic duty of the people.”
67
 
It reprinted national reports, such as the Women’s Liberty Loan Committee of Washington, 
D.C.’s statement calling for women to purchase liberty bonds, also known as “loyalty loans.”
68
 
The Pratt Daily Tribune cited specific data from the community and surrounding region and 
used shaming tactics to try to compel readers to contribute. In a fearmongering article published 
just before the conclusion of the first bond campaign on June 12, 1917, the paper lamented the 
“lethargy in the West” and raised the threat of the war reaching American shores due to the 
failure of the people to complete the bond drive. The Kansas City Federal Reserve District was 
then $50 million short of its apportioned goal.
69
 The shaming of the local press did not stop even 
when the district met its $100 million goal. The Tribune commented, “The banks and people of 
Pratt and Pratt county did not do as well as might have been expected from this wealthy and 
prosperous community.” It reported that the three banks in town had combined for a subscription 
of $123,850, and provided a detailed accounting of each bank that offered the townspeople 
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evidence of how their bankers were doing. The Pratt National Bank had raised $61,500 and the 
Peoples Bank $52,000, but the Citizens Bank lagged behind with only $10,000.
70
 Although there 
were no direct consequences for not exceeding the quotas assigned due to the sizes of the 
different banks, the newspaper indicated that it would be watching the banks and that the 
community would expect more in future bond campaigns. 
 The second Liberty Loan campaign took place in October 1917, and this time requested 
$3 billion in investment from the American people. In order to raise this huge sum, politicians, 
the press, and local businesses engaged in hyper-patriotic rhetorical appeals for purchases among 
the public. Governor Capper, though by faith a Quaker and a pacifist, made it clear that buying 
bonds was essential to winning the war for American ideals. He reiterated that buying bonds 
united ordinary citizens to the war effort in telling Kansans, “Democracy is most secure when 
financed by the common people. No nation can [fail] of progress when her chief financial 
obligation consists of loans from her people and the smaller the denomination and the more 
widely scattered, the more certain is the nation’s welfare.”
71
 Even more overtly than the Quaker 
Arthur Capper, the Pratt Daily Tribune equated bond buying with actual warfare:  
All may not go to the trenches. And yet to an American citizen nothing could be 
more distressing than the thought of not serving his country at this time. The 
Liberty Loan offers to every individual an opportunity of being of some 
assistance—the privilege of playing a part. The firing line is no farther than the 
nearest bank. To buy a liberty bond is to contribute directly, specifically, 
effectively toward America’s victory. To buy a liberty bond is to deliver a more 
effective blow in defense of American rights and of the larger freedom. Every 
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Although the newspaper conceded that the bank was the “firing line,” it took seriously its 
auxiliary role in the propaganda war. The paper noted, “Soldiers win battles; wealth wins war.”
73
 
It ran advertisements like the one for the W.E. Jett Mercantile Company on October 20, 1917, 
which implored readers to “Buy a Liberty Bond!” and assured them that the store would “take 
them as money.” The number of articles supporting the second Liberty Loan drive in the days 
leading up to its October 27 conclusion was prolific, and once it was completed the Tribune once 
again published the amounts raised by local banks. Pratt banks increased their total contributions 
by more than forty percent for this campaign, with $175,600 in bonds purchased through the 
National Bank of Pratt ($85,000), the Peoples Bank ($70,000), and the Citizens Bank 
($20,600).
74
   
War funding needs led local leaders to get more and more creative in reaching even the 
poorest of American citizens and convincing many families to take on even more of a financial 
burden if they were “able.” In 1918, the Pratt Daily Tribune advertised everything from 
additional liberty loan campaigns to the sale of “smileage” coupons at local banks and retailers. 
Civilians sent these coupon books on to soldiers in their camps, where they could be used for 
admission to shows and entertainment. In another program, Kansas City banker and the 1916-
1917 Chairman of the American Bankers Association P.W. Goebel organized War Savings 
Associations throughout the state. These groups comprised of ten to 300 citizens who pledged to 
save and “release labor and materials for the use of the government to prosecute the war.”
75
 
Pratt’s three banks joined together in a booth to sell “Baby Bonds and Thrift Stamps” (both 
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available in small denominations) at the Pratt Auto Show.
76
 The increasing diversity of 
investment opportunities for those of divergent financial means fulfilled the government’s aim to 
make this a “people’s campaign,” and also reinforced the desire of financial leaders that the war 
might serve “in teaching the people of the United States on a nation-wide scale and through an 
intelligent presentation of facts, the value of thrift and saving.”
77
  
During the war, banks published many advertisements for the sale of liberty bonds, thrift 
stamps, and baby bonds at their counters. The ads reinforced these values for patriotism and 
thrift while managing to cross-advertise regular bank amenities, such as safety deposit boxes. As 
was common in bank advertisements of this period, the use of bank officers’ names added weight 
to the institutional name and gravitas to the patriotic rhetoric (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).  
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Banks also joined together with their fellow businesses in the community to support common 
messages. A full-page cartoon by Kansas artist Albert T. Reid, “patriotically donated to the War 
Savings Stamp campaign” by the National Bank of Pratt, the Citizens State Bank, the People’s 
Bank, and three mercantile companies, features a drawing of a well-dressed man in his 
comfortable parlor, concerned as he reads war headlines in the newspaper. He stares directly at 
the reader and says, “Save? You bet I’ll save!” The text continues, “The increasing casualty lists 
are making America think” (Figure 3.5a). Citizens had given generously, but the ad further 
comments that they had done so “in almost reckless abandon—with our hurrah and a whoop. We 
have ‘gone over the top’ with our quotas—eager that our town or county should make a good 
showing—with the real purpose secondary.”
78
 Readers were called upon to join in the national 
commencement of a savings campaign. Meanwhile, the Pratt Daily Tribune’s publication of 
another Reid cartoon made it clear that all Americans, young and old, were supposed to 
contribute to the effort. Creating a pun on Kansas’s dry status as a prohibition state, Reid advises 
readers to “Get the Licker Habit” at an early age (Figure 3.5b). Patriotic propaganda pervaded 
rural towns across America, and local banks were among the key sponsors for these pieces. 
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Figure 3.4. National Bank of Pratt advertisement represents the increasing diversity of war 
savings options for citizens, and the bank’s role in offering these services to the public on 






As the government continued to issue calls for bonds from the public, totaling $3 billion 
in April 1918 and $6 billion in October 1918, as well as for a variety of smaller campaigns for 
war savings stamps and baby bonds, the expertise and influence of local bankers began to make a 
difference in the community’s continued ability to raise funds. As reported in the local paper, 
banker Thad C. Carver canvassed his fellow businessmen at a Chamber of Commerce meeting 
“to see whether they were taking their share of thrift stamps and baby bonds.” Carver reported 
that the community was well short of its goal of $20 for every man, woman, and child during 
1918. He noted, “As many men of large families are unable to meet more than a small part of 
this obligation, and no doubt some of them unable to make even a fair start on it . . . those who 
are financially able will have to assume more than an average share of the burden.”
79
 The banker 
later published a report of all those in the county who had made pledges of more than $100 to the 
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Figures 3.5a and b. Albert T. Reid cartoon 
advertising the War Savings Stamp campaign, 
Pratt Daily Tribune, June 20, 1918; and Albert 
T. Reid cartoon urging Americans of all ages to 
“Swat at the Kaiser” by licking stamps, Pratt 





war savings campaign. These tactics helped the county go over quota and double the $20 per 
capita goal for savings stamps.
80
 Carver’s position within the business community allowed him 
not only to exert polite social pressure in the Chamber of Commerce—an organization that often 
functioned as a social and political club for the town’s elite—but more than that, to make a real 
difference in the overall collections of his county.  
The pressure on Pratt’s well-to-do was even more evident in the liberty bond drives. Pratt 
County’s quota in the April drive was $230,300, and the October push required $807,000 of the 
county.
81
 As the Pratt Daily Tribune commented about the town on April 6, 1918, “The amount 
in this prosperous section should be at least double the minimum amount. Get busy.” The town’s 
businessmen did just that, and the new campaigns became more organized than ever before. The 
county created an index of taxpayers in each locality that allowed bond salesmen to know 
“exactly what that man ought to buy.” The newspaper commended this new strategy, saying, 
“This time there is going to be no camouflaging.”
82
 Certainly bankers played key roles not only 
in selling the bonds, but also in compiling this index of citizens; experience made them good 
judges of their neighbors’ financial abilities, and their knowledge was crucial to the success of 
this program. Ultimately, the card index and the leadership of community bankers, including 
T.C. Carver, who chaired the Tenth Liberty Loan district of Kansas, allowed Pratt County to go 
“over the top” and subscribe more than its quota by $100,000.
83
  
While all country bankers supervised their own bank’s sales and traded off leadership in 
the local bond drives, Carver’s leadership of the larger district effort helped his bank outpace the 
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others in town by a mile.
84
 Each of the town’s banks achieved a demonstrable growth in their 
quotas for bond sales, which indicated that Americans were saving more and banks were 
growing. The Peoples Bank, of which Carver was President, increased its deposits between 1916 
and 1917 from $490,485.05 to $767,010.89 (an increase of over 56 percent).
85
 Carver’s increased 
visibility in the community through his leadership in various war financing campaigns appears to 
have had a measurable impact on the deposit base of his bank and helped him achieve and indeed 
oversell the institution’s progressively higher quotas—raised from $52,000 to $70,000 and 
finally to $207,250 in the last, $6 billion national campaign.
86
 
After the completion of the Fourth Liberty Loan drive, as the war neared its end and as 
citizens’ attitudes began to turn toward peace, an article quoting local chairman George W. 
Lemon (President of the National Bank of Pratt) emphasized the importance of bankers in 
bringing the fundraising campaigns in their communities to completion. The $807,000 
apportioned to Pratt County for that drive had been difficult to reach, and Lemon commented 
upon passing the target:  
It means much in right down hard work on the part of those who have borne the 
brunt of the struggle . . . and these are chiefly the bankers of the county. Some of 
the subscriptions came voluntarily, but these were really a small proportion of the 
whole sum. For the greater part it has taken earnest personal work[;] the men who 
handle the finances of the county, being in position to perform this service more 
efficiently than anyone else, have shouldered the big load of responsibility and 
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Bankers’ use of financial and social pressure for the national cause is evident in these lines. But, 
the Tribune still considered the county’s accomplishment meaningful, because bankers’ circles in 
Topeka had been commenting that the western counties, affected by crop failures, would 
probably fall short of their quotas. Local bankers in Pratt clearly exercised enough influence in 
their communities to overcome such difficulties. Their tactics, particularly the ability to estimate 
how much each individual should be able to contribute, led to clear success, as when one citizen 
increased a bond purchase from $200 to $2,000 and another, incredibly, from $100 to $5,000, 
“based on the committee’s pointing out their fair shares of the drive.”
88
 The newspaper 
concluded, poignantly, about the community’s wartime efforts:  
If old John Brown of Osawatomie were to wake up from his long, long sleep he 
would find that the seeds of Liberty sown away back in the 1860s has [sic] been 
increased a million fold. For Kansas, the heart of the Nation, tops the rest of the 
Nation in loyalty. The men, the women and the children of Kansas see their duty 
clearly. They are going to back their government in this war to the last trench, no 





Masking the strong-arm tactics John Brown himself likely would have approved, Kansans were 
eager to associate their patriotic giving during the Great War with the “free state” tradition. No 
small part of the community’s financial commitments, and therefore of its status within the 
region and nation, owed to the dedication of its bankers.  
“Leading Business Men” and “Pious but Militant” Women: The Division of Red Cross 
Work in Kansas Communities 
 
At the same time that local communities like Pratt were endeavoring to raise hundreds of 
thousands of dollars for the Liberty Loan, they also contributed to national Red Cross campaigns. 
Red Cross work was diverse, ranging from fundraising drives typically headed by local 
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businessmen, to knitting and other hand-crafts organized by women’s groups. Fundraising 
campaigns were particularly fraught with patriotic meaning, as events in Pratt demonstrated. 
Women’s work for the Red Cross, however, also conveyed patriotism, social status, and often-
political intent. Women, especially middle- and upper-class women with the luxury of free time, 
were pressured to volunteer for Red Cross service. Club women’s filling out “census cards” of 
potential volunteers in fact fulfilled a similar purpose as the state’s requirement that men register 
for the draft.
90
 Although women might occasionally hold a charity event to raise money for the 
Red Cross, as when “Miss Margaret Carver” organized a benefit ball game to support her 
father’s finance committee work in Pratt, women did not appear to participate in fundraising 
campaigns to the same degree as men.
91
 Laura Doerr, the chairman of the Pawnee County Red 
Cross Chapter, wrote in her notes to “put men on committees. Finance—15 leading men 
including bankers mayor business men.”
92
 An official Red Cross bulletin directed to the 
chairmen of local chapters and auxiliaries likewise advised that finance committees should be 
“composed of your leading business men.” The work of finding supplies and creating goods, 
however, should be headed by “an influential wom[a]n [with] an established leadership, and 
exceptionally good judgment.”
93
 Gender and class structurally defined the roles of Red Cross 
volunteers. 
As was the case with the national bond drives, the community monitored participation in 
Red Cross work. Through their newspapers, townspeople paid close attention to who paid for a 
Red Cross membership and contributed monetarily to campaigns. Women’s groups recorded the 
volunteer work of their members carefully, sometimes noting the number of hours served by 
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each individual and always recording the amount of materials created by area women in chapter 
reports to the newspaper. Red Cross work was ubiquitous in the endeavors of elite social clubs 
for men and women, and participation conveyed both status and patriotism even more than did 
contributions to the Liberty Loan. As the Pratt Daily Tribune noted about the Red Cross, the 
“best and most influential citizens of the town and county [were] actively at work” on its behalf. 
The paper added:  
In our judgment there is a tremendous difference between a Liberty bond 
investment and a contribution to the Red Cross fund. Liberty bonds are a gilt-edge 
investment. The purchaser is in no [way] making a contribution to his 
government. He is simply investing a certain proportion of his savings in a bond 
of the most attractive character and which will yield a handsome rate of interest.  . 
. . The man or woman, however, who makes a Red Cross contribution, is giving 
something to the cause. He does it without the hope of financial gain or the 
prospect of its return. It is a free will offering and measured by the spirit of 





The community response to individual Red Cross contributors, and even more to those who 
failed to give of their time and treasure, demonstrated the coercive elements of wartime 
patriotism.
95
 Examples of fundraising efforts at Pratt, Kansas and the chapter organization of 
volunteer work in Larned, Kansas demonstrate that bankers and their wives were well positioned 
to lead Red Cross campaigns. Building on their memberships in social clubs—linked in turn to 
their economic status in town—these elite members of local communities gave strong service to 
the project of citizen-making in the wartime nation.  
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 Red Cross funding drives operated on a 
smaller scale than the Liberty Loan, but the 
leaders of the Pratt campaigns implemented 
similar techniques to elicit free-will donations 
from the community. In one drive, the town and 
surrounding county were tasked with raising 
$15,000 as a part of a $100 million national 
goal. Pledge seekers divided into several sub-
districts, and T.C. Carver headed up the effort as 
the finance committee chairman for the Pratt 
chapter of the Red Cross.
96
 Advertising in the local newspaper again was a central strategy in the 
effort to convince community members to donate to the Red Cross. Images and stories pulled on 
readers’ heartstrings, as when the tale of a French soldier “fighting our fight” and injured on the 
front lines filled the shape of a large cross and asked, “Will you help him?” (Figure 3.6) As the 
first national campaign drive neared completion, the Pratt Daily Tribune emblazoned its front 
page with the logo of the Red Cross, and an advertisement for the Pratt National Bank followed 
suit, urging readers and customers to “Give! Give! Give!—Until It Hurts!”
97
 The Peel Drug Co. 
urged readers of its advertisement on June 21, 1917, “Pratt Must Have No Slackers. Do Your 
‘Bit’ for the Red Cross.” 
Beyond the advertising it published for the campaign, coverage in the Pratt Daily 
Tribune proved as crucial to success in the Red Cross drive as it had been in raising the Liberty 
Loan. The paper reported on the advancement of the local and national campaigns throughout the 
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Figure 3.6. Advertisement for the Red 
Cross fundraising drive, Pratt Daily 




drive, and alternately commended the fundraising leadership and shamed readers into giving 
more so that the community would reach its apportioned goal.
98
 An editorial noted that 
“prominent business men” had “neglected their business duties and placed their entire time at the 
disposal of the local organization,” and complimented the women who have “especially done 
splendidly” for the campaign.
99
 The Tribune also quoted Carver’s updates in an effort to spur 
dawdling sectors of the community to shape up. Near the end of the national fundraising 
campaign in June 1917, the banker reported that the outlying districts had exceeded their quotas 
but that the town of Pratt was still short—particularly the Third Ward which was “sadly 
delinquent in subscription to the fund” and reporting only twenty percent participation. He 
commented, “It is barely possible that Pratt county may fall short in the amount asked by the 
national Red Cross leaders. If this condition should prevail, it would amount to a serious 
reflection on the loyalty, or rather lack of loyalty of the people, who possess far more wealth per 
capita than do the average peoples of Kansas.”
100
  
The chief fundraiser’s direct appeal to the community and the newspaper’s advertising 
efforts culminated in the success of the campaign and in the newspaper’s vow to publish a “Roll 
of Honor” listing who in the county had donated and the amounts given. The writer commented 
that the list would be “interesting and instructive,” and remarked:  
Some names will be missed from this list. Some amounts will be absurdly small 
in comparison to the ability of the givers, while other amounts will be surprisingly 
large if measured by the financial ability of the donors. . . . Comparatively few 
slackers were discovered by the Red Cross canvassers. The instance of a man in 
this city who recently sold $20,000 of wheat at the inflated war price and who 
begrudgingly gave $5.00 to the fund after repeated solicitations, is an exception. 
His measly little five dollars will feel out of place. They will not be used to such 
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good company. It is not fair, either, to the other honorable and respectable dollars 




In contrasting the “honorable” members of the community with “slackers” and grudging givers, 
the newspaper’s comments highlighted the fact that the Red Cross campaign was not only 
patriotic, but also coercive.  
 The humiliation of the unnamed but presumably well-known farmer in the above article 
was nothing compared to the almost gleeful reportage of how the community responded to 
“slackers” who refused to give any money at all to the Red Cross. While it was clear that Pratt 
County would continue its successful record in its May 1918 fundraising drive, owing to the 
committee’s repeated use of a card index allotting “suggested” individual contributions, it was 
still deemed unacceptable that anyone would refuse to give. The local Council of Defense, in 
meeting to help prepare for the upcoming campaign, compared notes about how to combat those 
who refused to give funds, whether for religious reasons or perceived pro-German sentiments.
102
 
The paper, for its part, disparaged the housewife who “viciously tore the little subscription card 
to shreds,” and commented that “this sort of thing has about exhausted the patience of the loyal 
citizens and some of them feel that they have stood for it long enough.”
103
 The May 21, 1918 
article went on to observe:  
In the middle of the street at the intersection of Main and Third there stands a 
barrel from which extends a slender rod with a crook in the end of it. A red cross 
about a foot each way rests upon the barrel, also a gallon can of yellow—very 
yellow—paint. What is to be done with them is shrouded in mystery, but they rest 
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Those who did not give of their funds risked receiving a dose of yellow paint, with the 
consequent shame of cowardly non-action fully apparent to all in the community. The same 
newspaper that had only a few weeks before lauded the “seeds of Liberty sown away back” by 
John Brown of Osawatomie, which inspired Kansas citizens to patriotically buy Liberty Bonds 
and promote global democracy, now supported the suppression of certain constitutional 
freedoms. The matter came to a head when that very evening, a “committee of representative 
citizens” arrived at the home of some “reluctant” donors. The regular donation committee, which 
may have included campaign manager Thad Carver, had already stopped by to try to convince 
the couple to contribute. The newspaper reported that the woman of the house finally turned over 
a check for the allotted sum upon viewing the spectacle on her doorstep, but apparently uttered 
“go to hell with it” to the recipient and thus failed to show the proper “patriotic spirit.” The 
committee refused to take the money and tore up the check, then proceeded to make good on the 
threats reported in the newspaper. Covering the couple’s car and home with yellow paint, red 
crosses, and the moniker “slackers,” the group sent a message to the rest of the community 
through its acts of intimidation.
105
 The fundraising committee continued its canvass of the town 
and county despite the state’s already having collected fifty percent above its quota, “to see that 
every citizen does his part.”
106
 
The hyper-patriotic nature of the Liberty Loan and especially the Red Cross drives led 
influential Pratt citizens—from the finance committee to the newspaper itself—to condone 
highly coercive actions in the name of the fight for freedom and democracy around the world. 
Other towns employed similar bullying tactics and offered a range of proposals to see that every 
citizen contributed what they should to the cause. The Larned, Kansas committee also compiled 
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lists of suggested donations; men such as John E. Wagner, a banker, and Albert A. Doerr, a 
mercantile owner and lender, canvassed those allotted $5 or more.
107
 Women were allowed to 
ask for free-will donations among the rest of the population. Executive committee member Dr. 
J.A. Dillon also submitted a statement to the National Red Cross favoring a tax that would 
require all wealthy individuals, including non-resident landholders, to contribute fairly to local 
fundraising.
108
 Although local Red Cross chairperson Laura Doerr disagreed with the proposed 
taxation plan, arguing that it did not express “the sentiment of our community, as many men and 
women worked loyally” to raise funds, this idea suggested the lengths to which dedicated 
committee members were willing to go to compel wide participation in the wartime cause.
109
 It is 
in this context that substantial support for “100% Americanism” and the renewed organization of 
the Ku Klux Klan could take hold. Local businessmen took center stage in fundraising drives for 
the Red Cross and took leading roles in pressuring fellow townspeople to “give until it hurts”; 
thus, they were able to display their own patriotic spirit. Women, although they engaged in 
different types of work than men, also had important parts to play in the Red Cross mission to 
both support the troops and rouse intensely patriotic feelings among the public. 
Women’s voluntary service largely centered on the time they donated to the Red Cross 
rather than on funds donated. In Pratt, the value of women’s time was especially clear in that the 
chapter regularly published reports in the Daily Tribune which compiled lists of individual 
women in the community and the amount of time devoted to the knitting room and other 
piecework. The wives of finance committee members, including Mrs. T.C. Carver, and of 
prominent town doctors and business professionals showed their commitment by routinely 
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recording between two and five and sometimes as many as fifteen or twenty-five hours in the 
Red Cross workroom.
110
 Volunteer commitments built upon middle-class women’s 
socioeconomic status and memberships in the best women’s clubs in town. On a national scale, 
women’s contributions during the war also aided them in claiming the vote in the post-war 
period.  
Laura Doerr’s leadership in the Pawnee County Chapter of the American Red Cross 
offers an illustrative example of women’s dedicated voluntarism during the war. Doerr, the wife 
of Larned mercantile owner, lender, and Kansas State Senator Albert A. Doerr, took on unusual 
responsibilities as the “Chairman” of the county chapter. The records she left behind tell 
something of the incredible organizational effort required to oversee the activities of the chapter 
and its auxiliaries across the county. As her obituary remembered, she devoted “her entire time 
and energy to the work.”
111
 Doerr likely gained the position due to her social status in the 
community and relationship to the local state senator, but she performed well in the job and it 
offered strong motivation for her continued political work in a variety of women’s political 
groups such as the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), the more radical 
National Women’s Party (NWP), and the League of Women Voters.  
 As Chairman of the Pawnee Chapter of the American Red Cross, Laura Doerr oversaw an 
Executive Committee composed of a Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer. These elected 
officers appointed committees on Military Relief and Civilian Relief (each with sub-
committees), Membership, General Propaganda, and Finance. Keeping this group of volunteers 
in line was not always an easy task. Doerr commented in a letter to L.R. Morgan, Director of the 
Bureau of Development in St. Louis, “You possibly realize that in forming a Chapter you often 
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select people for chairman who do not take charge of that department in the least. This condition 
exists here in several departments. It is embarrassing to change an officer and so a chapter 
chairman must select someone else to do the work.”
112
 Laura Doerr herself stepped in on many 
committee tasks, and relied on the assistance of close friends and business associates such as 
Harvey Eckert—the manager of her husband’s mercantile—to fill important roles. For example, 
Doerr and Mrs. E.E. Frizell, wife of another prominent Larned politician and rancher, aided the 
women’s clubs of Larned in compiling a list of charter members for the Pawnee County Chapter 
of the Red Cross. Doerr took the task seriously and compiled clippings from all over the state 
which tracked the charters and membership numbers of chapters for similarly sized towns.
113
 
Chapters and branches sought to enroll members “among all elements of the population,” but the 
leadership comprised largely those of the middle and upper classes.
114
  
 The position as Chairman required Doerr to maintain regular correspondence with the 
regional division and national headquarters of the American Red Cross, which regularly 
distributed newsletters and asked for reports on chapter activities, and with other branch and 
chapter leaders. Mailings from the regional division offices in Denver and St. Louis included 
knitting circulars with technical instructions and patterns in use by the Army, to be passed on to 
those crafting supplies for soldiers or incorporated into instructional classes. Red Cross 
leadership also advised local chapters of the difficulties of securing materials owing to 
fluctuating wartime prices and merchants’ long-term contracts with the military and garment 
factories. A Supply Service flyer offered goods from St. Louis, but urged chapters to continue 
dealing with local merchants when terms of delivery and price were satisfactory, “thereby 
                                                 
112. Mrs. A.A. Doerr to L.R. Morgan, Director of the Bureau of Development in St. Louis, Box 22, Folder 
6, Doerr Papers. 
113. “Checking Up Red Cross Cards,” n.d., and other clippings, Box 22, Folder 8, Doerr Papers.  
114. American Red Cross, Branches of Chapters and Chart Showing Chapter Organization of Simple Form, 




retaining incidental good-will towards the Red Cross.”
115
 Such notices confirmed the fact that 
obtaining supplies and coordinating volunteer knitters would prove a difficult part of the 
Chairman’s job. Much of Doerr’s correspondence involved sharing literature with the branches 
under her leadership and coordinating supplies for them. For example, she fielded letters from 
the Jetmore, Kansas branch requesting information on what their members could best direct their 
efforts toward making, and asking for material and patterns. A letter from an Elfrieda Kenyon 
suggested the intricacies involved in procuring supplies. Kenyon noted that she knew Doerr had 
been buying muslin at 15 cents per yard, but her branch had been unable to get anything less than 
22 cents per yard. She asked whether the chairperson would set aside two or three bolts for her 
branch at the lower price.
116
 Presiding at the head of a supply chain not only for her chapter but 
also for its branches, Doerr had to conduct market research, correspond with her subsidiaries, 
and coordinate distribution to area work rooms. Her connection with the A.A. Doerr Mercantile 
aided in securing materials; she reported that the company “guaranteed the payment of our yarn 
purchases of some $5,000,” and thus ensured the chapter could “purchase at the lowest wholesale 




 Doerr was justifiably proud of the organizational achievements of her chapter of the Red 
Cross. Shortly after relinquishing her post as Chairman of the local chapter, she compiled a 
yearbook of the chapter’s accomplishments and sent complimentary copies to the families of 
each service person from the county. In a forward addressed “To the Members of Pawnee 
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County Red Cross Chapter,” Doerr commented, “The productions of war necessities of the 
Chapter was such as to make every patriotic man and woman feel proud of Pawnee County’s 
accomplishments.” She boasted in typical booster language, “Our record can not be surpassed by 
any County in our State. In fact we lay claim to the distinction that Pawnee County has 
accomplished more Red Cross work in proportion to population than any other County in 
Kansas.”
118
 The 64-page pamphlet offers good insight into the organizational structure of the 
Chapter, including the names of officers and Executive Committee members, committee officers 
(e.g. Finance Committee and Committee of Women’s Work), and officers of twenty-three 
branches, auxiliaries, and affiliates. It also provides pages of tallies of hand-made goods created 
by the women in the county, from knitted items and soldiers’ “comfort kits” to hospital supplies 
and items for special relief projects. Pawnee County tallied a total of 257,632 individual items, 
along with over 5,000 pounds of supplies sent to Belgium for relief.
119
 The yearbook further 
included a detailed financial report and an “honor roll” listing the men and women who had 
served in the war. The work of a local chapter for the war effort was indeed monumental. 
Doerr’s attempt to memorialize the Red Cross service in Larned with this yearbook 
proved controversial, however. Some members of the local community were appreciative of the 
effort. Mrs. Ete Mueller, a colleague in the county Red Cross network, sent Mrs. Doerr a letter 
stating:  
I appreciate it very highly, and will reserve it as a great rememberance [sic], not 
only of the great World War; but to look back and see that we had a War 
Chairman that carried out plans & organized all our branches & auxiliaries in 
Pawnee County. Gave all her time, so as to be of service to our soldiers & sailors 
to keep them comfortable so they might return to their homes in a healthy 
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condition. Mrs. Doerr I must say you sure have won a crown in heaven for your 




By contrast, Alfred Fairbank, the Acting Manager of the Southwestern Division of the American 
Red Cross in St. Louis, rebuked Doerr for printing this yearbook and some of the contents. 
Fairbank suggested that Doerr had been using the publication for her own personal gratification 
as the self-styled “War Chairman” and for the political gain of her husband, the Senator. Albert 
A. Doerr had financed a substantial portion of the printing, and his name was published along 
with other local sponsors such as the Moffet Bros. Nat’l Bank and the First State Bank on the 
first page of the album. Fairbank accused Doerr of sending the publication to only a select 
number of recipients, without the knowledge of the current Executive Committee of the Larned 
Red Cross, and with cards reading “Compliments of Senator and Mrs. A.A. Doerr.” He took 
issue with Doerr’s use of the Red Cross name and emblem, and with a thank you column of 
several pages “in which full acknowledgment is given to yourself, your husband and others, but 
some who have worked faithfully for the Chapter are omitted.” Finally, he was angry that Mrs. 
Doerr had “attacked” Fairbank’s office in the publication. In the column purportedly set aside for 
gratitude, the “War Chairman” had described petulantly how “the divisional headquarters at St. 
Louis caused all county chapters much annoyance and financial embarrassment by their 
promiscuous shipping of supplies,” which “caused large duplications of stocks” and extra work 
and expense for chapter headquarters.
121
 Doerr’s ability to obtain locally supplied materials for 
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women’s sewing work, while demonstrative of her organizational capacities and good business 
connections, appears to have placed her into conflict with a national office accustomed to 
exercising greater control over local women. 
Fairbank’s suggestions of impropriety did little to diminish the significance of the work 
of this prominent community woman in the wartime service of the Red Cross. In fact, it simply 
underscored the social, political, and economic connections of leading women and the broader 
purposes their activities served. The nation viewed women’s work as an important component of 
the war effort. Laura Doerr, in a handwritten address given before an unknown body, noted that 
“the service of American women in preparation of supplies for this year alone is above or at fifty 
million dollars.”
122
 That constituted fully half of the year’s fundraising campaign. She added in 
an appeal to potential volunteers:  
The Red Cross is the most powerful allie [sic] our soldier boys will ever have. If 
you would be a help in this great work you must get the spirit of it. If you have 
not the spirit now and are doubting and questioning the reasons for all this relief 
work, you will perhaps get the R.C. spirit later when you scan the papers for the 
casualty lists and see familiar names or when the wounded soldiers begin to return 




Knitting and sewing represented far more than busy work or an idle social activity, and women 
with spare time—particularly those of the middle and upper classes—needed to come through 
for the soldiers lacking items like sweaters (not provided by government issue), hospital linens 
and garments, and surgical dressings. A visiting Chautauqua speaker engaged to speak at the Red 
Cross conference in Kansas orated that this work defined women as “pious but militant.” The 
work women carried out on the home front united them with men “without lines of distinction.” 
The speaker, Mrs. E.F. Brown of St. Louis, linked voluntary wartime service to the promise of 
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post-war suffrage, adding that “if the women would do effective work in this crisis ‘perhaps the 
men will give us the vote.’”
124
 Although the women of Kansas already had the vote, this was an 
important concern for the national woman suffrage movement that gave additional purpose to 
their patriotic efforts. In fulfilling demands for their service during the war, women like Laura 
Doerr helped to shape the contours of post-war society.  
Banking Families Continue to Lead as Rural Society Confronts the Postwar Era  
  
The wartime experience produced a range of consequences for the U.S., and particularly 
for rural America. On the one hand, the war came as the culmination of years of hard work by 
middle- and upper-class women who had demonstrated their worth in social and political causes 
and finally received national suffrage with the 21
st
 Amendment. On the other hand, the war and 
the postwar period reinforced the prejudices of many ordinary Americans against those different 
from them. As illustrated in the attacks on slackers during the war, and later by the resurgence of 
the Ku Klux Klan, some individuals continued to rebel against the effects of a nation growing 
more modern, urban, and diverse. Country bankers and their communities faced important 
challenges to their established social order. Some would embrace change, while others lashed out 
in ways nominally supportive—and actually repressive—of American ideals.  
Laura Doerr’s experience with the Red Cross and active political life during and after the 
war revealed the political advantages that attended women’s volunteer service for the national 
cause. A leading state newspaper, the Topeka Daily Capital, touted her eighteen months of 
“tireless” war service when commenting that she was in town to observe the legislature with her 
husband. The paper commented, “She was the first chairman to succeed in compiling a record of 
the county’s Red Cross activities, together with a complete list of the Pawnee county boys who 
                                                 




entered service.” Doerr’s record of service added to her popularity among the legislative crowd, 
and the article noted that “she has assisted at several receptions and was toastmistress at the 
luncheon given by the wives of the legislators.”
125
  
Doerr’s political connections helped her secure a part in a national women’s convention 
held at the Hotel Statler in St. Louis, March 24-29, 1919. She was one of fifty Kansas women 
invited to the convention, split evenly between Republican women and Doerr’s own Democratic 
Party.
126
 Doerr collected a variety of souvenirs during the experience, including a medal with a 
ribbon inscribed with the words, “National Suffrage Convention Delegate, St. Louis, 1919,” and 
a convention program. Inserted in the program was a request for Red Cross aid to suffering war 
survivors in Europe. Several sessions also focused on women’s service in the war, and it is likely 
that Doerr took a special interest in these topics.
127
 The convention featured an “indoor victory 
parade” and speeches by the newly elected governor of Kansas, Henry Allen, and National 
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) President Carrie Chapman Catt. Allen urged 
the women not to form a separate political party, but to join with the men. In a response printed 
in a St. Louis Republic report of the event, Catt stated that “the League of Women Voters would 
not form any women’s party, but that they intended to get in all parties—‘to put a stick in every 
part.’” She continued, “We women have no desire to become radicals, but we do intend to look 
forward and stand by the next generations. We would go hand in hand with our brothers and let 
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all political parties know that they have a powerful force behind them pushing them toward the 
right.” Catt simultaneously affirmed the strength of the women’s political power and their 
interests in “right” or moral causes. 
Laura Doerr embraced the vision laid out for political women during the St. Louis 
Convention. When she received the Minutes of the NAWSA Jubilee Convention, she pored over 
the material and annotated the document, pointing to themes she viewed as important. While at 
one point she wrote a comment criticizing “the inefficient organization of women for securing 
efficient laws,” she persisted in her commitment to the causes of suffrage and women’s influence 
in the political sphere.
128
 The collection of materials regarding Doerr’s participation in state and 
national political organizations is diverse. She maintained a correspondence with Lilla Day 
Monroe, Kansas’s foremost leader of women’s groups. In 1927, Monroe suggested to an 
organizer that Doerr might be able to meet a group of delegates and accompany them by car 
from Topeka to a Good Government League convention in Colorado Springs, and on to the 
Black Hills “to petition the President for his support of the Equal Rights Amendment.”
129
 
Doerr’s affiliation with women’s political groups during this period was matched by her 
participation in social and service clubs. She was a founding member of the Women’s Auxiliary 
of the American Legion for the seventh Kansas congressional district, for example. The 
Auxiliary’s programs of support for ex-service men proved a natural continuation of her wartime 
service in the Red Cross.
130
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Service was not always the only purpose of such activities, however. The Auxiliary, like 
many organizations of the era, supported a political agenda that included “building for 100% 
Americanism.”
131
 The very first bulletin of the League of Women Voters ever issued, included in 
Doerr’s files as a consequence of the League’s formation during the St. Louis Women’s 
Convention of 1919, indicated similar aims. Receiving and exercising the vote remained the 
League’s primary focus, but the organization also supported protections for women in industry 
and child labor prohibition, improvement of election laws, and other progressive causes. Taking 
up considerable space on the organization’s platform was education. The League supported 
common school education for children as well as extension programs for adults, and through 
such programs planned to promote Americanization efforts. The League of Women Voters 
promoted making English the national language, enacting “higher qualifications for citizenship 
and more sympathetic and impressive ceremonials for naturalization,” publishing advertisements 
for citizenship lessons in foreign language publications, and requiring a recital of an Oath of 
Allegiance to the United States before voting. The League furthermore wanted women to obtain 
direct citizenship, not simply citizenship through marriage, “as a qualification for the vote.”
132
 
Laura Doerr’s involvement in political and social clubs during the 1920s, then, supported a series 
of common causes, not only votes for women, but also service and the promotion of 
Americanism.  
 Kansans epitomized the fearfulness that gripped many Americans during the post-war 
period.
133
 Racialized and radicalized “others” in their midst set off discussions about who 
deserved status as an American and what sort of justice should be served to the rest. The rights of 
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labor proved a key testing point for Kansans; indeed, the state served as a microcosm for the 
nationwide strikes of 1919. The coal fields and later the railroads became focal points for the 
state’s efforts to repress strikes through legal means.
134
 Even as fears of bolshevism, anarchism, 
and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) pervaded the sentiments of many Kansans, 
however, strikers and their families also appealed to American values in defense of their 
actions.
135
 One woman protestor, quoted in the Pittsburg (Kansas) Daily Headlight, used the 
rhetoric of rights and patriotism to make her stand:  
We don’t want any bloodshed here in Kansas like there was in the Ludlow Strike, 
and in Alabama and Mingo County, West Virginia. What we want is our 
industrial freedom and liberty and we want our men to be good, true, loyal union 
men and 100 percent American citizens, not like you and your dirty bunch of 




That Wimler linked the actions of the mine workers directly to the patriotic acts of the wartime 
home front, particularly the purchase of liberty bonds, would have been significant for readers of 
the Headlight. The reference to erstwhile markers of patriotism, however, did not stop many 
Kansans from resorting to repressive measures against those whom they perceived as radicals or 
outsiders.  
Reactions to the expansion of unrest to railroad shop workers were demonstrative. 
Emporia newspaperman William Allen White decided to support the peaceful strikers and posted 
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a sign of solidarity with the strikers in his news office window. Governor Allen had him arrested, 
and as White reflected in his Autobiography, “Middle-class opinion in Kansas said thumbs down 
to my poster.” One of the objectors was White’s old friend and “former Bull Mooser” Frederick 
J. Atwood, the banker from Concordia, Kansas. White’s Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial, “To an 
Anxious Friend,” consisted of his response to the banker who had implored him to give up the 
cause of free speech in favor of peace. The “Sage of Emporia” laid out his argument in poetic 
and forceful language: 
You tell me that law is above freedom of utterance. And I reply that you can have 
no wise laws nor free enforcement of wise laws unless there is free expression of 
the wisdom of the people—and, alas, their folly with it. But if there is freedom, 
folly will die of its own poison, and the wisdom will survive. . . . You say that 
freedom of utterance is not for time of stress, and I reply with the sad truth that 
only in time of stress is freedom of utterance in danger. No one questions it in 
calm days, because it is not needed. And the reverse is true also; only when free 





White spoke as a voice of reason in the midst of dark fears, and as he concluded in the editorial, 
“Reason has never failed men. Only force and repression have made the wrecks in the world.”
138
 
The susceptibility of prominent community leaders such as Frederick Atwood to ideas repressive 
of rights, in the name of social and moral order, revealed a high risk for coercive measures of 
enforcement in arenas beyond the coal fields. One powerful editorial could not dissuade fearful 
sentiments among the greater Kansas population, including some bankers anxious to preserve the 
social boundaries of their communities.  
Within the context of the heightened enmity between Kansans and immigrant labor, the 
second Ku Klux Klan came to power in the state. The appeal of the KKK was broad. It was 
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strong in both rural areas and cities, all over the nation and especially in the South, West, and 
Midwest. Touched off by the World War, the KKK movement reacted to a perceived crisis of the 
moral order in a nation where women, immigrants, and internal minority groups were beginning 
to assert more personal and civil rights.
139
 Male participants in the Klan movement typically 
emerged from club activities and fraternal orders such as the Masons, Elks, and Odd Fellows. A 
few of these men were community elites, but most of the general membership drew from the 
lower-middle classes: those who stood to lose the most during periods of change and who could 
gain a measure of prestige in the Klan hierarchy.
140
 Women were influential in the Klan’s 
auxiliary movement, moving into its ranks from temperance organizations, the League of 
Women Voters, and other clubs. Laura Doerr’s literature supporting “100% Americanism” 
attests to some of the shared ideals of these organizations. As Kathleen M. Blee argued, women 
could prove valuable partners in the Klan’s work to intimidate outsiders—such as Catholics, 
Jews, and morally questionable citizens engaged in bootlegging or prostitution. Women had 
developed strong capacities for organization through their clubs and war work, and their methods 
of boycotting and spreading gossip were possibly more influential than the men’s vigilantism. 
The functions of exclusion and intimidation were only part of the issue for many women and 
men, however. Regardless of how Klan opponents viewed them, members often viewed their 
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In Kansas, the KKK spread widely in the early- to mid-1920s. In 1921 and 1922 the Klan 
began organizing klaverns (local branches) in southern and southeastern Kansas, near the coal 
and oil fields that sparked many labor disputes and condemnations of immigrant “others.” Towns 
across Kansas would continue to establish klaverns in the next few years, and up to 40,000 
people joined the organization throughout the state. During the state legislative session of 1925, 
friends of the Klan introduced a bill that would permit it an official organizational charter from 
the state.
142
 Governor Benjamin S. Paulen, a Republican banker from Fredonia, Kansas, 
supported the bill, but it raised serious debate among the legislators. Klan members had enough 
political strength to hold up important legislation for a time while seeking to get the charter bill 
passed. The Topeka Daily Capital expressed fears that Klan members might take revenge upon 
important legislation if the representatives did not pass their bill.
143
 Some opponents of the Klan 
supported the bill because it would bring the Klan into the daylight and make the organization 
accountable to the law. As one senator argued, “If we give the Klan the same recognition before 
the law as we give other foreign benevolent, eleemosynary or charitable organizations, we take 
away from the Klan the very element that makes it potent. That is its secrecy.”
144
 Others took 
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firm stances against it, reciting incidents of personal intimidation by the Klan. Arthur J. Ericcson, 
a Republican banker from Lyon County, reported receiving letters “threatening to ruin his 
business if he spoke disrespectfully of the Klan,” but went on to say for the record that he “didn’t 
give three whoops in a hot place for [the Klan].” He added to his fellow members of the Kansas 
House of Representatives, “If you vote for this bill, you will be classed as a Klansman.”
145
 The 
motion to pass the bill failed with an even vote, and thus it was tabled. Though the Senate had 
passed the Klan bill, the House of Representatives was convinced to squash the organization by 
refusing to pass a bill allowing it a charter.  
The battle over the KKK chartering act reflected the diversity of opinions on the 
organization among a cross-section of Kansas farmers, businessmen, and professionals. The 
divided legislature suggested that ordinary Kansans were also split on the issue. Among those 
serving from the banking profession alone, differences of opinion ranged from the adamantly 
opposed Ericcson, to the at least moderately supportive governor and J.W. Berryman, who 
registered no opinion but voted to recommend passage of the bill.
146
 It is unclear whether 
Berryman was a member of the Klan, friendly to its aims, keeping mum to preserve his business, 
or voting in its favor because it would make the Klan accountable. Yet that vote suggests that 
bankers were as liable as other Americans—rural and urban—to heed paranoid warnings that 
foreigners, non-Protestants, and the generally immoral were threatening the nation’s ideals.  
Country bankers and businessmen, influential as they were on economic, political, and 
social grounds, would make powerful allies, and the Klan definitely targeted them in 
membership drives. Albert Doerr kept in his records an invitation to a “naturalization meeting of 
the Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.” The meeting would take place in the 
                                                 





dark hours of June 14, 1924 in a pasture northeast of the small town of Garfield in Pawnee 
County. The card urged the reader to “look for the ‘Fiery Cross’” as a sign of the meeting, and to 
“present this card with your name signed on back for admission at the gate.” The fact that Doerr 
retained the card unsigned implies that he did not attend the meeting, but his inclusion in the 
membership drive is illuminating. The invitation offers clues that the klavern was reaching out to 
a broad number of potential members: the card issued to Doerr was number 1,063. Yet the offer 
of membership was still exclusive, listed specifically as “Not Transferable.”
147
 Though it is 
unclear just how many local klaverns were organized in the western region, and whether this 
particular chapter at Garfield took hold, at least 243 locals were formed throughout the state.
148
 
In promoting its agenda of Americanism, Protestant Christianity, and moral purity, selective 
membership and alliances with the rural middle classes and elite business community were 
important. Beyond becoming members of the organization themselves, bankers with knowledge 
of community members could prove useful as character references for potential applicants.
149
 
The Ku Klux Klan, thus, represents one form—albeit an extreme one—of some bankers’ service 
as moral gatekeepers within their communities during a particularly challenging era of transition 
in rural America.  
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 Bankers tended to reflect positively on the economic and social development of the state 
and their own roles in it. Frederick Atwood, ever-poetically inclined, observed sentimentally in 
his memoirs:  
May not one be pardoned for feeling slightly inflated when he remembers that he 
was born in the great state of New York, that he lived long enough among the 
Green Mountains to claim citizenship, and so be known as a Vermonter, and then 
as a crowning honor to have had a part in the upbuilding of that great state whose 
emblem is the sunflower? - A commonwealth whose comparatively brief 
existence has been crowded with moral victories, material betterments and 
intellectual progress? New York symbolizes power; Vermont stands for equality, 
shrewdness, thrift; Kansas means to all the world moral heroism, sublime 
optimism, strenuous faith. Our brilliant [Senator John] Ingalls most happily 
epitomized the spirit of our people when he suggested as the motto of our state ad 
astra per aspera-to the stars through difficulties! The night of adversity is never so 




Once again, moral victories and moral heroism commanded attention among Atwood’s self-
reflections. To him, support for moral causes defined the worth of Kansas, the Sunflower State, 
and he was proud that it had defined his public service record, as well. Bankers did not always 
agree on the proper use of their social and moral influence. In the case of the Law and Order 
League in Concordia, morals-based positions without the substance to support them politically 
proved unpopular, and challenged Atwood’s position in the community to some degree. 
Meanwhile, joining an organization such as the Ku Klux Klan that professed to uphold morality, 
along with Americanism and Protestant values, also proved divisive and ultimately misguided. 
Still, the participation of country bankers and their families in elite religious or social clubs—
most of them much less controversial than those named—revealed their prominence in rural 
society, and demonstrated their interests in community uplift and social development.  
                                                 




Such activities also paved the way for involvement in programs during the war that 
mobilized the rural public on behalf of a larger cause and set in motion broad changes among the 
American people. National programs such as the Liberty Bond drives and the American Red 
Cross built on existing economic, social, and political networks in towns throughout the U.S., but 
the growing influence of the federal government signaled a shift in the source of Americans’ 
citizenship. Increasing affiliation with the nation, not simply one’s local community, as well as 
the growth of cities, immigration, and challenges to the moral order, disturbed a way of life to 
which rural Americans had become accustomed. Atwood’s memoirs from around the First World 
War issued a grievance common among small towns, which “were beginning to complain that 
automobiles and better roads were taking their business to larger towns—thus hurting them 
badly.”
151
 As was the case in the Good Roads Movement in 1920s Kansas, many farmers and 
rural citizens resisted such change desperately. Others, including bankers J.W. Berryman and 
John M. Gray, embraced modernization and sought ways to transition their communities to a 
new era. This, too, represented their status as community builders.  
Bankers’ leadership would be sorely needed as economic and environmental crises began 
to join social and moral challenges in pummeling the rural communities of western Kansas. 
These local businessmen had to exercise all of their powers of financial strength to keep their 
institutions afloat as more and more farmers became unable to pay their mortgages due to low 
crop prices and later, low yields, during the 1920s and 1930s. For if a financial center was ripped 
apart, so, too, would all the constituent components of a community’s livelihood. A cartoon by 
Wyncie King in the Saturday Evening Post (Figure 3.7) reflected this reality rather starkly in an 
image that features the explosive storm of the economic crisis tearing at the pillars of the 
community bank. Centered around the now destroyed bank, also blown about and damaged, are 
                                                 




arranged buildings representing the 
major facets of the economic 
community, including a mercantile and 
manufacturing building. To the side, a 
barn representing agriculture is borne 
away, and a farmer holds onto his plow 
for dear life. His horse has been cut off 
at the reins and is blasting off in his 
own direction, blinders still on. At the 
top of the image, buffeted the furthest 
away from the ruins of the bank, was 
“the social life of the community.” A 
woman falls out of the bottom of this 
once fine-looking, traditional home.
152
 
It became evident by the middle of the Great Depression that while still worthwhile as 
symbols of status for some rural Americans, local clubs could do little to sustain the community 
at large by the power of charity alone. Even organizations that had functioned through a 
localized organizational structure as recently as World War I, such as the American Red Cross, 
would have to redirect their centers upward, toward leadership and fundraising activities more 
national than local in scope.
153
 When private local donations ran as dry as the weather in the 
Great Plains, rural Americans would have to accept aid from federal sources such as the Federal 
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Figure 3.7. Wyncie King illustration, Saturday 




Emergency Relief Administration and its successor, the Works Progress Administration. Their 
considerable influence notwithstanding, bankers could not command a successful system of 
donations—as they had during the war—when their communities were faced with immense 
economic and environmental challenges. Social and moral concerns, too, lost a considerable 
amount of attention as propping up the livelihoods of rural Kansas citizens and communities 
became the utmost concern for regional financial leaders. This dissertation now turns to this 




Chapter Four. The Lending Tree: Conservative Banking and the Community 
in Crisis 
 
Bankers in rural western Kansas may have exhibited the strength of their economic 
power in the integration of their banks into the financial networks of the region and nation, but 
these very connections with the broader economy meant that local communities were subject 
periodically to forces beyond the immediate market. Integrated fully into the national system of 
capital, rural communities felt the pressures of national depressions, such as during the 1890s 
and 1920s and 1930s. These and other economic downturns owed to diverse causes, from failed 
maneuvers on the stock market to mismatches in supply and demand in the agricultural 
commodity markets. These events led to contractions of credit in rural communities as bankers 
sought to protect their capital, and often spurred the public to challenge the authority of the 
country banker. Populist tracts during the 1890s, for example, skewered bankers and the 
railroads for turning farmers out of their homes. Novels published during the 1920s and 1930s, 
meanwhile, pitted the farmer against the creditor. Interest payments threatened doom for the 
settler family of John Ise’s 1936 memoir of his family’s pioneer days, Sod and Stubble. John 
Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath, published in 1939, equated the banker with the machines 
displacing farmers from their land.
1
  
The insights from the 1920s and 1930s on the country’s rural economic system are 
especially important because these years culminated in a major shift in American banking. The 
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federal government increasingly stepped in as a competitor in offering rural credits, and as a 
regulator of the national banking system. In Kansas, 415 banks failed between 1920 and 1934. 
Bankers faced a loss of public confidence, but had to find ways of steering their businesses 
through these difficult years. It was difficult keeping bank assets liquid enough to meet depositor 
demand—especially when the banks held loans on farm real estate that had lost considerable 
value. Conservative bankers anticipated possible losses, understood the risk of illiquid assets, 
and lent money to clients who would most often reward the risk. These types of bankers, 
therefore, were most able to survive the constriction of profits and overall bank numbers as well 
as the increasing demands for oversight from the Federal Reserve System.
2
 Those that did 
persevere through the Great Depression emerged stronger and with the potential for tremendous 
growth in the prosperous years that followed. 
The positions of conservative, tenacious bankers within rural economies and their social 
and political communities belied many popular stereotypes: rarely were they as unconcerned 
with the farmers’ fate as depicted in popular literature. Indeed, their livelihoods depended upon 
agricultural success, and they had a major stake in assuring the continued stability of the rural 
economy. Anticipating and reconciling with national imperatives for banking reform, within 
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their own visions of economic viability, became essential to country bankers’ preservation of a 
place within their communities. 
As depression set in across the countryside during the 1920s and 1930s, a long-standing 
problem with keeping the public confidence resurfaced for bankers, who were accused of 
dragging already over-extended borrowers deeper into debt and then bailing on them when they 
could no longer pay. Lack of confidence was not the only issue at hand, however. Bankers’ 
economic control over small towns tended to be so centralized—and thus open for critique—
only because capitalism seemed to have triumphed over other social and cultural values. Sinclair 
Lewis’s Main Street cited this problem when his character Miles Bjornstam, Gopher Prairie’s 
resident rabble-rouser, noted, “The dollar-sign has chased the crucifix clean off the map.”
3
 The 
widely read journalist and political commentator Garet Garrett essentially agreed, when he 
explained the problem of the American finance system to the readers of the Saturday Evening 
Post in a 1933 article. He argued that the real issue was a “characteristically American” 
understanding of the function of banks, which considered credit a “dynamic, creative, all-saving 
power.” He added, “We think with credit, we create with credit, build with credit, play on credit, 
consume on credit—which is to say, on debt—and the equal is not true of any other people in the 
world.”
4
 Credit and the accumulation of debt for speculative purposes had created a crisis, yet 
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the American people were unable to understand the trouble in themselves and in the culture of 
many banks. Garrett pointed out that ignoring their speculative culture led Americans to tolerate 
“perilous banking” and to promote fixing the “trouble in the machine”: they wrote new banking 
regulations rather than addressing the root cause of the problem. Garrett surmised that 
Americans’ long-standing fear of “tyranny” also led them to prefer a lax system of “toothless 
laws” allowing state and national banks to participate in an endless cycle of unhealthy 
competition, wherein the number of banks increased dramatically and the rules for capitalization 
and security weakened. Believing that the issue was a lack of money, federal authorities 
supported the expansion of banking, and meanwhile feared interfering in poorly functioning 
banks because of the risk of inciting a panic.
5 Lawmakers ignored the fact that banks’ issues of 
“credit currency”—essentially checkbooks linked to lines of credit—destabilized the deposit 
basis of the whole system.  
Fixing the American banking system, according to Garrett, required a combination of 
increased standards for chartering banks, greater professionalization and oversight of those 
running them, and ultimately a promise to fulfill a “moral contract” with bank depositors to 
return their money when asked. This would necessitate conservative lending practices that would 
prove unpopular within the rural communities that demanded more and more credit. The number 
of banks in the United States had nearly tripled from 1900 to 1920, from 10,382 to 30,139 banks. 
The 1900 National Bank Act lowered the capitalization requirement for a federal charter from 
$50,000 to $25,000, and many states subsequently lowered the requirements for chartering banks 
as well. Garrett lamented that “a very great many of these new banks were organized by people 
whose knowledge of banking consisted in the idea that anybody with horse sense could run a 
                                                 






 Improving the status of banking, the journalist believed, involved promoting among 
bankers a more professional sense of the purposes of the trade and the desire to support 
depositors and borrowers with legitimate needs for expansion, rather than a group of select 
cronies who wished to borrow money and speculate with it. Bankers, again, had to exercise a 
certain degree of conservatism in lending in order to maintain a good ratio of deposits available 
for customers and keep their banks open during the runs that were so common in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s. They had to develop good judgment and the character to say no to wild 
demands for credit that would threaten the security of depositors’ money. A banker’s character 
was intimately linked to his bank’s fate. Garrett confirmed the adage, “It is not the bank that 
fails; it is the banker, in judgment and character. It is not banking that breaks down; it is the 
management, in morals and ethics.”
7
  
Garrett’s observations about bankers’ character certainly fit within the lexicon of 
American banking. Banks often professed to their “conservativism” in lending and esteemed 
bankers were hailed for their “judgment and character.” But that judgment, Garrett himself 
admitted, could seem a bit ill-defined:  
There is no common axiomatic rule among [conservative bankers] as to how their 
depositor’s money may be loaned or invested. An unsecured note may be a better 
risk than a piece of two-name paper with collateral attached that the examiner 
would sooner pass; that is something only the bank can know. . . . It is not the 
kind of loan or the kind of investment that matters; what does matter is that loan 




Ultimately, the fate of a bank came down to the local banker’s perceptions about individual 
clients’ needs and their own role in fulfilling demands for the economic development of the 
community as a whole. This was a difficult job, for the American system of banking was 
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dynamic, no less in rural communities than in the halls of Wall Street. Regulations changed 
frequently on the state and national levels, economic conditions shifted, and banks had to interact 
smoothly with an increasingly localized group of investors as well as with financial partners in 
eastern cities. While dealing with conditions incomprehensible to most of their clients, country 
bankers sought to present to their communities a fairly constant image of stability, pragmatism, 
professionalism, and knowledge of local economics, especially agriculture. They accomplished 
this primarily through preserving successful financial relationships with a large number of 
parties. 
While chapter one explored how country bankers established financial connections with a 
vast regional and national system of capital, as well as the ways they structured the security and 
stability of community banking institutions, this chapter considers the actual functioning of 
bankers’ lending and investing roles. Moving beyond the methods of advertising that attracted 
customers to their banks, I investigate the specific ways bankers developed credit relationships 
with their communities, cultivating the “lending tree” so that it grew new branches and bore 
fruit. Evaluating the activities of a group of bank directors from Oberlin, Kansas, and a banker 
from Colby, Kansas demonstrates how bankers sought to shape their communities’ economic 
fortunes, and how difficult that became when financial conditions deteriorated in the 1920s and 
1930s. When their ability to offer credit contracted, bankers made decisions to nurture the 
branches of credit that seemed most likely to survive. They remained invested in an economic 
system primarily dependent upon agriculture, but many believed that it could now only support 
the most efficient, scientific, and mechanized producers.  
The substantial economic power vested in bankers had important implications for a 




interests in western Kansas to thrive, but also exposed the region to severe contractions when 
speculative growth outpaced actual economic need. Bankers bore a great deal of the blame for 
having promoted farmers’ speculative and expansionistic tendencies in the 1880s and later in the 
years surrounding World War I. They also had to shoulder part of the responsibility for carrying 
rural America through depression in the 1890s and the 1920s-1930s. Considering financial 
relationships in western Kansas—those between local directors and a broad clientele of farmers, 
ranchers, and rural merchants; and between bankers and individual borrowers—clarifies the role 
of the country bank as an institution within the larger national economy. Demand for credit 
remained a constant in the capitalistic and speculative economy of the United States, but 
bankers’ motivations for filling this demand sometimes changed as they began to cope with the 
increasing financial complexities of the twentieth century. In order to realize the continued 
economic viability of their communities, country bankers in western Kansas often made choices 
that supported a narrower and more elite group of borrowers. Although their financial decisions 
sometimes worked against agrarian dreams for a nation of family farmers, I maintain that 
bankers viewed their actions as the fulfillment of the regional community’s broader economic 
interests. Country bankers successful in maintaining the viability of their banks and developing 
ways to continue attracting capital investment for the prosperity of their region were 
conservative in the sense that Garrett meant: careful, principled, and professional. They were 
also conservative in the sense that they preserved the Great Plains agricultural economy in a 
form sustainable at least for the next several decades.
9
 The conservativism that characterized the 
class of country bankers remaining active in the Great Plains region following the contractions of 
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the 1920s and 1930s allowed them to regain the confidence and respect of their communities and 
to hold their strong positions within the economic power structure of the rural West.   
Bank Directors and the Bottom Line: Profits, Policies, and the Public Confidence 
A lack of understanding about what sorts of decisions bankers faced in the course of their 
business contributed to the often-incomplete portrayal of banks and bankers in popular and 
political culture. Examining the private records of banks—usually only possible with the 
permission of current owners—reveals a great deal about the motivations behind the banking 
policies enacted to keep these financial institutions solvent even during the most difficult 
economic conditions. The records of the board of directors of the Farmers National Bank in 
Oberlin, Kansas, lent to the author by a descendent of a former bank president, provide necessary 
context about the bank’s lending practices and other institutional policies in the era between 
World War I and World War II.
10
 These documents show how bankers mediated between the 
conservative principles of their profession, those mandated by state and federal bank regulators, 
and demands for investment in their community.  
Bank directors invested heavily in banking operations, not just financially as 
stockholders, but also in an advisory capacity. As elected members of a board composed of at 
least five members responsible for managing the bank, they were substantively involved in 
decision-making processes.
11
 They often did much more than simply collect dividends on their 
stock; directors oversaw bank operations and set policy, attended to personnel changes and 
salaries, and sought to increase the bank’s profits through expanding deposits and purchasing 
bonds. Most importantly, directors were implicated personally in the successful management of 
                                                 
10. Board of Directors Record Books, 1918-1939, Farmers National Bank of Oberlin, Kansas, private 
collection, loaned to the author by Charles L. Frickey. 
11. James T. Bradley, “Bank Administration by Directors,” 121-26, in Proceedings of the Twenty-second 




the bank’s loan portfolio. They set interest rates, routinely considered the status of individual 
loans, and worked as a body to fulfill the recommendations of bank examiners regarding poor 
lines of credit.
12
 In short, directors fulfilled many of the leadership needs for country banks.  
Bank directors represented a diverse collection of occupations and family connections to 
banking operations in Kansas. Eastern capitalists, such as the stockholders of the Cloud County 
Bank of Concordia, sometimes served as directors in frontier communities. Beginning in 1891, 
Kansas law required that state residents comprise the majority of bank boards of directors, 
however, so locals attained greater positions of leadership in all banks as the banking system 
matured. Directors were selected from a potentially large group of local stockholders. The first 
group of investors who ventured capital in a local bank or even in multiple banks consisted of 
those successful in farming or ranching pursuits, mercantile stores, law or medicine, or other 
enterprises. A second group included relatives of bank officers. Just as the relatives of H.C. 
Harrison, T.B. Smith, and J.W. Berryman had invested in family-run enterprises in Great Bend, 
Kansas; Concordia, Kansas; and Pond Creek, Oklahoma, extended family continued to play an 
important role in capitalization and service on bank boards of directors. Even wives and children 
of bank officers frequently embraced positions as stockholders and directors within country 
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banks. Undoubtedly, the officers strengthened their own standing and influence by drawing 
family into the business.  
Yet, these situations did not produce idle players in the decision-making processes of 
bank directors. Local directors had an important place to maintain within their communities, and 
thus were held accountable for their decisions not only by state and national banking authorities, 
but also by their neighbors. The directors of a bank represented the financial institution to the 
public to almost as great a degree as the officers working in the front of the bank, and they 
affixed their names to the financial reports published in local newspapers as well. This was 
appropriate recognition of their status, because directors had a substantial influence over lending 
decisions and the ultimate policies of the bank. Given the influence of directors within bank 
operations, and the large number of bank directors in country towns, I define the banking “class” 
as much broader than simply the officers in the front of the bank. 
The bank in Oberlin is representative of the characteristics of national banks in the early 
twentieth century in several ways. It was originally chartered as the First National Bank on May 
7, 1886 and still operates today. Yet in name, status, and operational profile, it changed 
periodically. The bank re-chartered as a state institution catering to a specific clientele in 1897, 
when it became the Farmers State Bank. Operating under a state charter allowed the bank to 
reduce its capital following a period of economic contraction in the early 1890s (moving from a 
$50,000 minimum to a $5,000 minimum capitalization was significant). It also allowed the bank 
to provide full service to the farmers now represented in the bank name as the key constituents of 
the bank, because state banks could offer loans based on farm real estate. The bank went back to 
a national charter as the Farmers National Bank in 1904, however. National banking laws had 




with business recovery allowed the bank to move back into the first tier of country banks within 
the region. The bank continued to grow through the years of World War I, and despite years of 
difficult collecting during the 1920s and 1930s, it managed to emerge after World War II as a $3-
million operation.  
The board of directors during this period was similar to other national banks in that it 
represented a mix of occupations and diverse levels of involvement in banking operations. The 
board chose officers, including a president, vice president, and secretary, as well as the cashier 
and assistant cashier of the bank. The president and cashiers worked daily in the front offices of 
the bank, and drew pay for their services.
13
 Other directors served on committees to oversee loan 
portfolios or examine balances. Several of the directors of this bank in the 1920s and 1930s were 
farmers and stockmen by trade, and others were merchants or lawyers. Most of the directors 
resided in Oberlin.
14
 Involvement in banks as a secondary occupation, as a means of investment 
and community leadership, was a common trend throughout western Kansas.
15
   
The minutes from meetings of the Farmers National Bank board of directors between 
1918 and 1940 illustrate the typical activities of this body. The board met monthly, while also 
convening for an additional two stockholders’ meetings in June and December. In January, the 
directors chose the officers of the bank and the board, often re-appointing the same group as 
chairman of the board, secretary, president, and vice president. They also considered bank 
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employee salaries, from the president to the cashiers and clerks, and stipulated that certain of 
these employees bond themselves to the bank as security.
16
  
Throughout the year, regular meetings followed a standard pattern, which included 
reviewing the notes issued to borrowers during the previous month alongside those on the books 
as loans receivable. Some of these included loans to directors, which received special attention. 
The number of notes approved in a given month varied, but the average was around 150, ranging 
from a few dollars to thousands of dollars. Each month these notes “were carefully examined and 
looked into and upon motion were approved.”
17
 By this time, national law allowed the Farmers 
National Bank to accept real estate as collateral on long-term mortgages, but the bank continued 
to maintain a portfolio of relatively short-term loans, based on equipment or livestock security; 
these loans produced more regular returns for local investors. The rates for the bank’s short-term 
loans remained somewhat high, at eight percent “on all amounts above One Hundred Dollars,” 
for “all the customers who do all their business at this bank.” Rates were probably higher for 
smaller notes or non-customers, but the bank still experienced consistent demand for credit.
18
 In 
the 1920s, drops in crop prices and land values made banks more reluctant to extend credit at the 
lower interest rates that had prevailed in the region during the optimistic years of World War I 
and the Great Plow Up. They could and frequently did decide to use their institutional capital for 
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purposes other than lending, so customers needing short-term credit may not have had the option 
to protest high interest rates.
19
   
As part of the standard pattern of business, the directors frequently considered specific 
overdue notes. The matter most often involved a simple discussion of the note, and a resolution 
to talk to the borrower about reducing their debt. In one meeting, “It was agreed that the Cashier 
should go to Norcatur and interview Mr. W.A. Williams* in regard to his son’s note, which 
needed special attention.”
20
 In a similar vein, the minutes recorded that “Robert T. Johnson’s 
assets were carefully discussed in view of his obligations at this Bank. It was recommended that 
he be encouraged to reduce his indebtedness within the very near future.”
21
 Such pressure on 
borrowers remained a key tactic for the bank officers, even when they reversed their decisions 
and lent more credit to those they wanted to see reduce their debts.
22
  
In less simple cases, for example if it seemed clear that the bank would not receive the 
balance of a note, the directors “charged off” the loan to Bills Receivable in the Profit and Loss 
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fast as possible.” Yet the next month the loan officers decided to extend him three more short-term notes of $200, 







 This became necessary especially when a borrower “left the country,” making the note 
uncollectible, but the bank would still try to do what it could to recover any of the money 
loaned.
24
 They would sell the borrower’s remaining property, such as a $6,106.90 threshing 
machine on which one client had a note.
25
 The bank might pursue an option where the borrower 
would deed his land (used as collateral on a mortgage) over to the bank with the chance to buy it 
back if he could find the means.
26
 In some cases the directors would decide to take action on 
cosigners, as when a borrower started bankruptcy proceedings to get out from under his debt 
obligations and the bank sought action on two individuals who had also signed the note.
27
 One of 
these co-signers was the borrower’s mother, which indicates the bank was open to accepting 
women borrowers. Although the vast majority of borrowers discussed by the board and the 
special loan committee were men, a few women also showed up in the record.
28
 
Difficult collecting conditions in the 1920s and 1930s led the directors to develop 
policies about lending less credit, but in some instances they ignored them. In an October 21, 
1926 meeting the minutes recorded, “In view of resent [sic] conditions, it was agreed that we not 
take on any new customers where it involved loans of any consequence. It was also decided that 
we curtail on loaning to the fullest extent possible.” In the same meeting, however, “It was voted 
to make an additional loan to Henry Albertsen of not to exceed $600.00.”
29
 An existing 
relationship with the bank or a perception of stability often elicited the continued support of the 
                                                 
23. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, December 15, 1919. 
24. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, November 9, 1922. 
25. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, July 13, 1922. 
26. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, March 13, 1924. 
27. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, August 19, 1921.  
28. The Jennie Smith note of $300.00 was recorded as charged off, and the Louisa Larson loan of $500.00 
“especially discussed.” See the Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, January 
14, 1926 and February 12, 1927. The Discount Committee records, available from the late 1930s, indicated that 
women continued to receive several types of short-term loans, ranging from including three- to six-months’ 
maturity, and from $50 to $350. See Minutes, Discount Committee, March 12, 1936 and May 14, 1936. 
Occasionally, women cosigned notes with their husbands, though this occurred much less frequently than I would 
have expected. See Minutes, Discount Committee, March 30, 1936.  




directors. During a board meeting in September 1927, the directors acted leniently with borrower 
Tom Jones, whom they loaned “enough money to buy seed wheat to sow two hundred acres of 
wheat.”
30
 The promise of government allotment payments to farmers, beginning with the New 
Deal’s farm program, proved another factor in easing lending conditions for many borrowers in 
the Oberlin area. In January 1936, the bank decided to give additional funds to a customer who 
already owed a six-month, $1,200 note to the bank: “Frank Gliss being out of feed it was decided 
to advance him money on his government checks with which to buy feed.”
31
 In 1939, the bank 
adopted a more wide-ranging policy of extending notes rather than issuing new ones with shorter 
maturity and more interest, because “a considerable number of the past due notes in the bank’s 
files are the result of delayed wheat allotment checks due borrowers.”
32
 The bank thus became 
more willing to extend the time on loans when checks for withholding planting acreage or 
buying feed were forthcoming. Backing by government institutions in the form of allotment 
payments and even the extension of loans from the federal land bank in Wichita assured the bank 
that a borrower had the ability to maintain and improve his land, earn more money, and repay the 
bank. Various factors persuaded the bank to extend loans, but each individual case proves the 
bank was willing to take risks to support worthy community members in the pursuit of shared 
economic interests.  
Beyond these factors, considerations of a borrower’s age, marital status, and the 
condition of the farm in question influenced the lending decisions of the Oberlin bank 
directors.
33
 In Oberlin, the directors treated young or unmarried borrowers with some caution. 
                                                 
30. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, September 8, 1927.  
31. Minutes, Meeting of Discount Committee, January 12, 1936.  
32. Minutes, Meeting of Discount Committee, March 14, 1939. 
33. Sara Gregg has elaborated on bankers’ propensity to prefer borrowers with well-kept farm buildings, 
sound and up-to-date machinery, healthy livestock, diversified farms, and even with a propensity to boost 
community causes like good roads. Those farmers who robbed the soil with a monoculture, left machines to rust and 




The directors asked a 38-year-old man who still lived in his parents’ home while farming his 
own land, “To give a second mortgage on his land to secure his paper.”
34
 The directors also 
determined during this September 1927 meeting to take over and sell the property that had 
secured a mortgage for a T.B. Anderson. Anderson, too, was still a young man. The Farmers 
National later changed its mind about him and continued trying to work out his debt with him 
over the next year, but sought additional security on Anderson’s loan from his father and mother, 
who had lived in the area for more than twenty years.
35
 The bank had to renew pressure on the 
“considerably past due” Anderson note in November 1928, but its willingness to reframe a loan’s 
status owing to a family connection in the area is an important illustration of the bank’s policies 
for loan security.  
The bank expressed a clear preference for certain borrowers based on their personal 
characteristics, support systems, longevity of residence in the area and of their relationship with 
the bank, and ultimately their ability to repay their debts. This fact is immediately apparent in a 
set of instructions issued in 1923 regarding a set of borrowers who took out credit for the same 
purposes:  
It was decided that farmers who borrowed money to harvest this year’s wheat 
crop be encouraged to sell enough of their wheat as soon as they thresh to pay all 
harvest expenses. It was further decided that certain customers be instructed to 





                                                                                                                                                             
were less likely to receive bank loans. Access to credit permitted development, but lack of development perpetuated 
a cycle of poor credit and inability to improve farms. As Gregg noted, access to longer-term, amortized loans 
through the land banks was meant to give more farmers the ability to expand and improve their farms. Credit from 
the land bank could therefore also serve as a symbol of a farmers’ worthiness for additional loans from local banks. 
See Gregg, “From Breadbasket to Dust Bowl,” 133. 
34. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, September 8, 1927; 1925 
Kansas State Census for Oberlin, Decatur County, Kansas. 
35. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, April 12, 1928. 




While some of these borrowers would be treated with leniency and “encouragement,” others 
deemed less trustworthy or stable would be “instructed” to do exactly what the bank demanded 
and pay all the proceeds of their harvest sales to the bank. Later that same year, the directors 
determined that “only customers who are land owners and have plenty of property back of them 
be permitted to feed [cattle and hogs] and customers who have very little property be refused 
credit with which to feed.”
37
 A man who received a total of twenty-seven lines of credit 
amounting to $5,018.50, and who had paid off eighteen notes in full as well as reduced the total 
due on five others, would continue in the bank’s good graces.
38
 Meanwhile, the bank would view 
someone who did not even honor the Farmers National with his entire business with skepticism 
and ask him to “pay up because he owes the other bank.”
39
 For those individual clients 
continually deemed worthy of credit, their relationship with the community bank would help to 
maintain an agricultural economy upon which they were mutually dependent. The rescinding of 
credit from an individual, however, could mean the difference in his ability to remain a viable 
member of the local economic community. In selecting worthy borrowers and continuing to 
support them through an era of agricultural depression, then, bankers (including the directors of 
banks) furthered the development of an agricultural economy where only the more successful 
and credit-worthy could thrive.  
Bank directors, who were already some of the wealthiest citizens of a community when 
they made their investments in bank stock, were naturally among those who would most benefit 
from the shift toward more consolidated, industrialized, and capitalized farm operations. The 
meeting minutes from the Farmers National Bank Board of Directors demonstrate that 
stockholders drew funds from the bank to support other investments, including land. In the 
                                                 
37. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, September 13, 1923. 
38. Minutes, Meeting of Discount Committee, February 29, 1936.  




interest of transparency and in compliance with state banking law, the board took care to 
consider loans made to directors of the bank and specifically listed the amount loaned. Some of 
the bank directors began to take out thousands of dollars in loans in 1925, and although the 
purpose for the loans remained unstated, it is probable that the loans were used to purchase land 
from insolvent farmers and ranchers.
40
 It was during this period that many farmers were 
beginning to lose their land due to the high debts they had incurred in the farm expansion frenzy 
of the World War and due to large machinery purchases made to manage larger farms more 
efficiently. To top off problems with unbearable debt levels, crop prices in the post-war market 
bottomed out in the 1920s, not to recover naturally (without government price supports) until the 
next world war. Farmers’ standard of living declined steadily, and often they were unable to 
repay loans to the bank or mortgage company. Members of the local bank’s board of directors 
gained insider knowledge into the financial condition of bank customers and other community 
members who applied to the bank for extensions of credit. It was a common if not a generally 
popular practice to take advantage of this knowledge and direct access to capital to buy land out 
of foreclosure sales or even before owners reached this state. The period when the Oberlin 
directors began applying for so many loans coincided with the low tide of agricultural prices and 
a time of high land turnover.
41
 These directors’ land buying habits, including whether they 
speculated in land or held farms as long-term assets, deserve more investigation. These records 
                                                 
40. Examples of this practice on the part of individual directors and directors in partnership with other 
investors are numerous in these records. The first instance I found was recorded in the November 12, 1925 minutes, 
when “A loan of $2500.00 to Director [C.L.] Frickey and a loan of $2687.75 to Director [J.F.] Martin by motion 
were approved.” Certain directors began taking out large amounts, often in partnership with other investors, and this 
is especially suggestive of real estate accumulation. See, for example, the May 14, 1926 minutes, when the board 
approved loans individually to Frickey and Martin, as well as to two separate partnerships with Martin: “Martin and 
Tapp $1000.00, Martin and Helvey $500.00.” Loans to directors, ranging as with standard notes from a few dollars 
to thousands of dollars, continued in a heavy volume into the early 1930s, but they did taper off in the late 1930s. 
41. Wayne D. Angell has noted that the over-extension of loans to bank officers for their use in speculative 
enterprises could create substantial problems of cash flow, as in 1890 when three national banks—the First National 
Bank of Abilene, the Harper National Bank, and the State National Bank of Wellington—failed for these reasons. 
The Kansas legislature’s failure to outlaw such lending practices in its 1891 and 1897 Banking Acts garnered 




provide remarkable insight into an often-obscure side of the land-buying equation. Prominent 
members of the community with the financial wherewithal to invest in bank stock were also able 
to leverage their economic power into an expansion of their capital investment in the form of 
land, and especially land formerly held by economically unstable owners. Many ordinary farmers 
and ranchers lost their land during these years, while the rural elite expanded their estates 
proportionally.   
Carefully considering the bank’s overall lending portfolio and individual loans during 
every meeting of the board of directors was essential to the operation of the bank. The directors 
were held responsible for the bank’s loan policies, not only by the watchful eyes of the 
community dependent on the institution’s continued ability to finance them, but also by national 
bank examiners. The system of oversight for national banks included the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Federal Reserve in Kansas City, and the Kansas national bank examiner. The latter 
office subjected the bank to semiannual audits, making reports to the directors about weaknesses 
in the Farmers National Bank operation. The comptroller would also send periodic requests for 
updates on the bank’s lending portfolio, demanding that the directors sign the report individually. 
In one such letter, the comptroller’s office asked the board to work on the bank’s loan portfolio: 
While it is realized that liquidations depend more or less upon this year’s crops, 
all possible efforts should be put forth in the meantime to strengthen the loans 
with additional security. Immediately following the June meeting of the board, 
please advise over your individual signatures what reduction or improvement, if 





                                                 
42. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, June 9, 1927. The board 
received similar letters yearly and sometimes on a bi-annual basis. For more on the national regulations imposed on 
Federal Reserve member banks, see Eugene White, “To Establish More Effective Supervision of Banking: How the 
Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision,” in A Return to Jekyll Island: The Origins, History, and Future of the 




This request is significant because it assigned full responsibility for the bank’s actions to the 
board of directors. The professional implications of the request for directors to take on the task of 
recovering loans, in addition to the financial weight of stockholders’ double liability, highlight a 
bank board’s strong interest in keeping the institution sound.
43
  
Loan collections were one of the bank’s most important sources of survival, and thus 
constituted a major portion of each meeting of the board of directors. The directors also 
considered other ways of shoring up the bank’s assets and earning interest revenue on its funds 
during these meetings.
44
 One of the chief ways the bank invested, beyond loans, was through 
buying bonds. This practice had a long history, and in fact buying bonds to back up loan 
portfolios was a key policy that linked the national banking system to the U.S. government. 
Under the National Banking Act of 1863, three-fifths of a small bank’s $50,000 in capital had to 
be held in U.S. Treasury Bonds.
45
 Buying additional bonds periodically was a safe way of 
increasing the bank’s revenue on its profits, and bonds constituted one of the most liquid forms 
of assets for banks, so the board of directors routinely authorized the cashier to purchase bonds 
from the government or from a municipal or state project. A 1918 purchase of $10,000 in U.S. 
Treasury Certificates, due in three months and earning four and a half percent interest on the 
bank’s capital, was a purchase typical of the World War I era, when the government repeatedly 
                                                 
43. Unlike in other corporations in the United States, bank stockholders not only stood to lose the value of 
their investment, but were also responsible to pay for the bank’s loss, up to the amount of their stock. The Banking 
Act of 1935 finally did away with this rule, so that stockholders would only lose their original investment in the 
event of a failure. See Angell, “A Century of Commercial Banking,” 431. Some scholars have argued that the 
reversal of double liability has taken away necessary responsibility from shareholders, while doing little to protect 
the banking system and public confidence. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Double Liability of 
Bank Shareholders: History and Implications,” Wake Forest Law Review 27, no. 1 (1992), 31-62.  
44. A discussion by the Kansas Bankers Association members during their 1908 meeting illuminates the 
typical range of investments for banks, from real estate and cattle loans to investments in corporate stocks or 
commercial loans, and bonds. The more conservative bankers in this group thought that banks should hold forty to 
fifty percent of their capital and surplus on reserve, while limiting the least-liquid assets, real estate loans, to around 
twenty-five percent of the bank’s investments. See Angell, “A Century of Commercial Banking,” 349-55. 




called on financial institutions and ordinary citizens to support the war effort.
46
 The Farmers 
National Bank also turned to bonds and other investments when lending in the local community 
was most risky. The directors considered government bonds much safer than loans in the mid-
1920s. Even as some of these businessmen opted to buy out struggling farmers themselves, using 
the dividends from their bank stock as well as their own borrowing, they decided in a May 1924 
meeting that on the bank’s account, “new loans [should] be avoided as much as possible due to 
present conditions. It was also decided that government bonds be purchased to the extent from 
time to time as the reserve would justify.”
47
 This would maximize bank profits and continue to 
provide the directors an income, whereas relying on repayment of local farm loans was riskier.  
The bank continued to place large amounts of capital in U.S. Treasury bonds, including a 
$30,000 purchase in 1925, but it also pursued interests in the seemingly less risky loan portfolios 
of certain mortgage companies or city banks.
48
 In July of 1924, for example, the bank invested 
$25,000 with the Inter-State Cattle Loan Company.
49
 The bank also authorized large deposits of 
“call money,” to be used by banks such as the Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Company of 
Chicago, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York City, and the Inter-State National Bank of 
Kansas City. The Farmers National received interest payments for the favor of essentially 
lending the city banks these deposits so that these institutions might use the money to finance 
short-term notes of their own. The country bank also benefited from the fact that these funds 
                                                 
46. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, April 1, 1918. 
47. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, May 15, 1924 
48. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, June 11, 1925. The bond-
buying strategy continued through the late-1920s and 1930s, and remains a common investment practice for banks 
today.  
49. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, July 10, 1924. The directors 






 Not only did these actions shore up regional and national financial 
connections, but they also provided liquid investments for the country bank.  
Increasing bank profits, through high yields of interest from lending and investments in 
bonds and commercial banks, was important for the institution’s stability, and also allowed the 
stockholders to continue to draw dividends, or a portion of the bank profits, from the bank. On a 
semiannual basis, the directors would determine the stockholders’ dividend based on the bank’s 
earnings that period. When paid, the amount of the dividend ranged from a low of four percent to 
a high of ten percent, but issuing dividends of any amount was generally a sign of healthy 
profits.
51
 Dividends were one of the perquisites of investments in country banks that drew what 
many observers considered to be an unhealthy number of non-bankers into the field during 
expansionary years. While the Oberlin bank went through only two periods where directors 
opted not to distribute dividends in the interwar years, these were signs of the bank responding to 
more conservative sentiments. Regulators and the public began to view such decisions as 
important elements of the character of a bank and its personnel. The first time the Farmers 
National stopped distributing dividends was in response to poor loan-collecting conditions. On 
June 27, 1923, the directors decided not to give out dividends “due to the fact that notes totaling 
over $3,000 (having been determined by the Board of Directors as doubtful or worthless) hav[e] 
been charged to Undivided Profits account since the first of the year.”
52
 The board stuck with 
this no-dividend policy through 1924, but rebounded by distributing the highest recorded 
                                                 
50. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, August 18, 1929. 
51. In the first of numerous examples, the directors awarded themselves an eight percent dividend on 
December 22, 1919. Angell offers a table recording the yearly average of dividend rates of national banks from 1895 
to 1914. National banks ranged from a low five percent dividend in 1896 to a high 14.8 percent dividend in 1910. 
The average over the twenty-year period was 9.8 percent. This provides a useful comparison between prosperous 
years and the leaner times of the 1920s and 1930s. The Oberlin bank’s continued issuance or reasonably high 
dividends during much of the 1920s is surprising considering evidence that as a whole, banks in Kansas were 
operating with low profits. See Angell, “A Century of Commercial Banking,” 359, 450.  




dividend of ten percent on December 28, 1925. The bank suspended dividends one other time 
during this period, in response to national policy recommendations passed down in the first 
“Hundred Days” of the New Deal. In their meeting on May 10, 1933 the directors discussed a 
letter from the Comptroller of the Currency requesting the bank comply with a congressional 
policy that “there was no intention of declaring dividends at present and that salaries and 
expenses had been reduced.” The Farmers National directors complied with this measure, which 
helped fulfill the New Deal’s mission to restore confidence in local banks and the solidarity of 
their directors. No further dividends appeared to be issued until December 23, 1935, when the 
directors distributed a five percent dividend to stockholders.
53
 By the late 1930s, this bi-annual 
five percent dividend, which equated to about $2,500, became standard. Meanwhile, the bank put 
more profits into raising the bank’s surplus on a bi-annual basis.
54
 These policies represented a 
healthy return on investment for stockholders, who would continue to maintain their place 
among the wealthy elite of these rural communities, and also raised the stature and security of 
the bank itself.  
Maintaining the bank’s stature within the community was another important 
consideration for the directors and stockholders. Devoting attention to customer service was one 
important method of improving the bank’s relationship with the community. The directors did 
not all work in the bank every day, but they did sometimes weigh in on how employees should 
interact with customers. In one case, the directors responded to a concern that the employees had 
not had enough time to work with customers and fulfill the routine tasks of recordkeeping. They 
declined to hire more employees, and instead resolved to hold meetings and help the employees 
                                                 
53. The Oberlin bank’s failure to distribute dividends from 1933 to 1935 corresponds to a three-year period 
when state and national banks in Kansas, as a whole, operated at a loss. Clearly all banks and their investors were 
experiencing the same difficulties and restrictions. See Angell, “A Century of Commercial Banking,” 450.  




develop better organizational frameworks for completing long-term tasks on a daily basis. 
“Keeping all pass books balanced to date, remittances and all bank books worked each day and 
all filing records being completed at the close of each day’s work,” would prove a more efficient 
system, supported by better team work and time management.
55
 With these efficiencies in place, 
the employees could then focus their efforts on customer service:  
It was contended by the Directors that there was not anything that counted more 
for the welfare of the Institution, than efficient and courteous service at the 
windows and that the officers and help be encouraged and urged to work toward 
that end. It was recommended that a customer or patron at the window be given 
first consideration, irrespective of what the teller might be doing when said 




Prompt and courteous service certainly made the bank appear more community-oriented, rather 
than simply profit-oriented.  
Another important method of improving the bank’s stature within the local community 
was to strengthen its stake within the state and national banking system, a practice that reassured 
the community of the institution’s stability. The bank periodically bid for a position as a 
depository for funds from the state of Kansas, as in August 1921 when the directors resolved 
“that the Farmers National Bank of Oberlin, Kansas offer to act as one of the State Depositories 
to the amount of $20,000.00 for the term of two years. That said Bank offer to pay interest on 
daily balances at the rate of 3.86 per cent.”
57
 Receiving such deposits was not a direct money-
making venture for the bank, since it actually paid the state interest for the privilege of holding 
its funds. This practice did, however, give the bank more capital to invest in loans with the 
community, and furthermore, the state’s investment was perceived to increase general 
confidence in the bank and serve as a stimulus for receiving further deposits. The bank’s stature 
                                                 
55. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, February 9, 1922. 
56. Ibid. 




within the state was affirmed when it was “made a depository for an Emergency account by the 
Treasury Examiners of the State of Kansas,” in September of 1933.
58
 Similarly, participation in 
national programs such as Title II of the National Housing Act, which permitted the bank to 
issue mortgages for a new class of housing loans, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
granted the bank further status, security, and profit potential.
59
 Despite the difficulties of banking 
in the 1920s and 1930s, and the bad reputation many banks experienced within this period, the 
Farmers National Bank managed to remain profitable and ultimately successful in attracting 
business from local and state depositors. The appointment of Elwood M. Brooks, for many years 
the bank’s cashier and secretary of the Board of Directors, as the Kansas Bank Commissioner in 
1937 represented a significant symbol of the institution’s success.
60
 
 This evaluation of the board of directors’ minutes for the Farmers National Bank of 
Oberlin between 1918 and 1940 illustrates the contributions directors made to the bank’s 
operations. Directors concentrated on the successful management of the bank as a business. They 
were interested in sustaining profits for themselves, but adding to the bottom line meant more 
than that: it meant security for depositors. Careful considerations of investments, from loans to 
bonds, kept the bank’s finances sound. Such oversight was especially important during the 
extended agricultural depression, when many banks failed due to low crop prices and poor 
management. Directors’ jobs were important because they set the tone of relationships with 
borrowers and depositors and helped establish a successful profile with state and national 
regulatory agencies. Furthermore, their actions maintained the status of the institution within a 
                                                 
58. Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National Bank, September 13, 1933. 
59. The directors made an application for approval as a mortgagee for the Federal Housing Administration 
on May 8, 1935. The bank began participating in the FDIC by remitting one half of one percent of the bank’s 
deposits ($1606.63) on June 24, 1935. See Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Farmers National 
Bank. 
60. Brooks was given a leave of absence from the bank, while the bank president, Charles L. Frickey, 
stepped into more active duty in the bank’s daily operations. See Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 




local community that might otherwise distrust and pull business from the bank in an era when 
public confidence was essential to a bank’s livelihood.  
 “The First Thing is Character”: Lending Practices and the Country Banker 
A congressional committee once asked J.P. Morgan, the most prominent New York 
banker of the early twentieth century, ‘“Is not commercial credit based primarily upon money or 
property?’” Morgan replied, ‘“No, sir . . . The first thing is character . . . Money cannot buy it. . . 
. Because a man I do not trust could not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom.’”
61
 
Morgan’s statement made for a pithy summation of a common attitude about the functions of 
banking. Those banking on the local level made similar statements if pressed about their credit 
policies. A banker from Colby, Kansas reflected that he “learned a lot about judging character” 
when he accompanied his father on visits to the farms of potential borrowers. “Character” 
entailed a clean chicken house, “fresh grease on the wagon wheels,” and neatness.
62
 But the 
records of the Oberlin bank make clear that additional layers of scrutiny were involved in the 
lending process—not just a vague perception of “character.” The bank considered age, family 
connections, valuations of land and other farm goods, and other factors before determining the 
safety of a particular loan. As the Concordia banker Frederick J. Atwood noted, one of the first 
things he learned about banking in Kansas was to carefully evaluate land and make abstracts.
63
 
Such processes only became more complex and professionalized as bankers and the business 
community more generally urged farmers to keep accurate accounts of their production and land 
                                                 
61. Quoted in Gordon, Empire of Wealth, 233.  
62. “W.S. Ferguson Founds Thomas County Bank in 1886,” 1960, Thomas County Clippings, vol. 12, 
Kansas State Historical Society.  




values during the early twentieth century.
64
 Determining whether a borrower’s “character” was 
reliable was one way bankers evidenced the value of conservatism within their own practices.  
Although a precise formula employed by individual banks for lending considerations is 
elusive, records from the New Deal Farm Credit Administration demonstrate how evaluating 
property, along with a farmer’s character and family, had been mainstreamed by the 1930s. This 
federal agency used twelve-page summary forms to verify the accuracy of local loan appraisals. 
These forms considered land and soil type, use, and value; the condition and value of farm 
buildings, including the home; number and value of livestock and equipment; details of the 
farmer’s cropping program (diversity); cash flow and current liabilities; and assessments of 
“moral risk” and family, such as whether a line of succession was present. The files also 
contained a hand-drawn abstract of the farm property—land use, buildings, and other major 
features included.
65
 The trend toward more information, and the holistic consideration of both a 
farmer’s diligence and the value of his operations, suggests that lending practices were complex 
on the individual level. The files of the Oberlin bank and the following example of Colby, 
Kansas banker W. D. Ferguson indicate that country bankers in the Great Plains region expressed 
a decided preference for more established borrowers with extensive land to farm and the 
equipment to operate on a large scale. Thus, lending practices certainly encouraged consolidation 
and mechanization trends within the farming industry of the early- to mid-twentieth century.  
 The correspondence between W.D. Ferguson and a wealthy borrower and sometimes 
business partner named Ray H. Garvey reveals much about the financial motives and networks 
                                                 
64. Deborah Fitzgerald provides extensive commentary on the motivations of businessmen in the farm 
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of bankers, the daily business of the bank, fears about public reputation, and most importantly, 
about how a banker’s relationship with a substantial client affected the local agricultural 
economy for the long-term. William David (Dave or W.D.) Ferguson was born May 25, 1889, to 
William S. and Anna (Harris) Ferguson. W.S. Ferguson had entered banking through his 
mercantile business in Stella, Nebraska, but when he moved to Colby he established the state-
chartered Thomas County Bank. Both he and his wife would wait on customers during busy 
hours, and his wife served as bank president for several years before her death in December 
1906.
66
 Like many in the second generation of bankers on the Plains, W.D. Ferguson earned a 
college degree—from Washburn University in Topeka—before beginning work as an assistant 
cashier in the family bank in 1910. He became president of the Thomas County Bank after his 
father died in 1916 and served in that capacity until his own death in 1964.
67
 
Ferguson’s activities are recorded primarily in his voluminous correspondence with Ray 
H. Garvey, a wealthy farmer, gas station developer, and builder of grain elevators. It is only 
possible to understand the banker’s relationship with the wealthy and influential Ray Garvey 
because Garvey left a record, unlike the many smaller clients a banker like Ferguson would deal 
with every day. We can glean a great deal about the banker’s occupation through these letters. 
He had to be knowledgeable of the conditions of a large number of clients, whom he conversed 
with—and about—regularly. For large clients such as Garvey, the devotion of time was 
tremendous. Ferguson and Garvey conversed frequently about business deals of their own and of 
others in the region, the conditions of mortgages they held together, prices for bonds in various 
companies, and the day-to-day dealings of other bank depositors and mortgagors. The 
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correspondence between these two men was heaviest in the 1930s. Although they maintained 
close contact until Garvey’s death in 1957, the Depression years illustrate most accurately how 
intimately tied a banker could be with the success of the community around him, and the lengths 
he would go to support his vision of success despite the local backlash he dreaded receiving. 
These letters reveal much about Ferguson’s financial motivations, and the economic and political 
power he wielded locally and regionally—even in a period when he dissented vigorously from 
the farm and bank programs of the New Deal, which he and his friends perceived as a radical 
betrayal of the free market. 
The Garvey family lived in the Colby area until the late 1920s, and would have known 
the banker W.D. Ferguson long before they engaged in a farming partnership together in 1930. 
After moving to Wichita, R.H. Garvey began corresponding with Ferguson and others in Colby 
regarding his extensive real estate holdings and other business investments there. He drew 
Ferguson as well as the brothers from another local banking family, Glenn and Kenneth Crumly, 
into a series of partnerships for real estate investment, farm operations, and a gas station business 
called Service Oil.
68
 The farming company engaged Claude Schnellbacher as manager, and the 
partners routinely corresponded about Garvey’s efforts to make a profit planting thousands of 
acres of wheat. Soon, the company added more investors and incorporated, an action that raised 
the ire of the Colby community. Rhetoric against “corporate farming,” which involved highly 
mechanized farming on a large scale at the expense of family farmers and inefficient tenants, was 
strong in Kansas during this era, to the extent that the incorporation of farms was made illegal in 
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the state in 1931 and the Garvey operation had to reclassify back to a partnership.
69
 The letters 
between Garvey and Ferguson during this period illuminate the intricacies of the relationship 
between bankers and wealthy landowners, not just as lenders but also as personal investment 
partners. The banker, as a resident of Colby, was able to keep an eye on Schnellbacher’s 
financial management of the farming concern. His proximity to the situation also led him to 
experience more of the backlash against the farm operation, and to fear the consequences to the 
reputation of himself and his bank to a much greater degree than Garvey. Though the two men 
agreed on the principle that consolidated, mechanized farming allowed for greater efficiencies 
and ultimately for better stewardship of the land, and continued to forward that vision through 
their company, Ferguson frequently expressed doubts about his direct connections to the 
unpopular farming company. His experience is highly relevant to this study of bankers 
throughout the Great Plains, because lenders indirectly supported the modernization trends in 
agriculture through financing efficient farmers with large acreages and advanced equipment, and 
many of them engaged directly in similar farm operations as well.  
Ferguson’s doubts about the farming company stemmed from the intensity of anti-
consolidation sentiment in the Colby area. It was apparent to both Ferguson and Garvey that in 
early 1930, just as the farming company was considering taking on additional investors who 
wished to incorporate, locals had come to equate corporate farming with chain stores as ruinous 
agents in the rural economy. Ferguson especially resisted the idea of incorporating the farm 
because although it would mean little change in the farm’s actual operation, it would put too fine 
a point on its motives to capitalize on land consolidation and mechanization. This, in turn, would 
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open up Ferguson’s bank and the Service Oil Company, which shared investors with the farming 
company, to harsh local criticism.
70
 Ferguson wrote to Garvey about his concerns for business: 
There is no doubt at all about sentiment against farming companies. I ran into 
quite a tirade on that yesterday. . . . I am inclined to think it would be smart for 
both the Service Oil Company and for me, personally, to dodge as much farmer 
criticism on this farming company business as is possible. It really had me a little 
worried yesterday. I can see that it could easily have quite an effect on the Bank 





Ferguson had not finished airing all of his concerns. He later reflected on the substance of a 
conversation with Claude Schnellbacher, the farm manager, which made the attitude of local 
farmers about corporate farming all the clearer. Ferguson’s fears about his bank’s business had 
not subsided after “a couple of good customers had panned [him]” over the matter: 
I have been very anxious all the time to be distinctly in the backgroun[d] in this 
movement unless it was launched in a big enough scale to make it really worth 
while [sic]. I cannot afford to flaunt an antagonizing move in this community. I 
believe Frank Mahanna and our competing bank will make very good use of the 
existing sentiment against the so-called chain farming. The right or wrong of it, or 
the fact that this enterprise is no different at all from the small scale farming 




Not only were regular customers berating the banker, but local auctioneers were also vilifying 
him at farm sales and the banker commented that newspapers were “describing the dreadful 
results of corporate farming in established communities.”
73
 The banker was so skittish that he 
actually proposed turning over his interests in the farm (nominally, not financially) to Claude 
Schnellbacher. The threat of political haranguing by a class of farmers at risk of losing their 
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livelihoods to a new system of large farms, as well as the threat of losing a substantial amount of 
business at the bank, was clearly troublesome for Ferguson. 
 To Garvey, these threats seemed minimal and easily dismissed, but he did not have to 
experience the direct impact of vituperation from his home in Wichita. Garvey did not feel that 
the incorporation of the farm could be kept secret, or that it would materially impact Ferguson’s 
bank. He commented, pointedly, that those who might be swayed by the populist rhetoric against 
corporations “have no money to deposit” and that giving their business to the other bank “would 
make your bank stronger and the other weaker, as a rule.”
74
 He viewed corporate farms as a last-
ditch effort to make farming profitable in the region, and therefore as a vital experiment for 
determining the future of the region. Corporate farms, in Garvey’s attitude, “took a lot of 
distress[ed] land off the market” to keep it in production, and if they could not make money 
through efficient operation, farming as an industry would be decimated in the region. If this were 
to come to pass, furthermore, “Bank stock in Thomas County banks, so far as grain farming 
makes it valuable, will hardly be worth having.”
75
 In another letter, Garvey noted that “ninety per 
cent of the little farmers are incapable from a standpoint of knowledge, finances, and will to do 
the right kind of work to handle power machinery profitably.”
76
 Interestingly, he also cited a 
quotation from Henry Ford, an idol among many farmers for his production of cheap 
automobiles and farm equipment. Ford had argued, “The farmer’s problem can be solved only by 
mass production of farm products.” Garvey thought that Ford meant, although he had not said it 
in so many words, “That the proud farmer, lord of more land than he can cultivate economically, 
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must make room for farming on modern industrial lines.”
77
 Garvey’s private statements to his 
friend the banker expressed the condescension rural communities perceived and most hated 
about local elites. He and Ferguson agreed that the future of farming, and of the banks and 
communities which were dependent on it, was at stake. Yet the banker had to mitigate such harsh 
sentiments within a local economic and political context.  
 Garvey argued that a local man’s purchase of interests in the farming company actually 
promised to help the case of their farming company. Garvey seemed to think that this new 
investor’s presence would serve as an “alibi” for Ferguson’s bank customers:  
That if we had not gone in with Dr. Geiger that he was going to turn all of his land 
over to the Wheat Farming Company, which not only is a real chain farming 
proposition but would be absolutely out of the control of anyone in Thomas 
County, and that if these things are going over at all, that they should remain in 





Emphasizing the local basis for many of the financial interests in the company was an important 
strategy for dealing with the fears of the Colby community. Indeed, Garvey could report to 
Ferguson about a conversation he had with the farm manager, Claude Schnellbacher, “He says 
that he is hearing some favorable comments now on the Colby Farming Company on the 
proposition that if farming companies are to be had that they should be Colby companies rather 
than foreign companies.”
79
 Garvey added that Schnellbacher was making a much better profit 
than had “indifferent tenants the past ten years,” and that ultimately “it is better for the home 
people if a profit is made and better for the community.”
80
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For his part, Ferguson agreed with Garvey that those “influenced by this flood of ‘Anti-
Chain Propaganda’” were an unseemly sort. He even privately compared them to “another Ku 
Klux Klan movement.” In so disparaging the angry partisans, he expressed both economic and 
moral justification for pursuing large-scale farming. He had to suppress his feelings in public for 
the sake of business, but it was not easy: “The thing will blow over just as the Klan movement 
did but it is indeed something to be reckoned with at the present time.”
81
  
Despite this optimism, the anti-corporation rhetoric continued throughout the political 
season of 1930. The Colby Free Press-Tribune lauded the mechanized wheat production efforts 
of area farmers, considering Colby part of a “great agricultural empire where wheat is King, with 
an annual production of 10,000,000 bushels.”
82
 Yet some of the key developers of that empire 
came under intense scrutiny. The nominal difference between “corporate farmers” and others 
farming thousands of acres on the Great Plains stirred local citizens into a fury. The newspaper 
became a forum for grousing against the two biggest names associated with corporate farming in 
Colby: Ray H. Garvey and W.D. Ferguson. A column titled “Observations (By a Democrat)” 
made allusions that the banker controlled the county’s Republican Party and ignored the interests 
of its farmer constituents. The writer accused Colby Republicans of trying to delude voters into 
supporting a pro-corporation farming candidate.
83
 A campaign advertisement for the Democratic 
candidate for state representative, J.C. Woofter, actually named names. It pointed fingers directly 
at the banker and his farming partner and drew connections between them and the Republican 
candidate. The advertisement declared:  
Ray Garvey of Wichita, for years Republican chairman of Thomas county, and his 
close friend and associate, W.D. Ferguson, of Colby, likewise a Republican 
politician, are said to be operating a considerable body of land under a plan 
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similar to chain farming. Roy Leak, the Republican candidate for Representative 




Garvey and Ferguson made excellent targets for both economic and partisan arguments. The 
Democrats placed the blame for the rise of farming corporations upon the Republican state 
chartering board, stating bluntly, “Chain farming is a child of Republican office holders and in 
Thomas county has been promoted by prominent Republicans, and these same men want you to 
vote for Roy Leak.”85 On the other hand, the ad quoted the Democratic candidate averring, “I am 
positively and absolutely against chain and corporation farming. I believe that the best interests 
of the whole community are at stake in this issue and if elected, I will do everything in my power 
to put corporation farming and chain farming out of business.”86 
 Republicans made their best efforts to disavow connections with the chain or corporate 
farming movement, pointing out that the party also had a campaign plank against the chartering 
of wheat farm corporations.87 The candidate for state representative, Roy Leak, published a letter 
to the Colby community expressing his opposition to chain farming. He wrote:  
The one thing more than anything else which prompted me to enter the race was 
my firm belief that the growth of chain farming in western Kansas is a menace to 
our individual and independent farmers as well as to the towns that have grown up 
in this part of the state. I think that both independent farmers and community 
centers are necessary for the growth of this part of Kansas of which we are all 
proud.88  
 
Despite these efforts to reject partisan ties with the Republican corporate farmers, the Democrat 
J.C. Woofter won his election bid. Ferguson’s comment to Garvey that “a number of Woofter’s 
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votes were against R.H. Garvey and myself rather than for him,” proved a powerful statement 
about the effects of associating with the corporation farm idea.
89
 
As the election season came upon the community in November 1930, Ferguson was 
exhausted by the fracas. He complained to Garvey:  
I presume the closing of the campaign will mark the climax of interest in chain 
farming discussion in this community, although this is quite apt to continue for a 
while yet, and I believe it would be advisable to make as little noise as possible 
about the corporation now, in and around Colby. My connection with the affair 
has proven very costly so far as the bank is concerned, and my competition has 




Although the total volume of Ferguson’s bank business did not actually decline during this 
period of political assault, the personal ramifications for the banker clearly were 
uncomfortable.
91
 The ways in which the banker tried to distance himself from visible 
connections with the farming company and his other business associations with his friend, Ray 
Garvey, are therefore understandable. 
Ferguson’s connections with Garvey and other local investors in multiple businesses, 
including the farming company and the Service Oil Company, created substantial economic and 
political pressure during this period. Given the backlash against the farming company, the 
Service Oil Company that shared the same main investors also came in for criticism. This made 
its manager, Kenneth Crumly, alert to any perceived slight against the company. He once 
suggested that Ferguson had not patronized the local service station as much as he should have, 
                                                 
89. Ferguson to Garvey, November 10, 1930, Box 1, Folder 13, Garvey Papers. 
90. Ferguson to Garvey, November 5, 1930, Box 1, Folder 13, Garvey Papers. 
91. Bank statements published in the newspaper indicate that the bank’s total business volume increased 
between March 1930 and December 1930. Initially the balance stood at $967,805.10, with deposits at $851,173.21 
and loans of $456,858.90. See “Statement of Condition of the Thomas County National Bank at the Close of 
Business on March 27th, 1930,” Colby Free Press-Tribune. Loan volume did decline to only $327,757.11 by the 
end of the year, which would have decreased interest payments to the bank, but deposits had increased to 
$911,709.18. The total bank balance at the end of the year stood at $1,034,699.50, about seven percent higher than 
in March. “The Thomas County National Bank, Colby, Kansas, Statement of Condition at the close of business 




and that he should tell his bank employees to buy gas there, too. Ferguson complained about this 
directive to Garvey:  
I’m right sorry Kenneth has the impression he has about my support of the 
Service station here. The facts are I have not purchased 10 gallons of gas at 
another station since the first of the year, longer than that I think. I have put in as 
many plugs for use of Service gas as I found opportunity to and will be glad to do 
more as directed by Kenneth. I have not undertaken to tell anybody here in the 
bank where they should spend their salaries but I have liked to think they were 
loyal enough to undertake to patronize those firms who in turn patronize us and I 




The burden of the political situation was clear, and the partners had to stick together and support 
each other’s businesses as much as possible. Garvey and Crumly continued to ask Ferguson to 
pressure people to use the Service Oil station, and his position as a banker gave him the position 
to do so. In one case, Garvey relayed to Ferguson that a tenant of one of their farms was “no 
longer giving the Service Oil Company his business.” He added, “I would be interested in having 
you suggest to him that it probably would not hurt his chances any on landing an extra quarter 
section . . . if his purchases were made from the Service Oil.”
93
 The issue of patronage for 
Service Oil was clearly connected to the relationship of its financial backers to the controversial 
farming company. Despite Kenneth Crumly’s efforts to pass off the Service Oil Company as a 
separate business dealing with different stockholders, the public was drawing correct conclusions 
about the shared interests of these two businesses.
94
 Bankers were accustomed to holding a 
substantial amount of political influence due to their economic standing, but clearly the 
community could do its part to challenge this power. For a banker already highly conscious of 
his local reputation, the political stress and economic threats against the farming company, 
Service Oil, and ultimately against his bank were a lot to bear. Ferguson had to consider the 
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effects of his personal business interests on his ability to keep customers at the bank, and 
whether supporting unpopular but extremely successful customers such as Garvey was worth the 
public disapproval. 
 This context helps to explain the banker’s reluctance to engage publicly with another of 
Garvey’s businesses, the Amortibanc Investment Company. Amortibanc purchased first 
mortgages on farms and homes and sold bonds on these securities, and Ferguson was an investor 
as well as a Director and Vice President of the company. He did not want to reveal too active an 
interest in the company to his home community, however, because he was already in hot water 
over the farming company and Service Oil business. When Garvey sent agents out to Colby to 
sell bonds, he expected Ferguson to advise the salesmen on whom they might solicit for 
purchases within Thomas County. He understood that a banker would have a wide knowledge of 
customers’ and non-customers’ finances. Ferguson disapproved of this scheme and refused to 
help sell them. He thought his direct participation in bond sales would put undue pressure on his 
customers and make himself look too eager to make money. Ultimately, he decided he did not 
want to be involved publicly in the Amortibanc Company. He claimed that he would not vouch 
for some of the claims to security that Garvey was making about the bonds, and wished to be 
taken off of the company letterhead. The matter ended with Ferguson tendering his resignation as 
Vice President and Director, but retaining his investments in stock.
95
   
 All the distress over appearances and involvement in various businesses did eventually 
subside, especially after the election season ended in 1930, and thus served primarily as a 
dramatic episode punctuating an otherwise generally smooth relationship between Ferguson and 
Garvey. Indeed, their partnership in the farming company and in other investment ventures 
                                                 
95. Ferguson to Garvey, April 24, 1930; Garvey to Ferguson, April 25, 1930; Ferguson to Garvey, April 





generally worked to the benefit of each man. For instance, Ferguson’s location near the farm 
allowed him to provide some oversight of its operations and report back to Garvey. His expertise 
in evaluating clients was useful in identifying when the farm manager, Claude Schnellbacher, 
needed to economize on his equipment and supply purchases as well as labor expenditures. 
Though Ferguson was never the bookkeeper for the farm operation, he was knowledgeable about 
its expenses.
96
 He trusted Schnellbacher as a farmer and believed in investing in sound and 
modern machinery and operating efficiently on the large scale, but sometimes grew frustrated 
with the manager’s difficulties in money handling. As he wrote to Garvey on July 10, 1930, “I 
am convinced that the company should make good money and I believe it is a smart way to 
handle the land.”
97
 But, he reiterated, Schnellbacher needed to cut costs. Garvey made similar 
observations over the next couple of years, and ultimately agreed to seek a manager who could 
operate the expansive farm more cheaply.
98
 Ferguson continued to provide on-the-ground 
intelligence to Garvey about farm management during this time. For instance, he gave his 
approval for Garvey to test out a new farm manager, John Kriss, in 1933. He observed to 
Garvey, “He is a good boy and had his schooling under a very efficient farmer. I will be . . . 
interested in his answer to your questions as to whether he thinks he can make a profit to you 
with wheat at 25¢ a bushel.”
99
 Kriss proved very successful at cutting costs and running the farm 
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 In addition to their interests in the farm operation, Ferguson and Garvey shared interests 
as regional creditors and frequently exchanged investment information with one another. 
Ferguson’s bank in Colby would sometimes offer mortgages or intelligence on mortgagors 
willing to negotiate new terms to Garvey’s Amortibanc Investment Company, for example.
101
 
From these transactions, Garvey gained trustworthy local knowledge on these clients, while 
Ferguson’s bank gained breathing room on its loan portfolio. In one instance, Garvey asked the 
banker for information on a potential borrower. Ferguson collected information from regional 
financiers and reported back, “He has very poor rating with his finance connections and we have 
had several interviews with the Nash folks who seem to think he keeps everything covered up in 
his wife’s name for a reason.”
102
 Beyond just wanting to help his friend and business partner 
make sound decisions as a creditor in the region, Ferguson still owned stock in Amortibanc and 
had a financial interest in its success. He could offer advice to Garvey even without having his 
name on the mortgage company’s letterhead, and therefore with less risk to his reputation. The 
banker clearly exerted a great deal of influence over the financial future of his community, 
beyond his own lending practices. 
 Ferguson and Garvey shared common financial interests in certain borrowers to whom 
they had both lent credit, and this further cemented their shared financial interests. One 
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additional example serves to characterize the relationships between the creditors and those 
indebted to them, relationships that routinely lasted for years and involved extensive discussions 
over payments, foreclosure, and leniency. The borrower, Mr. Datson*, was born in Russia, but 
had immigrated to Kansas with his family in 1874 when he was about eight years old; this was 
around the same time many of the persecuted Volga Germans left that region of Russia. Kansas 
state census records indicate that he and his family lived in McPherson, Marion, and Wilson 
counties prior to moving to Thomas County by 1925.
103
 This mobility indicates that the financial 
condition of the nearly 70-year-old farmer was somewhat tenuous. He had a farm of his own in 
Thomas County as of 1925, but it was encumbered with a mortgage, and by 1930, when Garvey 
and Ferguson began discussing him, he was behind on his bank notes and rental payments on 
land belonging to R.H. Garvey.  
During conversations about this particular man over the next several years, Garvey was 
particularly critical of his farming operation and the consequences for his ability to make 
payments. Despite the man’s control over a large acreage and access to the labor of several 
grown sons, he did not produce what Garvey thought he should. He noted on April 15, 1930, 
“Mr. Datson has not been producing the crops that I think he should produce on the 960 acres 
which he owns and has been turning none of it to me on the payments due.”
104
 Garvey felt 
obliged to continue working with Datson and securing additional promises to pay because he had 
rented him 800 acres to farm besides his own land. This justified the banker’s persistence with 
the man, too; Garvey advised Ferguson not to extend the terms on his notes, but rather to make 
new notes as second mortgages on his land and wheat crop, which would warrant additional 
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 Garvey commented, “If he would apply his share of the crop on this each 
year, it should pay the portion on the principal each year, leaving him all of his own land to pay 
his expenses, interest, and taxes.” Unfortunately, as Garvey noted, that did not guarantee Datson 
would make the necessary payments. He wrote to Ferguson that Datson “has been paying the 
machine companies and everybody else but has nothing on the second mortgages, not even in 
1928 and 1929, when he had good crops. He thinks I am easy to take advantage of and has, 
apparently, taken care of everyone else and is letting me wait.”
106
  
Ferguson felt more sympathy for the elderly farmer than Garvey, and often acted in an 
advisory capacity in Datson’s dealings with Garvey. The banker’s kindness may have influenced 
the borrower’s tendency to delay his payments, however. When Datson came into the bank in 
February 1931 with “tears in his eyes and a frog in his throat” and a story that his returns on 
4,000 bushels of wheat were “about all he would have to give to the Lord this year,” he talked 
the banker out of demanding the payment for the bank. Ferguson reflected, “I felt so sorry for 
him that I considered slipping him an extra five spot in change.”
107
 Garvey responded curtly, 
“When this occurs I think that you should take a walk around the block, else you are liable to be 
converting the lobby of the bank into a soup kitchen.”
108
 Still, as the banker and his business 
partner continued to keep tabs on their mutual client, they continued to exercise a bit of leniency 
with him. They also offered Datson needed advice on how to deal with his many loans in order 
to best serve his family’s interests. The bank held mortgages from Datson on his farm in Kansas 
and on an investment in land in Oklahoma. Ferguson helped him figure out how to balance his 
payments between the two so that he would not lose both places. Garvey chimed in by 
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suggesting that Ferguson advise Datson to get a small note under $1,000 paid off so that he could 
sell the land and have more liquidity.
109
  
Datson’s continued difficulties making payments to the two creditors led Garvey to 
broach the subject of foreclosure in 1932. He asked Ferguson:  
What do you want to do relative to the Datson matter? If you think best we will 
start foreclosure which will give him about a two year option on the land. I 
presume that this is the thing to do possibly. I hate to do it to the old man, but he 
is neglecting the farming considerably and possibly it would be as kind a thing to 




Garvey thus posited a still somewhat flexible solution that would hopefully serve as a wake-up 
call for Datson. Ferguson’s reply took into account the farmer’s age and the fact that his sons 
were growing up and moving on, not helping him quite as much on the home farm. He wrote, “It 
would be a bit cruel to force him into a realization of his predicament at this time. He will find it 
out without our help, in the next year, and it is my idea that we might just as well penalize 
ourselves a year’s time on repossession of his farm.”
111
 Garvey, however, became more and 
more frustrated with Datson. In September of that year, Datson had approached Garvey to 
request a $500 loan to pay off part of a debt to an Oakley bank. Garvey commented somewhat 
drily, “Mr. Datson seems to have found a sense of humor at last and takes a great deal of 
pleasure in trying to have us solve his financial problems. I think possibly he is coached in this a 
little by the banker whom he frequently consults at Colby.”
112
 While taking this dig at Ferguson, 
Garvey pushed for the foreclosure route. He noted that he was sick of having his wheat “used to 
pay other peoples’ bills.”
113
 Though his patience was wearing thin, he deferred to the banker’s 
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decision to hold out on foreclosure. By June of 1933, Garvey wrote, “I hope that Datson is 
eligible for a new deal loan, which would enable us to realize on our seconds if possible. The 
limit of $5,000 to an individual might not be so helpful, however.”
114
 By that fall, however, 
Garvey and Ferguson opted to finally begin foreclosure proceedings in the interest of beating the 
Federal Land Bank to the punch in recovering their mortgage investments.
115
 Beginning the 
foreclosure proceedings did not mean that their interests with Datson’s plight were finished: 
Ferguson, for instance, tried to urge him to deed back all but a half section of his land to the bank 
to end the lawsuit and avoid losing all of it in foreclosure.
116
 State and federal legislation to delay 
foreclosure actions in 1934 finally nullified their foreclosure efforts.
117
 Although the historical 
record does not give us insight into how the borrower felt about this process, Ferguson and 
Garvey’s perspective does suggest that the decision to foreclose was complex. It involved 
dissatisfaction with the lack of repayment on investment, but also a fair degree of concern for the 
person on the other end of the credit relationship. At least for bankers with enough capital to 
carry on the banking operations with some bad loans on the books, these actions took time to 
develop. These lenders were able to offer some amount of advice and assistance to the borrower 
on how to reform debt obligations. 
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 In the end, though, it is clear that Ferguson’s credit policies most supported those clients 
who practiced efficient and modern methods of farming, including Ray Garvey himself. The 
banker had no qualms about extending short-term lines of credit or moving money around to 
cover Garvey’s many financial transactions, because he knew Garvey had the means to pay.
118
 
He shared Garvey’s interests directly—in that he was a business partner—but also indirectly, in 
that the success of large operators like Garvey kept the region in production and the bank in 
business. Ferguson gained much from his relationship with Garvey, from a recommendation to 
serve on the Kansas Board of Regents to the exchanging of tips on purchasing bonds.
119
 Perhaps 
most importantly, he gained the ear of someone approximating a social, financial, and political 
equal. Garvey and Ferguson could relate to one another when the press made jokes about their 
mercenary qualities, as when Ferguson wrote to Garvey with tongue-in-cheek congratulations on 
the report that he “had purchased $105,000.00 worth of notes for $455.00.”
120
 Ferguson was 
himself engaging in some of these types of transactions, bidding to buy failed banks’ assets at 
low prices and sending agents to work on collections in those areas. Although this business was 
difficult and required the expense of employing collections agents, the banker hoped to make a 
profit from the failed banks’ accounts receivable. He and Garvey carried on extensive 
correspondence about these purchases from banks in receivership in the late 1930s, sharing 
information about their purchases and experiences with collecting. While Garvey’s bank 
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purchases ranged as far away as Ohio, Kentucky, and Texas, Ferguson concentrated on 
purchases in neighboring states of Nebraska and Colorado. He was most familiar with banking 
laws in those states, and had family and business connections to help him learn what he needed 
to about moving into collections there.
121
 In his correspondence with Garvey, Ferguson could be 
unguarded about his own financial interests in a way he could not be within his own community, 
where he sought to remain somewhat aloof and where he had to obscure his distinct political and 
financial interests.  
 Ferguson often grew frustrated with the climate of public opinion and the way New Deal 
programs sought to control banking. Indeed, he summed up his acute frustration in a terse line to 
Garvey on June 10, 1933: “Governments seem to be undertaking to popularize persecution of 
financial institutions.”
122
 In another letter, he lambasted the new president for making promises 
to the “forgotten man” that were “far afield from the American tradition.” As Ferguson viewed 
it, “The redistribution of wealth is the foundation of all his program.”
123
 He loathed the way 
Roosevelt’s policies had devalued the dollar and artificially set prices for commodities during 
what he termed “this second November of 1929.”
124
 Ferguson’s freedom to express such 
opinions to a sympathetic friend were useful in an era when he would have to suppress such 
expressions and mitigate his personal reputation in the Colby community, among those who had 
supported local Democrats and the national New Deal program.  
 The relationship between Ferguson and Garvey is illustrative of the ease a banker could 
sometimes establish with his long-term customers, stable individuals who would come back to 
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the institution repeatedly for new lines of credit and for help maintaining their farm operations. 
Intertwined financial interests with a wealthy client in multiple businesses and investments added 
some complications to Ferguson’s job and made the banker especially conscious of his 
reputation within his community. This correspondence, though, provides a useful picture of how 
a banker sensitive to local criticism still followed his instincts in supplying credit where he saw 
the future of the community: in mechanized, efficient, and cost-effective farm operations.
125
  
Committed family farmers were not excluded from this equation, and in fact Ray Garvey 
continued to appeal to this type of farmer in his land sales company. In one advertisement 
published in the Colby Free Press-Tribune, Garvey praised a young Russian-German immigrant 
who had successfully accumulated land for a diverse family farm in northwestern Kansas. In 
language that was pure Garvey, the advertisement used this example as a means of combating the 
community’s recent attack on the land mogul’s own large farming corporation. He wrote:  
Propaganda has been spread in recent months by candidates . . . for the legislature 
and other gabble-mouths, to the effect that large scale farmers and farming 
corporations are driving the small farmer out of business. We doubt if the large 
scale farmer can affect such farmers as George Herbel [the immigrant]. He has his 
overhead more than covered each day with that day’s profits. He may drive out 




The advertisement concluded with an appeal to the land-owning American dream, by offering 
other property “for sale to young farmers with the grand passion for owning their farm.” The 
final query, “May we show one to you?” indicated, of course, that Garvey’s interests in family 
farmers ultimately were monetary.
127
 He and Ferguson did seem to believe, at least on a private 
level, that large-scale farming would determine the future for wheat farming in northwestern 
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Kansas. But the financial system of western Kansas did still encourage family farmers careful in 
their management, willing to mechanize to the degree that would keep them profitable. Land 
agents and bankers such as Ferguson would offer continued credit accommodations to strong 
farmers of either type, whether managing through the family or the more industrialized system. 
This decision to assist farmers who navigated successfully through difficult market conditions, 
for many bankers, affirmed the values of a free market. For those critical of the New Deal, like 
Ferguson, this was much preferable to and more sustainable than propping up inefficient, 
unscientific, unindustrialized family farmers. 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that the complexities of banking in the Great Plains region 
only increased over time. Like their nineteenth-century counterparts, bankers in the twentieth 
century continued to have to support the physical and fiscal security of their banks—sometimes 
at risk due to the public distrust for bankers. A country banker’s ability to maintain relationships 
with customers new and old, and to manage his reputation within the community, was more 
important than ever. In addition, the needs of the banking profession multiplied due to increased 
demand for credit in the industrializing agricultural sector, greater government regulation, and 
investors’ high expectations for profit. Country bankers had to make decisions that balanced the 
financial interests of stockholders and the needs of a community trying to expand its share in the 
agricultural economy. Often, that meant supporting only those farmers whom they perceived to 
be the most socially stable and economically efficient, often those who owned a substantial 
acreage and possessed the knowledge and foresight to employ the latest technology.    
Making lending decisions that supported only the most successful farmers could cause 




open did not give credit to everyone who asked for it. The bankers practicing such conservatism 
would not necessarily be “popular” in their communities because they did not cater to the 
speculative whims of borrowers who could not make something of the risk. But these bankers 
would, ultimately, be “esteemed” and profitable.
128
  
 There was a lot of truth to that statement. The bankers represented throughout this 
dissertation are notable for the regard their communities and their state held for them, despite 
some of the difficult financial and political decisions they made. Ferguson, while faced with 
ample criticism for his participation in the corporate farm and other enterprises with Ray Garvey, 
nonetheless had a sufficiently reputable place in his community that he served in a number of 
positions of honor and leadership in his town and state. He was a city treasurer, hospital board 
member, an appointed member of the Kansas Board of Regents, and a prominent booster of the 
local public library.
129
 None of this could have happened without respect for the banker’s 
decisions as a financial professional; even periods of intense disagreement with Ferguson’s 
business decisions did not sink his personal reputation if he maintained a successful and 
“conservative” bank.  
  It is worth noting a couple of examples of how bankers’ good judgment, even during 
times when speculative fever resulted in over-expansion, could earn them the respect of their 
communities. Obituaries in small-town newspapers, generally written by members of the family 
or sympathetic members of the press, can certainly strike the reader as over-stated and flowery 
write-ups of the lives of the elite, but their choice of language can nonetheless provide real 
understanding about the deceased’s true character. Memorials like the one for Benjamin F. 
Brown, a banker from Goodland, Kansas, imbued the qualities of “conservative business” with 
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honorable meaning. Brown was remembered as “a safety valve to the machine of public and 
private enterprise,” one whose advice sometimes had to temper overreaching ideas, but who 
nonetheless “inspired confidence in his wisdom as a financier.”
130
 A memorial for Latham 
Edward Harrison, a banker and former legislator from Saint Francis, Kansas, similarly noted the 
calming effects of the banker’s wisdom:  
Although he always favored progress, his enthusiasm never mastered his 
judgment; and for many years it has been traditional in this locality that if Mr. 
Harrison approved of a proposal, it was fundamentally sound. During the decades 
when Cheyenne county was emerging from a frontier to a modern community, his 
integrity and his wisdom contributed a stabilizing influence which was vital to its 
welfare; and his reputation for fairness and honesty gained the respect and 




Clearly, bankers could achieve general popularity, but a more valuable trait for their 
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Chapter Five. Stewards of a System: Lender-Landholders and the Future of 
Farming in the Great Plains 
 
There’s a dear old homestead on Nebraska’s fertile plain 
Where I toiled my manhood's strength away; 
All that labor now is lost to me, but it is Shylock’s gain, 
For that dear old home he claims today. 
 
Chorus 
Ah, my dear prairie home! Nevermore in years to come 
Can I call what I made by toil my own; 
The railroads and banks combined, the lawyers paid to find 
Out a way to rob me of my home. . . . 
 
We must now the robbers pay for a chance to till the soil, 
And when God calls us over the great range, 
All a’heaven will be owned, I suppose, by men who never toil, 
So I doubt if we notice the exchange. 
~My Prairie Home, by Luna Kellie 
 
At the height of the populist era in the 1890s, Nebraska Farmer’s Alliance activist Luna 
Kellie wrote a poem attacking bankers and their allies. “My Prairie Home” expressed attitudes 
common among many discontented farmers in the Midwest and Great Plains. Kellie’s lyrics 
depicting “Shylock” and his railroad and lawyer friends robbing farmers of their “prairie homes” 
and forcing them to “pay for a chance to till the soil” prevailed throughout much of the late 
nineteenth century.
1
 Suspicion of banks and bankers was such a strong trope that the memoirs of 
pioneers sometimes reflected on the risks of taking out loans. As John Ise remembered in his 
classic tale of pioneering in western Kansas, his parents generally distrusted bank loans but 
sometimes by necessity signed over a mortgage on their home and land. To cover medical 
expenses, they once paid 15 percent interest upfront, or $45 of scarce cash.
2
 The family resented 
bankers and the high interest rates that made them fear losing their homes, and did whatever 
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possible to take care of their personal needs and even the financial needs of their neighbors 
through alternative methods. 
These sentiments reverberated through popular literature and political rhetoric even 
during the twentieth century. One of the famous scenes from John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath, 
for instance, describes a representative of the bank evicting tenants like the Joads from their 
long-cherished land. The evictor stated on behalf of the bank, “The tenant system won’t work 
any more. One man on a tractor can take the place of twelve or fourteen families.” This 
calculation suggested that no matter how humane and sympathetic the bankers themselves could 
be, the bank as an institution was a “monster.” Steinbeck condemned the banks as “machines and 
masters” which “breathe profits . . . [and] eat the interest on money.”
3
 This language was all the 
more meaningful when compared with his description of a tractor cutting down the erstwhile 
homes of the tenant farmers. “Snub-nosed monsters,” Steinbeck called the machines, “great 
crawlers moving like insects . . . raising the dust and sticking their snouts into it, straight down 
the country, across the country, through fences, through dooryards, in and out of gullies in 
straight lines.”
4
 Steinbeck argued that banks and tractors, monsters alike, united forces in 
destroying a way of life.  
 Steinbeck’s work portrayed common perceptions of bankers’ mercenary disregard for the 
people who had farmed the land for generations, buckling to severe economic pressure and 
forcing them off the land in favor of machines. In reality, country bankers were quite conscious 
of this reputation and sought to address the issue through reform. As a community, country 
bankers evidenced a great deal of concern for tenancy, related matters of farm credit, and the 
movement to modernize farms while still preserving a way of life for as many farmers as 
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possible. A diversity of opinions on these subjects circulated within the Banker-Farmer, a 
monthly publication of the Agricultural Committee of the American Bankers Association (ABA) 
between 1913 and 1927. The journal gamely published critiques of the country banker, such as a 
1920 piece reprinted from the Organized Farmer that contended bankers served only the 
“exploiting classes.” In language similar to populist writers before him, and especially 
reminiscent of Luna Kellie, Dr. Frederic G. Howe argued, “Instead of aiding the farmer they 
injure the farmer. Very frequently they bankrupt him. They foreclose farm mortgages in bad 
times.”
5
 In the midst of the post-Great War agricultural crisis, as in the decades before, the threat 
that bankers might take over farmers’ land and rent it to tenants if they were unable to pay their 
mortgages seemed very real.  
Yet, by demonstrating bankers’ interests in improving the agricultural situation and 
reducing tenancy, as well as in effecting broad reforms within rural communities, the historical 
record repeatedly belies the anti-banker rhetoric. As George E. Roberts wrote in response to Dr. 
Howe’s diatribe, “There is plenty of evidence that the bankers take a lively and helpful interest in 
the progress of agriculture.”
6
 Debates over “country life reform,” indeed, were centerpieces of 
the Banker-Farmer’s coverage of the rural economy.
7
 State banking associations supported 
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regional agricultural research and rural community development.
8
 The motivations for bankers to 
join rural reform movements were complex. Their involvement did not represent merely an 
altruistic perception of their worth as businessmen and community leaders, but also reflected 
financial interests in the continued success of rural economies. In addition, bankers’ participation 
in movements to develop modern farming systems while preserving strong communities still 
based on agriculture suggested their adherence to a cultural value for agrarian lifestyles. Western 
Kansas was home to banks such as the Stockgrowers Bank and many “Farmers National” or 
“Farmers State” banks. These names did not represent simply a marketing ploy. The officers of 
these banks, quite frequently, were farmers or stockmen themselves.
9
 Though they viewed land 
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ownership as an opportunity for profit and power in their communities, the strong connections 
between bankers and agriculture made them act less as greedy mercenaries trying to take over 
land from the less able, and more as protectors of a long-cherished agricultural system and of a 
regional community based upon this system. Like the bankers represented in Steinbeck’s work, 
country bankers did face tough decisions about whether they could keep tenants on the land—
making no money—or if they should flow with the tide of mechanization in farming and make 
the process as efficient and profitable as possible. Their responses to economic and 
environmental crises varied, but bankers were willing to align with successful farmers in their 
communities as “stewards” searching for long-term solutions to agricultural maladjustments.  
Whereas chapter four considered the financial functions of the decisions bankers made 
about the “branches” of credit they wished to cultivate, this chapter turns to the ways these 
decisions affected the region’s farm system. It concentrates on the system of land turnover in 
western Kansas during the interwar period, with the intention of better understanding lenders’ 
roles in shaping the changing patterns of land ownership and adding nuance to the frequent 
vilification of the foreclosing banker. Scholarship has focused largely on the conditions of 
tenancy in the nineteenth century and mirrored the criticisms of bankers highlighted in the 
popular literature above.
10
 Critiques of the environmental effects of tenancy dominate 
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discussions of twentieth century agricultural problems.
11
 Understanding how and why lenders 
built up large holdings of farmland during this era of sustained economic hardship in the region 
offers a more complete picture of the changes that were developing in the regional agricultural 
economy. Farming on the Great Plains was moving rapidly toward consolidation and 
mechanization, heavily financed through an increasingly complicated credit system and through 
the shifting technological landscape of wheat production. I argue that the process of financing 
land and implements purchases made lenders increasingly active participants in the transition 
from a traditional agrarian system of smallholding farmers to a modern system where farms were 
increasingly larger and more mechanized. Bankers and implements dealers facilitated this 
modernization as a result of a complex system of economic and cultural values. Even in cases 
when purchasing or foreclosing land from distressed farmers resulted in the protection and 
expansion of lenders’ own financial interests, maintaining the land’s productive capacity in 
partnership with successful tenants also fulfilled lenders’ visions of progress and contributed in 
material ways to the land use system of the Great Plains.  
To illustrate these arguments, I examine Albert A. Doerr’s record as a lender and landlord 
in southwestern Kansas during the 1920s and 1930s. His story counters narratives depicting 
bankers as the robbers of farm lands and enemies of rural people prominent in American popular 
culture. It is more insightful about the motivations of rural financiers to protect not just their own 
livelihoods, but also the broader economic vitality of the communities on which they depended. 
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As the owner of a large hardware and farm implements mercantile in Larned, Kansas, Doerr 
operated also as a creditor for customers making large purchases to expand their farm operations 
through mechanization. He also served as a director of several regional banks and building and 
loan associations, and thus engaged in the institutional lending field. Through his business 
interests and personal connections, he was able to amass a large land estate in nine Kansas 
counties as well as in New Mexico and Colorado. He rented this land out to tenants and 
corresponded in detail with them about farm operations. His collection of letters provides insight 
into the relationship between a landlord and his tenants in a changing system of land ownership 
and occupancy. They also reveal the hardships of maintaining a livelihood on the Plains during a 
period when crop and land prices remained unpredictable and production costs increased 
dramatically, and especially when nearly a decade of drought and dust descended on the region. 
Perseverance through difficult years and keeping the land even once it recovered value during 
the 1940s suggested that Doerr, like many of those accumulating farmland in the region, did not 
do so as a speculative venture.  
Land turnover is an odious part of regional lore, but Doerr’s case suggests that in addition 
to serving his personal business interests, buying out heavily indebted farmers during the 1920s 
both relieved them of mortgage burdens and served to stabilize a farming culture that few people 
wanted to upend. The land increasingly came into the hands of a few wealthy families, who kept 
it in production by way of tenant operators as the region weathered a depression and, later, years 
of drought. These investments were not merely speculative and businessmen did not always seek 
simply to hold the land until they could sell it at a better price. Instead, Doerr’s records show 




maintain for their families and for the broader region the legacy of the farming culture they had 
long embraced.  
Although many family farmers lost their livelihoods during this era, their farms often 
remained in the regional farming system as part of the property of those who could manage large 
farms on an industrialized basis. The letters between Doerr and his tenants illustrate how this 
system functioned and how the tenants were able to hold to their identity as farmers even as the 
region suffered from poor markets and terrible dust storms during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Furthermore, agricultural data provided by the Kansas State Census and the Kansas Board of 
Agriculture show that over the interwar period, those who rented land could experience some 
success even during difficult years, and often could aspire to own part of the land they 
operated.
12
 These data represent the transition of the regional farming landscape into its present 
form, where farmers mix land rental and fee-simple ownership in order to maximize the 
efficiency of their large-scale grain and cattle operations and to provide maximum profit for 
themselves and the larger region. 
As a representative of a business class with vast holdings of land during the boom and 
bust years of the early- to mid-twentieth century, Doerr presents an illustrative case. As a 
landlord and lender during years of economic and environmental disaster on the Great Plains, he 
deserves close scrutiny as part of a broad class of lender-landlords. Scholars have only rarely 
considered the cultural motivations for lenders to become landlords, especially with relationship 
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to the twentieth century.
13
 Understanding lender-landlords’ interest in maintaining the 
agricultural system of the Plains in a form profitable not just to themselves but also to the 
broader region helps to demonstrate the distinct nature of finance in the Great Plains context, 
which operated on a highly personal level in individual and regional communities. Rural finance 
was unique in that lenders faced challenging environmental conditions as the creditors of 
agriculture-centered communities in the arid region. This chapter underscores the conclusions of 
other chapters in this dissertation. In the Great Plains region, the reputation of lenders—bankers 
and merchants alike—and their ability to establish successful social and economic relationships 
with their fellow citizens, based on a comprehensive understanding of the local farm culture, 
were paramount in the maintenance of individual businesses and the communities themselves. In 
analyzing lenders’ relationships with their tenants as well as illustrating their understanding of 
land use and the agricultural trajectory of the region, this study of a lender-landlord case on the 
Great Plains exemplifies bankers’ broad roles in developing and sustaining rural communities. 
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Land Acquisition during the Agricultural Crisis 
Research into the landholdings of Albert A. Doerr, an implements dealer and lender from 
Larned, Kansas, illustrates the circumstances through which prominent individuals accumulated 
a vast amount of land from failing farmers in the postwar period. The plight of Kansas farmers 
owed initially to the opening of deep fissures in the wheat market in the post-World War I years, 
and worsened due to drought in the 1930s. Over the decade between 1919 and 1929, wheat 
exports declined from 366 million to 186 million bushels. American consumption declined also, 
as city dwellers required less food to sustain more sedentary lives, Prohibition decreased the 
amount of grains consumed as alcohol, and even fashion promoted smaller diets and slimmer 
figures.
14
 In the relatively wet 1920s, farmers persisted in planting more acres of commercial 
crops than markets demanded. Prices of commodities such as wheat remained unstable: in the 
early 1920s prices declined dramatically from the $2-plus per bushel rate they had achieved 
under wartime price support policies, but increased again before falling to a consistently 
depressed rate in the 1930s. The 63 cents per bushel farmers could get for their wheat in 1930 
was only slightly below the next decade’s average of 69 cents per bushel, and prices in 1931 and 
1932 reached all-time lows at 33 cents per bushel.
15
 Meanwhile, the costs of production rose as 
more and more farmers purchased tractors and other farm equipment such as combines, trucks, 
and grain silos. There were only 246,000 tractors working on American farms in 1920, while in 
1930 this number had more than tripled to 920,000 tractors. In Kansas, the number of tractors 
and combines on farms increased from 45,994 and 11,203, respectively, in 1928, to 87,515 and 
41,572, respectively, in 1940; though sales stalled in the drought-stricken Southwest, one in two 
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farms still owned a tractor.
16
 Financing these machines often required, at the very least, 
installment loans from the local implements dealer. Ultimately, to make farm technology worth 
the cost (from $750 for a simple model to upwards of $3,000 per machine), it made sense for 
farmers to put more land into commodity production. Purchasing additional acreage once again 
required credit. The most successful farmers purchased land from their less-successful neighbors, 
many of whom failed in financing their own efforts to expand or defaulted on mortgages. Farm 




Agricultural depression in Kansas and much of the U.S. rural sector ensured the 
perpetuation of tenancy as farm commodity prices dropped and farmers who had been 
encouraged to take on mortgages to purchase land or equipment were unable to fulfill their 
financial obligations. The Federal Reserve System, formed in 1913 as part of national efforts to 
correct some of the regional imbalances in credit distribution, did little to help farmers during the 
post-war period. Kansas farmers routinely criticized the institution for raising interest rates and 
failing to provide mechanisms for infrastructural development and crop marketing. The 
constituency of Kansas City’s Federal Reserve District Ten, along with other rural districts 
around the country, felt cheated out of the post-war prosperity many urban Americans were 
experiencing.
18
 Country bankers, often similarly frustrated with the Federal Reserve, protected 
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their financial interests as best they could under these circumstances. Forced to pay higher rates 
of interest on funds borrowed from the Fed, bankers called in loans and placed their money in 
stocks and bonds instead. As a Topeka Daily Capital editorial in August 1921 pointed out, banks 
in Federal Reserve District Ten had liquidated agricultural loans at twice the rate of commercial 
loans. The article concluded, “The hammering of agriculture should be stopped. . . . Call off the 
raid on the farm thru the country banks, Mr. Federal Reserve Banker.”
19
   
Nothing about a situation where bankers called in loans and foreclosed on farmland 
spelled opportunity for either national policymakers or local lenders. Low crop prices and low 
values of farm real estate meant that lenders had little to gain from their clients’ failure to pay. 
They would not earn much in the short term from acquiring the land themselves, as reselling the 
land at a good value was out of the question. Planting cash crops was risky in the already 
overextended markets, and if someone else managed the land the landlord would receive only 
one-quarter to one-third of the crop. Purchasing land cheaply at the sheriff’s auction, 
furthermore, would reflect poorly upon local businessmen. Historian David Danbom commented 
that lenders, therefore, “tried to be liberal, extending loans and delaying payments when they 
could,” that is, until their own creditors forced them to call in mortgages.
20
 In the 1930s, weather 
complicated the situation still further by making land investments risky and maintenance 
difficult. Temporary moratoria on foreclosure passed on the state and national levels, combined 
with New Deal refinancing schemes under the Farm Credit Administration, further impeded 
lenders from taking over land in the 1930s.
21
 Although circumstances in the 1920s did drive 
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many lenders and other businesspeople in agricultural regions to invest deeply in farm real estate 
at the expense of smaller farm owners, conditions did not support high rates of foreclosure in 
southwestern Kansas during the 1930s.  
Deed and plat records recording when farm land changed hands show the significant 
pressures of overextended credit among many farmers in the 1920s. The acquisition of land by 
those who had lent aspiring farmers the money for expansion or improvements was a direct 
result of these pressures. As historian Deborah Fitzgerald noted, lenders nationwide played an 
important role in the “factory-ization” or industrialization of farming through the expansion of 
credit for land and machinery, as well as through advocacy for business-like management 
models.
22
 On the Great Plains, this meant that they contributed to the expansion of crop farming 
onto virgin prairie during the years surrounding World War I, a phenomenon known as the 
“Great Plow Up.”
23
 The immediate consequences of this event included a drastic expansion of 
production that soon outpaced market demand. Lenders endeavored to fix the problem they 
helped create during this era, but ironically, as a survey of land exchanges in several Kansas 
counties reveals, expansive new credit solutions and subsequent farm failures may have aided in 
the more rapid consolidation of land in the hands of lenders and wealthy farmers during times of 
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regional economic and environmental crisis.
24
 Although this represented a distinct departure 
from the goal of expanding individual ownership of small farms, it did not represent a shift in the 
cultural valuation of the land for agriculture. The new owners, in building up increasingly larger 
estates, intended to keep the land under cultivation over the long term. The efficiencies of large-
scale, mechanized wheat farming would allow their landholdings to turn minimal profits as 
landlords rode out the farm crisis. Even as the depression deepened and as the region was 
convulsed by drought in the 1930s, landholders like Doerr would continue to hold onto the land 
in hopes that it would eventually form a valuable part of their personal legacies. In doing so, they 
played key roles in maintaing the regional identity as a farming culture, even while they also 
accelerated the transformation of the farm economy into one centered on the ownership of large 
amounts of property by elite families and on the high-input management of this property by 
renters.   
Despite his humble beginnings, Doerr in many ways represented the diverse occupations 
of western Kansas’s wealthy business class. Doerr’s family moved to western Kansas in 1877 
from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Albert, the eldest son at age eleven, began helping his father 
farm the family homestead. He went back to school and earned a certificate to teach in country 
schools when he was 21 years old, but continued to farm as well as to teach. After briefly serving 
in the 1890s as the editor of the Larned, Kansas newspaper, The Tiller and Toiler, he embarked 
upon a mercantile and agricultural implements business in Larned.
25
 Doerr built up a business 
demonstrating and selling the modern conveniences required for the new, modern vision of 
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“country life,” such as threshers and tractors, automobiles, electricity and plumbing fixtures.
26
 
His success managing the A.A. Doerr Mercantile Company allowed him to invest in many other 
ventures, including several banks and lending institutions. Most importantly, he purchased 
thousands of acres of farmland throughout Southwestern Kansas and rented them out while often 
simultaneously serving as his renters’ implements dealer and mortgage lender. Many 
businessmen, especially rural bankers and merchants, considered land purchases for speculation 
and rental purposes a matter of course. But Doerr’s background in farming undoubtedly 
influenced his decision to invest in land; his position as a commercial farmer, merchant of the 
mechanized tools of modern farming, and as a creditor gave him a strong interest in the future of 
modern agriculture in the region.  
Over the course of his lifetime, Albert A. Doerr purchased and maintained nearly 15,000 
acres of farmland throughout nine counties in southwestern Kansas.
27
 Deed records from these 
counties, along with corroborating detail from the section indexes which display the mortgage 
and ownership transactions on a particular piece of land, help to illustrate Doerr’s land 
purchasing patterns. His land purchases from the 1880s through the 1910s came in his home 
county of Pawnee, in the Sawmill, Valley Center, and Pleasant Valley townships. The land 
around Larned in Pawnee County is situated in the heart of the Kansas wheat belt. Perhaps owing 
to the higher value of land there, especially during the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
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Doerr bought and sold farms at higher prices in this county than elsewhere. Even his government 
patent for a quarter-section homestead in Valley Center became a source of income for the 
family. Initially, he sold the patent to his father, Jacob Doerr, whose own homestead adjoined the 
land. Jacob Doerr later sold both sections for $8,000 in 1906.
28
 If the family homesteads could 
accrue such value, so could other land nearby. In these heady days of good prices and reasonably 
good demand for wheat, Albert A. Doerr sold some of his land at a modest profit.
29
 Although 
Doerr occasionally engaged in the farm real estate trade for profit, in the overwhelming number 
of cases he retained the land over the long-term. Instead of building a monetary estate for his 
family out of the sale of his land once it recovered in value in the 1940s, Doerr decided to hold 
the land for his heirs. This confirmed his commitment to landholding as a stable investment. 
This pattern of land retention held true for most of Doerr’s other Pawnee County farms 
and those he purchased in other counties. Two sections that he purchased in Pawnee County in 
1909 for $4,850 remained in his estate when he died in 1950, though his daughter Laura Pate 
Campbell sold them in 1956 for $32,000.
30
 Several other parcels of land in the county were 
valuable enough to earn the Doerrs oil and gas money and to serve as collateral for small 
personal mortgages. Doerr’s land purchases in Pawnee County were distinguished by the fact 
that he bought these farms early in his adulthood, and he abstained from purchasing farm lands 
in that county during the agricultural crisis of the 1920s and during the Great Depression. 
Cheaper prices elsewhere may have discouraged him from this investment, despite the proven 
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value of Pawnee County soil for planting wheat. The merchant also may have been reluctant to 
take over the land of his erstwhile neighbors.  
Doerr did purchase a large amount of land from distressed farmers during the 1920s, if 
not in Pawnee County. Indeed, he bought nearly fifty percent of his estate during this decade. In 
counties to the west of Pawnee, including Hodgeman, Kearny, Hamilton, and Finney counties, 
the effects of heavy mortgage debt among those who deeded their farms to Doerr became clear. 
On several occasions Doerr purchased multiple parcels from the same individuals, which may 
have meant that they had been trying to expand their landholdings but could not manage to pay 
off the debt accrued to do so. One individual had owned 400 acres in Hodgeman County and a 
quarter section (160 acres) in Grant County, but mortgaged them for $7,000 and ultimately sold 
out to Doerr in three separate deeds between June and September of 1921.
31
 In a similar case, the 
owner of 560 acres in Kearny County and 160 acres in Hamilton County, mortgaged for $3,500, 
sold each piece of property to Doerr in October 1921.
32
 One farmer in Finney County had 
managed to mortgage his 640 acres to multiple lending institutions, including the Federal Land 
Bank of Wichita, local banks, and eastern mortgage companies, for an incredible $16,150. His 
farm likely had seen a great deal of improvement, perhaps even some irrigation works, but this 
outrageous sum must have caused quite a burden before the owner sold the land to Doerr in 
1926. In purchasing the land, Doerr promised to take over a $4,000 debt to the Federal Land 
Bank in Wichita as well as pay the former owner approximately $3,500.
33
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In a few cases Doerr purchased farms from foreclosing institutions. In 1926, Doerr 
acquired one section in the Garfield township of Finney County from a bank receiver after the 
original owner defaulted on $3,675 in mortgage debt, and after the bank, in turn, became 
insolvent and went into receivership.
34
 Doerr purchased another 160 acres in Garfield from the 
Jellison Trust Company, also in 1926. Jellison had foreclosed on the property and repurchased 
the Sheriff’s Deed to the land for $1,736 (it was a common practice for lending institutions to 
recoup the collateral on their debts and hold them until they could be sold at a reasonable price). 
Doerr received a slight discount from the trust company, paying $1,550 for the land.
35
 As a 
successful businessman interested in farm land investments, Doerr had a long-standing 
relationship with the Jellison Trust Company.
36
 At one time Jellison had even referred several 
potential buyers to Doerr when he was considering selling his mercantile business. Transacting 
purchases through trust companies was common among the financial elites of western Kansas. 
The practice had the benefit of individual buyers avoiding direct foreclosure sales, and probably 
helped to insulate Doerr from harmful backlash within the region, a matter of utmost importance 
for a merchant-lender dependent on farmer clients for the success of his implements business. In 
a region where popular culture among farmers routinely vilified bankers and those businessmen 
who lent money at interest, preyed upon poor farmers, and poached their land, Doerr actively 
sought to mitigate the image of his actions. On the Great Plains, the only way a businessman 
could successfully operate was if he held the trust of the community. A merchant or a banker’s 
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economic power, thus, depended not just on his business reputation but also on his dealings with 
that community. 
Doerr did not just protect his own image in making indirect purchases such as these. 
Dealing directly with former owners helped them avoid humiliating foreclosure proceedings, and 
allowed them to choose whether they wanted to deed the land directly to someone they knew in 
the region, rather than to a faceless mortgage company or bank. The merchant certainly protected 
his financial investment through this process, as well. Doerr and his hardware store, the A.A. 
Doerr Mercantile Company, did not grant many mortgages with farm real estate as collateral, but 
the terms on which many farmers signed over their deeds to Doerr suggest that they were 
connected financially to him in some way. One very common condition of the deeds was that 
Doerr paid the previous owner “$1 and other valuable considerations.”
37
 One dollar was and is 
the minimum price for transferring land to another individual; this price is perhaps most typically 
observed when considering honorary or charitable donations of land from wealthy donors. In this 
context, however, the monetary price did not convey a charitable intent. The phrase, “other 
valuable considerations,” ambiguous as it is, is most important to understanding these 
transactions. Given that the former owners’ mortgages later were recorded as paid off, it seems 
probable that Doerr gave them some amount of money for repayment of their debts to outside 
parties, and perhaps erased their smaller debts to his own mercantile company into the bargain. 
In receiving the land as payment for this financial assistance, Doerr recovered claims that likely 
would have gone unpaid in a legal foreclosure system that favored the holders of first mortgages 
on real estate. 
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Anecdotal evidence of similar cases from the 1920s and into the early 1940s suggests a 
number of trends in the region. As many as 42 percent of farmers held mortgage obligations in 
1930 as they tried to remain afloat during poor marketing seasons and over years of bad crops, 
and while they attempted simultaneously to maintain their stake in the farm economy through 
farm expansion and mechanization.
38
 When they proved unable to make payments on these 
mortgages, lenders and prominent merchants (often they had overlapping roles) stepped in to 
release farm owners of their debts and ultimately from the land they could no longer afford to 
own. In some cases, as in Doerr’s, this process could prove less shameful—if no less painful—
than in the foreclosure proceedings so common in popular accounts of the crisis. The assumption 
of mortgage debts in exchange for deeds, however, likely obscured a large number of distressed 
farmers from the already overwhelming records of farm foreclosures during this era. More farm 
families failed even than the historical record has demonstrated, and the transfer of land to 
wealthy businessmen under these circumstances was a direct result.
39
 Doerr’s interest in buying 
all of this land and keeping it in the family estate continued a pattern of increasingly large farms 
held by the few who could afford them. Former owners either moved out of the region or became 
renters. Landlords such as Doerr could not manage their extensive holdings alone; they or their 
farm managers needed these farmers to keep the land in production. Although the returns from 
farming remained low until the stimulus of World War II once again boosted prices, landowners 
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continued to place a high cultural value on farm real estate. Their predictions that the land would 
would return to profitability if they could just keep it under good management ultimately proved 
correct.  
Managing the Land: Landlord-Tenant Relations during the 1920s and 1930s 
As the size of individual landholdings on the Great Plains increased through the purchase 
of land from the insolvent, landlords were concerned with managing the land properly. 
Landlords who exhibited an abiding interest in preserving their estates would have considered 
more than just short-term profit in coordinating their farms. G-K Farms near Colby, Kansas, 
viewed the land as an asset in need of protection. Owner R.H. Garvey, manager John Kriss, and 
their banker/partner Dave Ferguson were interested in profit, but not at the cost of the land. They 
consequently practiced conservation strategies such as “strip listing”—which involved using 
heavy equipment to drill deep below the soil surface and bringing up clods of earth to hold the 
ground in a deep ridge and furrow pattern—and a well-thought-out plan of rotating fallow land. 
In a revolutionary move only permitted by the vast extent of its landholdings, the company 
allowed land in fallow to rest for fourteen months instead of the usual four. In these practices, as 
well as in the adoption of custom combining (hiring large crews from throughout the region and 
beyond to perform the harvesting work), G-K Farms paved the way for future large-scale wheat 
farmers to produce extensively and efficiently in the arid High Plains.
40
  
Like the Colby area operators, Doerr would conserve his land for a long future in 
farming. Although the structure of his farms differed somewhat from G-K, communication 
between Doerr and his many farm operators across southwestern Kansas suggested that lender-
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landholders in the region shared similar concerns for the sustainable maintenance of their farms. 
The system of farming under Doerr’s direction also indicated that the character of tenancy on the 
Great Plains was shifting. As this chapter demonstrates, tenants frequently owned part of the land 
they operated, and rented other pieces from wealthy landholders such as Doerr, Garvey, and 
Ferguson. Successful practices on their own land allowed them to persist in the region when 
many farmers had to leave, and also made landlords such as Doerr more willing to rent out 
additional acreage. Just as was the case with John Kriss and the other managers of G-K Farms, 
parcels of land remained in the control of farm families in partnership with wealthy owners who 
could coordinate large operations and produce more efficiently through the combination of labor 
and capital. These conditions fostered the consolidating trend in modern Great Plains agriculture.  
Doerr meticulously kept copies of letters he sent to and received from his tenants. These 
letters reveal the ordinary concerns of tenants and landlords, as well as the extra tensions of such 
relationships in the period of economic and environmental distress in the 1920s and 1930s. That 
Doerr extended forms of credit to many of his tenants added a further layer of complication to 
their interactions. Still, his attention to the details of farming, marketing, and to some extent, soil 
conservation, went beyond his concern for securing profits from his crop shares, rent, and loans. 
They reflected some of the maxims which agricultural reformers and land use planners had 
espoused for years.
41
 Contributors to such reform communities as the Banker-Farmer journal 
had been recommending many changes to the landlord-tenant relationship. The two parties were 
advised to cooperate in making conservation plans, purchasing seed and equipment, managing 
pests, and increasing the diversity of farm production, such as through the introduction of 
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livestock. Reformers suggested that landlords should embrace long-term leases, and that these 
documents should delineate methods of “scientific management” in a business-like formula. The 
lease should include a plan for crop rotation, even as the landlord and tenant kept abreast with 
changes in conditions from year-to-year which might call for different actions.
42
  
The banker-farmer movement recognized an important role for these business leaders—
frequently landlords themselves—in propagating the ideals of scientific management within a 
modern agricultural system where tenancy would not decline, despite reformers’ best efforts. 
Contemporaries of the movement and historians have criticized the over-involvement of “urban” 
reformers of the upper classes and the lack of participation among the actual farm population in 
the reform movement, but many country bankers’ experiences as landlords suited them to 
participation in agricultural reform.
43
 B.F. Harris, the first editor of the Banker-Farmer, 
represented this fact perfectly. The banker had inherited a large estate in Illinois, one of the 
nation’s leading centers of tenancy.
44
 As a landlord and journal editor, he was able to model the 
best practices of tenure relations as promoted by the reform movement. Harris’s colleagues 
reflected after his untimely death in 1920 that he managed his 2,000 acres of land well, provided 
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his tenants with neat houses, and gave personal attention to enlightened methods of scientific 
farming. J.R. Wheeler noted, “Mr. Harris divided his time proportionately between his farming 
and banking interests and . . . he was actively engaged in directing the operations of both.”
45
 
Doerr was well positioned to embrace the reforms promoted by the Banker-Farmer and 
other progressive farm journals. Although it is not clear whether Doerr actually signed formal 
leases with his tenants, he communicated his standards with them and expected frequent reports 
on their operations. The correspondence exchanged between landlord and tenants indicate 
Doerr’s close engagement with operations and longstanding relationship with many tenants. 
These letters concerned every aspect of the farming cycle, including the timing of planting and 
harvesting as well as instructions for marketing the landlord’s share of the crops.  
A sampling of correspondence from the early parts of the production cycle demonstrated 
some common characteristics. In the fall and spring planting seasons, tenants routinely informed 
Doerr about weather conditions and their progress in plowing the land.
46
 In the 1930s, tenants 
from Rozel, close to Larned in west-central Kansas, to Ulysses, 130 miles to the southwest, 
reported persistent drought.
47
 One tenant complained that he could not plant on time, as Doerr 
requested, because of a lack of rain.
48
 Doerr also paid close attention to his tenants’ maintenance 
of the soil. He visited the farms seasonally to view the land and discuss instructions with his 
tenants. After visiting the farm of one of his tenants in Garden City in September 1930, Doerr 
wrote:  
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I looked at the sod to-day, along the west side only and it looks as though it was 
necessary to disc same again. Please sow as soon as land is dry enough to work. 





Doerr routinely visited his farms, and had much to say about their maintenance. At the beginning 
of the planting cycle, Doerr’s letters frequently included instructions about seeding. The landlord 
purchased the seed from a nearby elevator and sent his tenants to pick up their portion. He 
followed the scientific farming maxims of the day in either purchasing treated seed or paying his 
tenants to treat it. In several letters, he gave specific instructions as to how much seed to plant 
per acre, varying from 20 quarts of seed to the acre near Garden City to 18 quarts in Ulysses. 
This correspondence, additionally, showed Doerr’s attention to the timing of the planting; in 
1926 he wished to have the wheat sown by October 1, and in 1930 he was “anxious to have the 
wheat sown during the week of September fourteen to twenty-first.”
50
 Doerr’s observations and 
detailed instructions to his tenants indicated his farming acumen and skill as a landlord. Doerr’s 
concern for all aspects of the farming cycle as well as other quotidian affairs of farm 
management, such as providing for repairs and building fences, reflected his position in a crop-
share leasing arrangement common in the wheat region of western Kansas. As a Kansas State 
Agricultural College Bulletin observed, this leasing system meant landlords and tenants shared in 
the risks of crop failures and benefited mutually from maintaining soil fertility and good farming 
practices. The Bulletin concluded that “as a result, landlords whose farms are rented for a share 
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Relations between landlord and tenant were not always smooth. Occasionally, tenants did 
not perform the maintenance Doerr required and received letters directing them in no uncertain 
terms that they had better improve their operations. In 1930, for instance, Doerr exchanged 
letters with a tenant named Earl Pitts about his failure to break all of his leased acreage. That 
Pitts held an unpaid note with Doerr and that Doerr had advanced him a sum of money for the 
breaking made the situation worse. When he first learned of the issue in June the landlord 
remarked, “It is certainly a great disappointment to me to have you handle the breaking in such a 
manner. If you are not going to finish please return the $35.00 that . . . you did not earn.” As Pitts 
failed to break the land even by August, Doerr again demanded that he return the cash advanced 
and “take steps to settle the balance of your note which with interest amounts to more than 
$475.00. This is an old note and we must have settlement of the same.”
52
 When Pitts failed even 
to reply to his landlord and lender’s letters, Doerr told him tersely in September:  
I am hereby notifying you that unless you make satisfactory settlement on the 
breaking deal, as well as your old note, legal action will be taken against you 
within ten days from date. This will involve Mrs. Pitts, as well as John Love. 
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This threat finally provoked a response about the land breaking, with Pitts agreeing to finish up 
with the oversight of his neighbor.
54
 Doerr’s concern with the character of his tenants and their 
ability to fulfill obligations—both financial and farm-related—was important because to remain 
viable, his farms needed good operators. As the number of farm-operators declined over the 
course of the twentieth century, landlords like Doerr sustained the practices of the best farm 
managers, while pressuring others to improve or get out of the business. 
In several cases, Doerr observed an ugly growth of weeds on his properties and sent off 
letters demanding that his tenants attend to the problem. In a note to Dave Bradford of Jetmore in 
1932, the landlord reprimanded the farmer for leaving fifty acres unworked and weedy. He 
wrote, “For some reason you seem unable to work for yourself. You had plenty of time to work 
the land if you had kept at it.” He added that if Bradford did not intend to put in a crop that fall, 
he should say so. Doerr did “not care to let a good farm raise weeds only.”
55
 The landlord sent a 
less strident letter about weeds to E.V. Pizenger, also of Jetmore. Pizenger’s response revealed 
that in tough economic times, even mild suggestions from the landlord could sometimes evoke 
vituperative reactions from hard-pressed tenants. The tension in his words is palpable: “Yes Mr. 
Doerr I realized that the ground was getting weedy and I started to work it Friday.” Pizenger 
added that he had much more pressing concerns in needing to get some threshing done and earn 
money to pay the gas bill. He further illustrated his dire economic situation:  
As you know Mr. Doerr I spent $1100.00 putting out 500 acres of wheat last fall 
and lost it all but about 60 or 70 acres and it made 6 bu. I put out 200 acres of 
corn and this spring spent another $300.00 planting and working it and its [sic] all 
about burned up. So out of 700 acres of crop I will not get my seed back. Taxes 
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These letters suggest that not only the common issues of land tenure, such as the prevailing 
notions that lazy tenants did not care well enough for their farms, but also the increasing 
pressures of depression and drought, strained the landlord-tenant relationship. 
A few series of letters relating to soil movement in the Dust Bowl region provide further 
evidence of these added stressors. In 1936 and again in 1939, Doerr received complaints from 
neighbors and from the Hodgeman and Finney County Boards of Commissioners about soil 
blowing on his tenants’ land.
57
 Although each of the tenants involved tried to lay blame 
elsewhere, Doerr nonetheless cautioned them and other nearby tenants to take care and properly 
contour the land to avoid further blowing.
58
 When Doerr again chastised a tenant for letting 
weeds grow on his acreage in the Garden City area in 1937, the threat of blowing soil caused the 
tenant and even his neighbor to push back against the landlord’s instructions. Ralph Mead 
explained that some weeds were necessary to hold the soil and his neighbor, R.E. Gasche, 
defended this conclusion. Gasche begged Doerr to reconsider his instructions for plowing under 
all weeds and stubble, remarking:  
It seems to me that you would have just as good a chance at a wheat crop to drill 
in this stubble as to work ground the condition it is now. I do not want to feel that 
I am trying in any way to dictate to you, but I am trying to live here and that has 




The Dust Bowl created conditions that exacerbated existing tensions between Doerr and his 
tenants during the production and maintenance phases of farming. The landlord’s interest in the 
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weed-free appearance of his farms certainly caused some pushback from some of his tenants who 
had other priorities and ideas about the soil’s needs.  
 Beyond the correspondence related to the planting and maintenance phases of the farming 
cycle, Doerr also communicated with his tenants frequently during harvest and market times. 
These letters, again, shared certain characteristics. The weather occupied a primary role in letters 
between Doerr and his tenants. Sometimes Doerr had to ask about hail damage or rain, but more 
often tenants volunteered this information.
60
 The vast majority of the letters concerning harvest 
and marketing reported simply that the tenant had completed the job. Tenants often asked Doerr 
for advice about when to sell his share of the crop, and Doerr always gave instructions about 
when to sell, when to hold for better prices, and whether he planned to provide storage bins for 
holding the crop.
61
 Part of the success of the landlord-tenant relationships in the modern system 
of agriculture on the Great Plains that was developing during this time involved the easy 
exchange of information about challenges and successes in the farming process. The landlord’s 
marketing experience and business expertise often led tenants to trust his decisions. 
Even if the system worked efficiently, it did not create large profits for many tenants or 
for the landlord during these years of agricultural depression; consequently, harvest and market 
time produced the greatest strains on the landlord and some of his tenants. Doerr monitored his 
tenants closely during post-harvest and marketing periods, and when tenant practices did not 
meet his standards he scolded them. If a tenant did not care properly for the harvested wheat, 
Doerr became especially irritable. As he wrote to a Garden City farmer in August 1930, “I was 
certainly displeased to find some of my wheat on the ground. Had I thought you was going [sic] 
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to be all fall in getting it to town I certainly would have employed some one else to haul it.”
62
 In 
another case, a tenant near Bazine had left poor wheat in the granary well past harvest time. 
Doerr wrote tersely, “You are about the only person that has [let] wheat spoil this year. I do not 
feel that I should be asked to stand a loss on my share year after year.”
63
 
 If tenants failed to bring the crop to market on time or send Doerr the check for his share 
of the sale, relations with the landlord tended to sour. Doerr’s tone ranged from firm to quite 
chilly, depending on the severity of the situation. Most frequently, he simply urged his 
correspondents to stop delaying and market the crops.
64
 Tenants who repeatedly failed to respond 
to his requests for information and payment at harvest time especially tested the landlord’s 
patience.
65
 Cases that involved tenants badly in arrears on their rent, of which there were at least 
six between 1920 and 1940, unsurprisingly provoked the strongest admonitions. Still, although 
occasionally Doerr unceremoniously told the tenant he would not renew the lease, more often he 
exercised leniency. The state of the economy and whether Doerr could find another tenant may 
have factored into his decisions. In 1920, just before the agricultural economy began to decline 
precipitously, he ousted one tenant fairly abruptly, whereas over the course of the Great 
Depression he requested rent from another tenant repeatedly but appeared never to evict him.
66
  
                                                 
62. Doerr to Ralph H. Mead, August 12, 1930, in Series III, Box 2, Folder 6, Doerr Papers.  
63. Doerr to Ed Beltz, April 11, 1933, in Series III, Box 2, Folder 9, Doerr Papers.  
64. The correspondence files between 1920 and 1940 contain numerous examples, including Doerr to 
Arthur Meredith (Larned), May 5, 1922; Doerr to S.H. Holden (Cimarron), January 7, 1925; Doerr to H.N. Meredith 
(Larned), May 23, 1928; Doerr to S.I. Taylor (Jetmore), April 19, 1929; and Doerr to J.W. Collins (Larned), April 2, 
1931, all in Series III, Box 2, Folders 6-7, Doerr Papers.  
65. Doerr’s correspondence with Fred Cossman of Jetmore, KS represented his annoyance at a tenant’s 
failure to provide a full account of the amount of wheat harvested and prices at its sale. See Doerr to Cossman, July 
19, 1930; July 19, 1930; September 3, 1930; October 15, 1930; and October 27, 1930. Doerr even wrote to the 
Turon Mill & Elevator Co. to inquire after Cossman’s account. See Doerr to Turon Mill, October 28, 1930, all in 
Series III, Box 2, Folder 6, Doerr Papers.  
66. The first case involved Oscar McComas of Macksville, KS. See Doerr to McComas, July 7, 1920 and 
July 22, 1920, in Series III, Box 2, Folder 6, Doerr Papers. M.D. Brown, another of Doerr’s tenants residing near 
Larned, was a repeat defaulter and received several pleas for payment in 1931, 1932, and again in 1940. See Doerr 
to Brown, June 9, 1931, November 2, 1931, January 23, 1932, in Series III, Box 2, Folders 7-8, Doerr Papers; and 




The poor economic climate of the depression also created problems for tenants at harvest 
time, as destitution drove some individuals to criminal acts. Twice in one year, stolen grain 
caused headaches for Doerr and his tenants. In August 1930, two truckloads of wheat were stolen 
from one of Doerr’s farms near Garden City. This prompted him to reprimand the tenant 
responsible:  
This wheat that was taken belonged to both of us and you will have to stand ¾ of 
the loss and I ¼ my rent share. The wheat was in your possession and you had 
permission long ago to market the same but did not do so. When we make final 




Doerr offered a $25 reward for the arrest and conviction of the wheat thieves and sent letters 
warning his other tenants in the area to “keep a close watch on the bins containing my wheat.”
68
 
Unfortunately, thieves struck again in December, as another of Doerr’s Garden City tenants 
reported. This time, Doerr seemed to accept the inevitable and tried to forestall more thievery by 
asking all his tenants in the area to move their grain to the Farmer’s Equity elevator in town.
69
 
As an extended drought ground on through the 1930s, tenants lamented the lack of rain 
that made operations difficult. In some cases the tenants decided the crop was not worth cutting 
and in one year Doerr asked several of his tenants simply to plow up the wheat and prepare for 
the next year.
70
 In one case, the poor yield made a tenant so hard pressed for cash that he needed 
assistance in order to harvest the crop or keep operating for the next year. I.M. Friesen of Garden 
City wrote in July 1932 that he expected to harvest only 4-5 bushels of wheat per acre and that 
these would fetch only 33 cents per bushel. He remarked, “After paying for repairs, gas & oil, 
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labor and rent there is nothing left to go ahead and put out another crop.” He therefore requested 
confirmation that he would get a threshing job with which he could leverage for some oil from 
the oil company.
71
 Drought continued to hit Finney County hard, and no doubt both tenants and 
landlords were relieved when the New Deal in 1933 stepped in to provide 95 percent of wheat 
farmers there with allotment checks from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) 
averaging more than $500.
72
 Before that program was established, however, the landlord’s 
forbearance and ability to provide cash jobs to the tenants was essential in preserving their 
livelihoods. 
Doerr’s status as a merchant-lender complicated his relationship with his tenants even in 
good times and especially during the Great Depression. What tenancy reports termed “the 
landlord’s lien” comprised the first part of a landlord’s demands on his renters. This functioned 
as a “statutory lien upon the crops or chattels of the tenant,” and was built into leases as a means 
of protecting the “landlord’s right to rent payments.”
73
 But this most basic financial arrangement 
typically was only the first element of the tenant’s obligations to their landlords. Some historians 
have acknowledged that many landlords were also moneylenders, but they have provided little 
evidence of the day-to-day lending relationships as an added layer of the tenant-landlord 
contract.
74
 Doerr’s involvement in the operations of several local and regional banks and savings 
and loan associations made him a prominent figure on the regional banking scene. He held 
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Other examples include Paul W. Gates, “Frontier Landlords and Pioneer Tenants,” Journal of the Illinois State 
Historical Society 38, no. 2 (June 1945), esp. 167-73; and Allan G. Bogue, “Foreclosure Tenancy on the Northern 




positions as a shareholder in a major regional mortgage lending company, the Aetna Building & 
Loan Association (Topeka); as a shareholder of the Banking, Railroad Building, Loan & Savings 
Association (Newton); as an officer with the Wichita Building and Loan League; as a 
shareholder and trustee with significant influence on lending practices at the First National Bank 
and at one point also at the Moffet Brothers National Bank, both of Larned; and as the president 
of the Larned Building, Loan, and Savings Association.
75
 Such a multiplicity of directorships and 
stockholding interests was not unusual among the rural business elite. 
Beyond these more traditional “banking” activities, Doerr’s agricultural implements 
dealership placed him in a prime position to lend to farmers attempting to industrialize their 
production. His correspondence with business associate Harvey Eckert provides ample evidence 
of his extension of credit on machine loans through his mercantile company.
76
 The company 
handled its loans in-house, which allowed a certain degree of flexibility in prolonging credit 
terms with worthy clients during the Depression.
77
 Some of his tractor loans involved tenants, 
and when this was the case Doerr allowed them to perform contracted work and apply the 
balance to their loans.
78
 Most frequently, however, tenants used profits from their crop sales to 
pay their outstanding notes, beyond the rent or shares they paid Doerr for use of the land.
79
 
                                                 
75. Series III, Box 6, Folders 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 13, Doerr Papers.  
76. The letters in this file reference only a sampling of the credit accounts for clients of the A.A. Mercantile 
Company, because the credit collector Harvey Eckert only wrote them during periods where the boss was traveling 
extensively in 1934 and 1940. These are fairly indicative of the lending practices of that institution, however. Doerr 
and Eckert were lenient in extending the credit of good customers, but less so among wily or untrustworthy 
customers. For contrasting examples, see Eckert to Doerr, January 27, 1934; February 1, 1934; and March 3, 1940, 
all in Series III, Box 3, Folder 3, Doerr Papers.  
77. It was only in 1940 that the mercantile contracted with the Industrial Bank and Trust Company of St. 
Louis, Missouri, to sell its loan papers to the mortgage lender. The mercantile continued to exercise authority in 
accepting loan applications and collecting on notes, and thus retained a great deal of control over the local credit 
scene. See the Agreement, in Series III, Box 3, Folder 3, Doerr Papers.  
78. Ralph Mead (Garden City) to Doerr, Sept. 7, 1930; and Ralph Mead to Doerr, Feb. 14, 1931, both in 
Series III, Box 2, Folders 6-7, Doerr Papers.  
79. S.F. Taylor (Jetmore) to Doerr, Feb. 10, 1931; Doerr to J.A. Henderson (Jetmore), Feb. 6, 1931; Walter 
Zook (Larned) to Doerr, March 2, 1932; and Doerr to Dave Bradford (Jetmore), May 26, 1932, all in Series III, Box 




Occasionally, Doerr’s tone was quite stern in defending his fiscal interests in a crop and 
in demanding payment for a note. In one case a tenant informed his lender-landlord that he was 
having trouble coming up with money to make a payment on a McCormick Deering tractor note. 
He explored several options for paying it off, including having a neighbor buy some of his wheat 
in repayment for services, so he would have money to pay the note. Doerr apparently did not 
approve of this solution or it was insufficient to cover the loan. When the tenant later sold some 
of the wheat in his own name, Doerr wrote a letter to the tenant’s father informing him that his 
son needed to remit the payment to the mercantile company for the mortgage it held on the 
wheat.
80
 In a second case, Doerr agreed to extend one of his tenants’ loans for three years, but 
balked at the tenant’s attempts to stall the interest payments. Even when a fellow banker wrote to 
Doerr on the borrower’s behalf, the landlord responded, “The proposition of extending the 
interest payment does not appeal at all to me; since I am not compelling them to take up the 
loan.” He added, “Personally, we are in need of just such items in our own affairs.”
81
 Doerr 
clearly felt the strain of the Depression, too. He concluded as much in a letter to a friend in 1936:   
This is the fifth consecutive complete failures [sic] in this territory and human 
hope has about vanished, and unless the climate reforms and becomes somewhat 
normal, this part of Kansas will be depopulated. You can imagine what 
collections are under such continued abnormal conditions. We are renewing a lot 




The poor agricultural and economic climate put stresses on the lending business, which forced 
lenders and merchants at times to more firmly protect their business interests. Yet Doerr still 
hoped that the climate might improve again and thus remained invested in agricultural enterprise. 
                                                 
80. Ben Crook (Garden City) to Doerr, Sept. 12, 1931; George Riedl (Ash Valley) to Doerr, Oct. 20, 1931; 
and Doerr to Herold Crook, undated, all in Series III, Box 2, Folder 7, Doerr Papers.  
81. J.S. Fisher (Holton, KS) to Doerr, Feb. 3, 1931; John E. Wagner (President Citizens State Bank, 
Cimarron) to Doerr, August 31, 1931; Doerr to Wagner, September 1, 1931; and J.S. Fisher (Holton) to Doerr, Oct. 
12, 1931, all in Series III, Box 2, Folder 7, Doerr Papers. Correspondence regarding the interest outstanding on this 
loan continued throughout 1932.  




In most cases this hopefulness led him to exercise leniency in his relations with loan clients 
rather than simply foreclose on their collateral.   
Throughout the farming cycle, Doerr and his tenants had to contend with problematic 
conditions involving the climate and the economy in addition to the regular plowing, planting, 
harvesting, and marketing operations of the tenure system. The landlord’s attention to even the 
most mundane details of farm appearance, operations, and marketing showed that Doerr did not 
simply purchase a vast amount of land and leave it to tenants, seeking only to wring out the 
highest yields of wheat possible and giving little attention to the manner in which tenants 
performed the farming. Knowing a great deal about the farming business and keeping a close 
watch on operations from his home base in Larned, Doerr did not exhibit the typical 
characteristics of an urban, absentee “suitcase farmer,” but rather those of a highly invested 
landlord of a crop-share leasing arrangement.  
Doerr’s record as a landlord provides some nuance to scholarly criticisms of profiteering 
farm investors who cared little for the region and environment. Correspondence with his tenants 
at all points of the agricultural cycle revealed a significant amount of tension over the appearance 
of the farms, the tenants’ inability or unwillingness to do the work of farm maintenance, failures 
in marketing, or the upkeep of the soil. The latter cases, in particular, illustrate the growing 
impact of industrializing agriculture in the twentieth century and efforts to bring the tenure 
system up to grade in contending with environmental and economic challenges. Some of Doerr’s 
decisions indicated that he did not fully understand the complexity of the Great Plains ecology, 
and his comments hoping for a return to the region’s normal climate and precipitation level made 
it apparent that he did not believe a permanent revision of practices was necessary. Hoping for 




of wheat from his land as possible. Thus in his role as lender and landlord he did embody some 
of the typical attitudes of the period’s farming frenzy, and his concerns for output largely 
reflected economic interest. Much like the region’s other farmers during this period, he 
participated in the exploitation of a fragile ecology and paid the price during years of drought 
and dust.  
Nonetheless, Doerr learned over time the necessity of reducing erosion to prevent the soil 
on his farms from blowing. Although he and his tenants held contending notions about how to 
maintain the soil, whether through fallowing or leaving unsightly weeds and stubble on the 
ground, Doerr advocated some of the improved techniques of conservation modeled by New 
Deal conservation programs. He and his tenants participated in the AAA’s allotment programs 
for wheat and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act’s plans for farm management 
improvements. They submitted yearly farm plans and cooperated with local supervisors and 
extension agents in taking steps to reduce production and protect the soil. Doerr placed the land 
he operated himself into the conservation program, and his farm plan was diverse in terms of soil 
conservation and enrichment practices, including non-crop pasture, fallowing, and thirty grazing 
animals.
83
 Scholars have criticized the federal government’s unfulfilled mission to redress the 
social and environmental problems of tenancy and its neglect of soil conservation efforts in its 
drive for economic recovery.
84
 Yet the combined efforts of local farmers and the government to 
assuage the loss of soil in the Dust Bowl should not count for nothing. Doerr’s participation in 
New Deal agricultural programs revealed his growing understanding of soil conservation needs.  
                                                 
83. Farm Plans, in Series III, Box 5, Folders 3-4, Doerr Papers.  
84. Rasmussen, ‘“Never a Landlord for the Good of the Land,’” 71-74. Worster’s Dust Bowl condemns the 
New Deal for not going far enough, as well. Sarah T. Phillips is more complimentary of New Deal land management 
programs in This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal. New York: Cambridge 




Certainly Doerr observed that the economic imperative for participation in the New Deal 
allotment programs was strong as well. The AAA provided landlords and farm operators the 
opportunity to earn income on land that had become unproductive during several years of 
drought, and thus functioned as a sort of crop insurance. Doerr received a share of the AAA 
allotment payments for crop reduction proportional to his usual share of the crop—typically a 
one-quarter interest.
85
 But even more than that small stake in the AAA payments, he stood to 
gain in other ways from the money in his tenants’ pockets. Historian Peter Fearon cites a 
statewide Extension Service questionnaire that reported, “Approximately 40 percent of the first 
adjustment payment was devoted to clearing debts; 26 percent was committed for home supplies, 
including food, clothing, and repairs to farm and home equipment; and 23 percent was 
earmarked for taxes.”
86
 The funds that would come back to Doerr for his loans on farm 
equipment provided strong incentive for supporting the AAA. 
Doerr and his tenants continued to share the benefits of government benefit payments and 
advice on conservation. The sharing of benefits between landlord and tenants reflected the 
differences between wheat allotments and the cotton programs of the South, which allowed 
landowners to evict sharecroppers and keep the full payments themselves. Even in western 
Kansas, landlords sometimes took over their land to farm themselves in order to reap the full 
benefits.
87
 Correspondence with government agencies on behalf of his tenants, allowing them to 
                                                 
85. Doerr’s Papers include a number of folders containing applications and allotment agreements between 
the USDA and the tenants of his farms. One representative example is the 1933 Wheat Adjustment Plan, Form No. 
CRW-201, Box 5, Folder 11. The form shows the percent paid to each payee (operator and landlord). Doerr’s share 
on six of the listed farms was 25 percent, while he received 33.3 percent of the payments on nineteen farms, and 
fully 50 percent on one farm. A letter from AAA Secretary for Hodgeman County Carl M. Elling to A.A. Doerr on 
October 29, 1938 (Box 5, Folder 1, Doerr Papers) further explained, “The wheat and general payment is divided 
according to the crop share and soil-building payment to the person who performs the actual soil-building practices.”   
86. Fearon, Kansas in the Great Depression, 178. See also Hurt, “Prices, Payments, and Production,” 80. 
87. The non-contiguous structure of Doerr’s large estate would have prevented this. On the limitations of 
the AAA in the South, see David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 




participate in the AAA and other programs as well as supporting their applications for 
government loans, showed that Doerr was willing to foster the wellbeing of his long-time tenants 
as he himself received partial benefits and indirect financial help from the influx of funds into the 
regional economy.
88
 With opportunities from landlords like Doerr, many of his tenants were able 
to improve their circumstances, continue long-term land rental contracts, and often purchase 
some land of their own to farm in conjunction with the rented land. This demonstrates that the 
roots of the modern system of landholding and farming in western Kansas and the Great Plains 
more broadly began well before the boom in land and commodity prices in the wake of World 
War II, and took on a different dimension than popular depictions suggested.  
Tenants and the Creation of the Modern Land Tenure System in Western Kansas 
Portraits of a few of Doerr’s tenants help to humanize the twentieth-century farm tenancy 
relationship that provided an opportunity for both cooperation and independence in farm 
operations. Farm tenancy, which reformers viewed as an aberration from the American dream of 
land lownership, nonetheless could prove attractive for farmers on the Great Plains. During the 
1920s and 1930s, some were forced to become tenants due to their inability to repay debt, but 
others likely chose to remain tenants or to rent additional land rather than invest in acreage 
during an increasingly unstable economic period. Some tenants were family members of their 
landlords’ and thus faced no significant pressure to buy land themselves. As Peter Fearon puts it, 
“There was little difference in status between tenants and owners, especially in central and 
western Kansas, and it is quite possible that some owners contemplating the burden of their debts 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Hurt, “Prices, Payments, and Production,” 87, each argued that the AAA largely favored large-scale producers 
and landlords over small-acreage farmers and tenants. 
88. Additional samples of Doerr’s correspondence with the USDA on behalf of tenants from 1934 through 




envied renters, whose obligations were limited to livestock and machinery.”
89
 In Kansas, tenancy 
and farm rental were becoming increasingly normalized. Farm operations in 1930 were 
composed of “57,151 full owners, 37,611 part owners, and 70,326 tenants,” and these numbers 
remained fairly stable during the following decade.
90
 As the farm system advanced into its 
present form, it shaped new roles for the landlord and those who operated the farms. For the 
farmers who rented Doerr’s land, tenancy did not proscribe opportunities for economic and 
social success. Renters on the Great Plains occupied a permanent place in the community. In 
fact, the tenants with whom Doerr chose to operate represented a stabilizing regional farm 
population—almost exclusively white, American-born, farm-raised individuals—devoted to their 
communities and to the continuation of a farm economy with maximized profits.  
Peter C. Kiistner was one of Doerr’s most successful tenants. He was born in Grant 
County, Kansas in 1889, and lived with his parents there until his marriage in 1914. By 1920, the 
federal census indicated that he owned his own farm free of a mortgage. Data from the Kansas 
State Agricultural Board in 1922 showed that Kiistner managed 1,435 acres of land in Grant 
County (where his parents lived) and 215 acres in Kearny County, where he made his home in 
the Kendall township. Kiistner followed still prevalent regional norms of planting a diverse range 
of crops, while also leaving a great deal of land in prairie grass, where presumably he quartered 
his fourteen horses, seven mules, and forty-seven cattle.
91
 Although historical census and 
                                                 
89. Fearon, Kansas in the Great Depression, 151. 
90. Ibid.  
91. 1922 Grant County data from the Kansas State Board of Agriculture indicated that P.C. Kiistner held 
1,320 acres of prairie grass, 20 acres planted to winter wheat, 5 to corn, 20 to kafir, 30 to milo, 30 to sorghum, and 
10 to other uses. Kearny County records for the same year included 100 acres of prairie grass, 15 acres planted to 
winter wheat, 10 to corn, 25 to broom corn, 15 to sorghum, 20 to kafir, and 30 to milo. Kansas Board of Agriculture 
Farm Statistics for 1919-1924 and 1937-1940 (and later) are available on microfilm at the Kansas State Historical 
Society, Topeka. A number of scholars have offered quantitative evidence of the diversity of Great Plains farming, 
including Geoff Cunfer, On the Great Plains: Agriculture and Environment (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2005). Since publication of this book, Cunfer has participated in other studies based on Geographic 




agricultural board records failed to indicate the precise ratio of farmers’ rented versus owned 
land, correspondence records indicated that Kiistner rented part of Doerr’s land in Kearny 
County. The land under his management in Kearny County had increased to 320 acres by 1925. 
Again, he operated in a diverse fashion, with two-thirds of this land remaining in prairie grass 
and the remainder divided among winter wheat, corn, kafir, and milo.
92
 By 1937, a Kansas State 
Board of Agriculture record showed that Kiistner’s farm in Kearny County had once again 
expanded, to 640 total acres. The proportion of land planted to winter wheat increased 
dramatically to 56 percent (360 acres). More than a quarter of the land remained in grass (170 
acres), while Kiistner maintained his tradition of planting a small acreage of other forage crops 
such as kafir and milo (110 acres). This sizable operation, including land rented from Doerr, 
represented the achievements of a lifetime of farming and perseverance through a difficult period 
of economic and climatic pressures.
93
 Kiistner’s successes as a farmer and stockman lent him 
authority within his community, which elected him county commissioner.  
Walter Zook exhibited a similar background and life trajectory as a farm owner-operator. 
He was born in 1891, and lived with his parents in Pawnee County, Kansas. His parents 
advanced from rental status to farm ownership by 1910.
94
 Walter Zook graduated from a two-
year Mennonite college in 1912, married in 1914, and then mirrored his parents in moving from 
                                                                                                                                                             
M. Sylvester, Susan Hautaniemi Leonard, Myron P. Gutmann, and Geoff Cunfer, “Demography and Environment in 
Grassland Settlement: Using Linked Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Data to Explore Household and Agricultural 
Systems,” History and Computing 14, no. 1-2 (2006), 31-60. A follow-up was published as Kenneth Sylvester and 
Geoff Cunfer, “An Unremembered Diversity: Mixed Husbandry and the American Grasslands,” Agricultural 
History 83, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 352-383. Sylvester has published a related study independently: “Ecological 
Frontiers on the Grasslands of Kansas: Changes in Farm Scale and Crop Diversity,” The Journal of Economic 
History 69, no. 4 (Dec 2009), 1041-1062. 
92. Statistics refer to the 1925 Kansas State Population and Agricultural Census for Kendall, Kearny 
County. 
93. Kiistner, along with several other tenants, had participated in the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration’s allotment program, with Doerr’s permission. See correspondence in Series III, Box 2, Folder 9; 
and USDA-AAA-ACP Wheat Allotment Contract, in Series III, Box 5, Folders 3-4, Doerr Papers.  
94. Daniel B. and Mary M. Zook are listed in the 1900 Census, Pleasant Valley, Pawnee County 
(Supervisor’s District 7, Enumerator District 172, Sheet 3A, Line 54). They rented a farm at this time. In the 1910 




farm rental to partial ownership by 1940.
95
 His operations in 1915 on his farm in Pleasant Valley, 
Pawnee County included 320 total acres, 150 acres of which he planted to winter wheat. He 
devoted sixty-two other acres to forage and fodder crops for his small number of horses, mules, 
cattle, and swine: twenty-five acres of corn, six of kafir and feterita, sixteen of alfalfa, and fifteen 
of cultivated hay.
96
 A Kansas Board of Agriculture survey in 1922 noted that his farm had 
expanded to 480 acres, with 260 (fifty-four percent) of these acres planted to winter wheat. He 
had built up his livestock holdings considerably, and these animals had the benefit of feeding 
from forty-five acres of alfalfa and eighty acres of fenced pasture. Zook also owned a tractor and 
a cement silo, which signaled that his operation was becoming a sizable one befitting the 
common needs of expansive farm operations on the Plains.
97
 Only three years later, the state 
census reported that Zook controlled 640 acres in Pawnee County, 340 acres devoted to wheat, 
160 to corn, and the rest to the upkeep of his many livestock. He had purchased a combined 
harvester-thresher by this time, probably from the A.A. Doerr Mercantile.
98
 Zook’s operations 
suffered somewhat during the Dust Bowl, in that he scaled back his operations to only 480 acres, 
but landownership likely outweighed the decrease in acreage and increased his government 
benefits. He benefited from a number of New Deal programs and was able to maintain a solid 
stake in his community.
99
 Indeed, upon his death in 1963, the Great Bend Daily Tribune called 
                                                 
95. Walter Zook had classified himself as a renter on state and federal censuses from 1915 until 1930, but 
the 1940 census noted that he owned his home farm. Again, the exact portion of rented versus owned land is 
unavailable, but it is clear that Zook continued to rent some land in addition to what he owned. 
96. See the 1915 Kansas State Agricultural Census for Pleasant Valley, Pawnee County.  
97. Zook reported to the Kansas Board of Agriculture that he owned 12 horses, 21 mules, 5 milk cows, 45 
other cattle, and 50 swine. The 1937 report of the President’s Committee on Farm Tenancy noted that in northern 
states, including Kansas, tenants tended to own high value machinery (worth an average of $866 per capita), even 
higher than that of farm owners in the region ($733 per capita), presumably because they operated greater acreages 
to make ends meet. See United States et al., Farm Tenancy, 55. 
98. Correspondence with Doerr on March 2, 1932 confirms that on at least one occasion, Doerr held a note 
of Zook’s. This lending relationship was likely a lengthy one. See Zook to Doerr, March 2, 1932, in Series III, Box 
2, Folder 8, Doerr Papers.  
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him a “prominent Pawnee County farmer-stockman” and reported that he had served as a district 
director for the Kansas Farm Bureau, as a “field man” for the Kansas Association of Wheat 
Growers, and as the president of the Larned Rotary Club.
100
  
Longtime area residents were not Doerr’s only successful tenants, however. Fairly recent 
immigrants to the U.S. and to Kansas could also find some success on a Great Plains farm, even 
while agro-business became more costly and competitive. Ralph D. Smith’s adoption of the 
Americanized version of his parents’ German last name, Schmid, signaled his newness to the 
country in the 1915 Kansas state census. His parents, and soon Ralph himself, owned their own 
farms, which suggested that they had some means to set themselves up when they arrived in 
Kansas. R.D. Smith operated more than half a section of land by 1925, where he planted a 
diverse set of commercial and feed crops as well as reserved nearly half of the land as pasture for 
his forty-two cattle, eight milk cows, and five horses.
101
 By 1937, Smith had demonstrated his 
ability to manage an even larger amount of land, and his farm contained 640 acres. Of this, 160 
acres were planted to wheat—probably this is the land he rented from Doerr and from which he 
paid his shares—and under fifty acres grew feed grains including corn, kafir, and sorghum. 
Smith maintained a land rental relationship with Doerr for many years until Doerr finally sold 
him the 160 acres he had been renting in 1944 for $2,000.
102
 It was rare for Doerr to sell any 
land, but several factors probably went into the decision. Doerr was advancing in age (he would 
die in 1950) and beginning to transfer some of his land to his daughters, Laura Isabel Campbell 
and Pauline Pate Davis. The one parcel of land he held in Ford County might not have been 
valuable enough to bother with its maintenance in the estate. Smith’s continuing dedication to 
                                                 
100. Obituary, Great Bend Daily Tribune, October 11, 1963. 
101. Smith farmed 115 acres of winter wheat, 5 of corn, 10 of oats, and 20 of sorghum. See the 1925 
Kansas State Census, Agricultural Schedule for Royal Township, Ford County. 




the farm also would have made a difference, however. As this chapter has argued, Doerr 
supported the cultural and financial value of farms as durable assets to individuals and 
communities. Smith certainly embraced this value in keeping the land in his possession until his 
own old age and lack of heirs caused him to sell it in 1979. 
Even those tenants who did not ever own land of their own during the time they rented 
from Doerr still could manage some stability over the long term, as evidenced by their ability to 
stay in the business of farming during a period of great outmigration from the farming regions of 
western Kansas. Verdie Young, who moved to Kansas from Kentucky sometime between 1918 
and 1920, rented farms from Doerr in Pawnee and Finney Counties for at least twenty years. In 
1925, for example, he operated 560 acres just in Pawnee County. He made his living largely 
from raising winter wheat (400 acres), though he also planted some feed crops and kept some 
pasture for his small herd of livestock. He owned a tractor, and he was a valuable enough tenant 
that Doerr allowed him to take contracts for threshing, hauling, and other seasonal farm jobs on 
the land he rented out in the area.
103
 Doerr also permitted him to participate in many of the New 
Deal acreage reduction and allotment programs, which enabled Young to persevere through 
tough years. 
It has proven impossible to track every individual who rented land from Doerr over the 
course of the merchant’s lifetime, but a significant amount of correspondence with some of these 
individuals between the early 1920s and the late 1930s allows for the elucidation of the careers 
of selected tenants in the available statistical measures of the state agricultural censuses and 
                                                 
103. 1925 Kansas State Census, Agricultural Schedule for Grant Township, Pawnee County. See also 




reports compiled by the Kansas Board of Agriculture.
104
 These data prove that Doerr’s tenants, in 
addition to renting land from him and perhaps from other landowners, tended to own some of the 
land they farmed. The tenants’ diverse operations on both owned and rented land demonstrated a 
system of increasingly large and mechanized farm operations. Renters occupied a lower class 
than the wealthy families who could afford to buy thousands of acres of land, but often they were 
able to invest in smaller acreages on their own, as well as purchase equipment to farm large 
acreages. They therefore exhibited successful qualities to landlords who allowed them to take 
over operations of their farms. Some scholars, including the historian James Malin, argue that 
landlordism—absenteeism and corporation farming included—unequivocally made regional 
farm operators unstable, but this is unsubstantiated.
105
 Reformers feared tenancy, which in 
Kansas reached a rate of 44 percent by 1935, because they thought it always resulted in high 
rates of occupancy turnover and robbed the soil as well as the community of value. But just as 
stereotypes of land-grabbing bankers were not faithful always to the complex motivations of 
these individuals, these fears about tenancy did not fully represent the reality of a farming system 
that could prove very rewarding to those who opted out of the high carrying costs of 
landownership and focused their efforts upon production expertise and equipment. 
World War II merely solidified trends of high-input costs for hybridization, chemical use, 
and mechnization, as well as trends toward fewer and larger farms, farmed by renters or partial 
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 Visiting the deed offices in Great Plains counties today reveals that similar patterns of 
ownership by wealthy families remain in place from before the war. Doerr’s own descendants 
maintain a sizable estate comprising much of the land he acquired in the 1920s and rented out to 
local farmers as wheat and pasture land. This land remains in a rental system much like the one 
that took shape in the period under study; farmers who may own some land, but who must rent a 
large amount of acreage in order to have sufficient land for profitable operation, continue to hold 
longstanding relationships with wealthy landowners. The transition to this system began not 
during an era of profit and high land prices, but during the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s 
when Doerr and other wealthy elites purchased large amounts of land from those who could no 
longer afford to pay their debts.  
Conclusion 
This study of Albert A. Doerr, a Larned, Kansas merchant and lender, confirms the 
complexity of twentieth-century tenancy in a region where the subject has been under-studied. 
Letters written between Doerr and his tenants between 1920 and 1948 illuminate the landlord’s 
close attention to the details of farming in his large southwestern Kansas estate and the longevity 
of the relationships he held with his tenants. Doerr’s experience as a farmer and role as an 
agricultural advisor to his tenants are clear in that he instructed his tenants about many farm 
functions, such as proper seeds and fertilizer, fallowing and other soil conservation ideas, and 
marketing. These features of Doerr’s tenure system set him apart from landlords little versed in 
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the principles of farming and dwelling so far from their holdings as to rarely visit or tend to the 
farming operation.  
As a landlord and lender, Doerr certainly demonstrated an economic motive in promoting 
the success of his farms, extracting the maximum possible crop production, and recovering the 
money he lent his tenants. His business and farming instincts sometimes led him astray: at the 
height of the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, he fell back on outdated methods of soil maintenance that 
stood little chance of bearing up to harsh environmental conditions. Ultimately, however, he did 
what he could to change his methods as farmers’ and government agencies’ understanding of soil 
science grew. Drought and dust tested the mettle of Great Plains farmers in unimaginable ways. 
Doerr, like many others residing in the heart of the devastated region, seemed incredulous that 
the climate could remain so “abnormal” for several successive years and unsure of what to do if 
the drought failed to break. Tenants, equally if not more crushed by the weight of the agricultural 
depression, did not necessarily have the solutions either. These letters show, however, that they 
sometimes expressed wiser ideas about holding the soil in place than the landlord. The 
conditions of the 1930s could exacerbate relations and occasionally draw out overt or veiled 
resistance to the landlord’s exacting demands. Despite some disagreements, Doerr’s disposition 
to hear out his tenants’ ideas through an extensive correspondence record, and not dismiss them 
out of hand, is important. Additionally, positive responses to New Deal-era land management 
programs showed a willingness to adapt to the scientific knowledge of experts as well as a desire 
to do everything possible to maintain the vitality of the land for the future. This confirms Doerr’s 
acceptance of a still widely-held cultural value for landholding, although the modern dynamic 
between an elite land-owning class and a class of longstanding farm tenants reflected a revision 




Doerr’s case is significant in illustrating the concerns of the landlord for proper farm 
operation, profit, and conservation. The qualitative evidence abundant in the collection of letters 
between Doerr and his tenants is invaluable in better understanding the lived relationships of 
tenancy, rather than just the raw statistics tracking farmers’ mobility within the agricultural 
ladder which have occupied the majority of historical scholarship on tenancy.
107
 Analysis of 
these letters shows that, like most of his peers, Doerr’s ecological understanding remained 
inadequate and he contributed to the continuing degradation of the soil of the Great Plains; this 
was emblematic of the time and indeed, of those heavily invested in the capitalist agricultural 
system. Yet this landlord nonetheless embodied a number of the better traits of landlords and 
generally understanding local lenders. The system of tenancy under landlord Albert A. Doerr, 
then, highlights several important issues regarding tenancy reform in the twentieth century, 
uncovers some of the realities of rural class interactions during a period of tremendous ecological 
and economic stress, and shows the landlord less as the monolithic figure historians have 
presented and more as a complex player in farm communities.  
It is important to note that Doerr was not alone in his investment in the future of 
agriculture on the Great Plains. The case of Colby, Kansas banker Dave Ferguson evidenced how 
the financial assistance and deep connections between bankers and farmers could shape the 
regional agricultural landscape materially. As the rhetoric of the Banker-Farmer illustrated, 
bankers moved beyond merely financing farmers; they modeled good farm practices and effected 
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lasting reforms within their spheres of influence as lenders and landlords. Kansas bankers 
embraced fully the mission placed upon them by the secretary of the Kansas State Board of 
Agriculture, F.D. Coburn. Coburn, in a Banker-Farmer article, exhorted his audience:  
We must bring these facts [of scientific learning] to the farmer. How shall they 
believe who have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher? Let 




Country bankers in Kansas became “preachers of the gospel” of agricultural reform not only 
through their practices as landlords, but also through creative visions for conservation and land 
use, and through actions as civil servants shaping the trajectory of land and resource use in the 
Great Plains region. For example, Henry S. Buzick of Sylvan Grove, Kansas, and John M. Gray 
of Kirwin, Kansas each influenced the direction of water resource use in Kansas. Gray was 
chairman of the Kansas Reclamation Commission, while Buzick was a member of the 
commission which completely revised Kansas’s water appropriation laws in 1945.
109
  
James C. Hopper, a farmer, rancher, and banker from Ness City, Kansas, offers a 
particularly colorful example of how bankers promoted agricultural reforms they viewed as 
essential to the preservation of the Great Plains regional economy. Hopper owned a vast amount 
of land, and the evocative names of his farms indicate how he envisioned his role in promoting 
reform: he called a 7,800-acre estate the “Big Four Ranch and Ideal Farm,” while naming a 660-
acre parcel the “Model Stock Farm” (emphasis added). Perhaps an even clearer sign of Hopper’s 
sense of his reformer credentials was his weekly column in the Ness County News called “Dam 
                                                 
108. F.D. Coburn, “Be An Agricultural Missionary,” The Banker-Farmer 1, no. 4 (March 1914), 7.  
109. “John Gray Funeral Sunday at Kirwin,” Topeka Capital, November 7, 1953; Robert Irvine, “The 
Waterscape and the Law: Adopting Prior Appropriation in Kansas,” Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 
19 (Spring 1996), 33, fn. 34, 36. Less influential than these high profile civil service activities, perhaps, but still 
reflective of the regional conservation sensibilities of bankers, was Quinter, Kansas banker Cecil Calvert’s memoir. 
“The Price of Prairie Grass,” published as a pamphlet on March 31, 1951 and available in the Kansas State 
Historical Society, reflected on the destruction of native prairie grasses in western Kansas by the plow, wind, and 
water erosion. Calvert was ultimately optimistic about the ability of engineers to produce replacement grass seed 




the Draws.” The column spoke to Hopper’s notion that collecting water in the low areas (draws) 
of farmlands would add moisture to the environment itself. He successfully promoted methods of 
conservation such as summer fallowing, and planting trees. As a one-term state legislator, he 
“secured the passage of an act for experimental irrigation dams.”
110
 The banker-reformer’s 
biggest idea, however, was to build a 600-mile “Great Interstate Canal” between South Dakota 
and Oklahoma and to divert water from the Missouri and Mississippi basins for the irrigation of 
farms on the Great Plains. The grandiose plan never came to fruition. Still, Hopper’s visions 
confirm the strong role bankers carved out for themselves as reformers and visionaries 
determined to secure the future of the Great Plains farm economy.
111
 Bankers’ stewardship of an 
agricultural system subject to a challenging regional environment represented a key aspect of 
their community leadership. As financiers, reformers, and landlords, they helped steer the region 
through a period of modernization and consolidation that revised the traditional agrarian dream, 
but preserved farming as a still functional economic basis for those who remained in the region. 
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The historian Lewis Atherton channels Sinclair Lewis in his 1954 monograph, Main 
Street on the Middle Border. The title is appropriate for a book revealing not just the myths, but 
the true cultural and economic history of everyday life in Middle America’s “country towns.”
1
 
Atherton represents the origins of the religious and cultural values defining many rural 
Americans faithfully and sketches the broad outlines of rural communities and their 
institutions—without resorting to mocking tones. Nonetheless, the breadth of his narrative means 
that he, too, cannot explicate fully the characters of each “type” of rural dweller. Atherton 
describes bankers, following his religious and cultural emphasis, as “high priests of finance.” But 
his short descriptions of the typical structure and function of banks, and of bankers’ place within 
rural society, produce little more in the way of truth than Sinclair Lewis’s stereotypical 
portrayals of the banker “type” in Main Street.  
 Atherton’s depiction of the banker is rather simple, and neglects to probe deeply into 
individual personalities. He writes of these dignified, conservative professionals:  
Though highly respected because of their power, bankers were seldom popular. 
People knew that they stood at the very center of the small group of local men 
who manipulated village affairs. At death, they received long-and-laudatory 
obituary notices, and their families moved in the best social circles. Beyond that, 
the banker remained an enigmatic character whose ceremonial shell concealed his 
inner thoughts. . . . As high priests of materialism, bankers have never been 





Certainly the broad strokes of this portrait are true. At the very least, Atherton moves beyond the 
labels of greed and disinterest in placing bankers firmly within a tradition of rural capitalism and 
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within the institutions of the community itself. Atherton shows us that bankers did not operate 
outside the circles of rural society, but it is still unclear just what their relationships with the 
community looked like, particularly beyond the economic realm. We have come to expect more.  
 Efforts to mine a variety of sources pertaining to this particular group of rural actors have 
produced a rich portrait of country bankers as economic, political, and social actors within their 
communities. The frontier banking institutions of those like Frederick J. Atwood in Concordia, 
Kansas, and Theo. Ackerman in Russell, Kansas might strike a chord with readers of western 
novels. Tales of sleeping in the back room with a flimsy safe and only a revolver for personal 
protection, or of chasing defaulted borrowers out into unsettled territory, offer a romantic image 
of the frontier banker. But delving into these men’s memories about banking in the 1870s and 
1880s, when communities were taking shape throughout western Kansas, suggest that 
maintaining a bank involved much more than a lone man with a gun could provide. Country 
banking required the maintenance of capital connections rooted in eastern communities such as 
Brandon, Vermont, and in regional financial centers such as Kansas City and Wichita. As 
bankers in western Kansas gained experience within the profession and established institutions of 
their own, strong roots of capitalization served as an asset in their efforts to attract business from 
their communities. Advertising for banks from the 1880s-1900s illustrated, additionally, the 
importance of the personalities behind local banks; the reputation of country bankers and the 
longevity of their banks were important in efforts to develop economic relationships with 
potential customers. 
 The stories of this dissertation also make clear that country bankers were integrated fully 
in the political leadership of their communities. Jerome W. Berryman’s election to the Kansas 




First, country bankers as politicians served the interests of their communities as well as of their 
own profession. Berryman’s backing of railroad regulations, the primary election, a farm home 
bill which would offer new agricultural credit opportunities in Kansas, and the good roads 
amendment illustrated this particularly well. Symbolically speaking, country bankers helped to 
maintain a fertile ground for the continued prosperity of their banks and communities, while they 
acted upon suggestions for country life reform then circulating through state and national 
bankers’ associations. Second, Berryman’s example shows that bankers’ political power, though 
strong, was mediated by their constituents. If the banker-legislator’s community disagreed with 
his actions, as when he worked against a widely popular bank guaranty law, they could and did 
remove him from office. Bankers’ service as legislators and in other civic capacities represented 
their positions at the head of local political scene, but the predication of their power upon their 
communities’ decisions showed them as more than just “manipulators of village affairs.”  
 Perhaps the most striking characteristic of bankers—as portrayed by the novelist Sinclair 
Lewis and the historian Lewis Atherton—is social aloofness. Although bankers and their 
families ran in the “best social circles,” their individual attitudes and preferences remained 
enigmas. This dissertation, however, has illuminated the canopy of social and moral values that 
country bankers and their families actively promoted within their communities. From prohibition 
to patriotic efforts during the Great War, from women’s suffrage to 100 percent Americanism, 
country bankers played a part in confronting many of the major social and cultural challenges 
faced by communities across the nation. In attempting to shape their communities’ social sphere, 
bankers at times embraced controversial or even coercive measures such as intimidating local 
residents to participate in bond drives or Red Cross campaigns during the war, or supporting the 




bankers acted within the limits of the communities around them, truly becoming “flesh-and-
blood individuals” with idealistic expectations and faults alike.  
An important part of portraying country banking realistically is to understand the 
motivations behind their financial decisions and the effects these had upon the economy of their 
local communities. Some of these motivations became clearer through the analysis of the 
minutes from Board of Directors meetings at the Farmers National Bank of Oberlin, Kansas, 
between 1918 and 1940. In making decisions about the bank’s investment in individual loans, 
short-term investments in city correspondent banks, or bond-buying, the directors reflected upon 
the economic challenges facing their communities and the relative safety of different investment 
instruments in that climate. They made choices based on what would make their own 
investments as bank stockholders secure, but protecting the bank also meant guarding the 
interests of depositors and the long-term financial future of their community. These records 
showed the connections between a broad class of rural elites—including farmers, ranchers, 
merchants, and lawyers—and the country banks in which they frequently invested. Many of 
these individuals should be classed with country bankers as the leaders of rural finance, because 
when they became bank directors, they would meet regularly to conduct bank business and 
contribute substantively to decisions about the bank’s investments and personnel. As members of 
the community representing diverse professions, bank directors demonstrate the intimate 
connections between bankers and the broader rural society. Furthermore, Colby, Kansas, banker 
W.D. Ferguson’s interactions with his farming company partner Ray H. Garvey showed how 
country bankers shaped the economic trajectory of their communities. Even when Ferguson’s 
perception about what practices constituted the future of Great Plains farming put him in conflict 




economy. Bankers were not popular always; this much the literature has gotten right. Periods of 
economic stress, such as during the 1920s and 1930s, cast them as the opponents of family 
farmers struggling to remain on their farms despite being mired in debt acquired in the effort to 
mechanize and expand their operations. Country bankers—including bank directors such as 
Albert A. Doerr—were as invested in the local agricultural economy as their farmer clients, 
however. They saw themselves as stewards for the agricultural economy that sat at the heart of 
rural communities on the Great Plains, and in their lending decisions as well as their own farm 
operations, they supported those who could create modern, efficient farms. 
 Exploring the manuscripts of country bankers, including private letters between financial 
backers and local bank officers, husbands and wives, and landlords and farm tenants, has 
allowed me to peel back the banker’s so-called “ceremonial shell” and access some of their inner 
thoughts about clients, maintaining their families’ place among elite rural society members, and 
about the future of the regional economy. For instance, it was clear that the implements dealer, 
lender, and landlord Albert A. Doerr wanted to retain his stake in the future of wheat farming on 
the Great Plains and to promote profitable and sound farming principles among his tenants. The 
management of Doerr’s farms through many different renters across multiple counties differed 
somewhat from other large-scale farms in the region, including G-K Farms near Colby. Yet, 
Doerr shared a vision of a changing farm landscape with other bankers in the Great Plains. Local 
elites—including country bankers with access to ample capital—would come to own a great deal 
of land in the region, but a class of farm managers would continue to operate it under the 
principles of scientific management. Modernization on the farm included a combination of large 
acreages, often owned by one individual and farmed by another, and the use of machinery at 




irrigation, and modified seed, wealthy landowners and farm operators continued to share capital 
inputs. Meanwhile, farmers’ credit needs remained substantial. Although the number of farmers 
declined from the 1930s onward, the regional economic base remained firmly planted in 
agriculture.     
In this respect, country banking retained some of its original characteristics into the 
second half of the twentieth century. Banking institutions in the state of Kansas continued to rely 
primarily upon agricultural lending, despite diversification into industrial development and small 
consumer loans.
3
 As historian Wayne Angell points out, “As farms grow in size the capital 
required per farmer can be expected to increase. Consequently agricultur[al] credit will continue 
to be a major lending activity for Kansas banks.”
4
 Programs initially formed during the New 
Deal assisted bankers in their ability to support farmers. One example is the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC)—a still-operational government program first established in 1933—which 
guarantees farmers and their creditors price minimums on agricultural commodities.  
Greater evidence of government intervention into the banking system reflected one of the 
major changes within banking in the second half of the twentieth century. The CCC, like the 
Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, was not uniformly popular among country bankers, but they 
ultimately had to come to terms with increasing governmental oversight into the banking 
business after the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s. Revisions to the Federal Reserve Act in 
1933 and 1935 increased that agency’s appeal to bankers in rural America who had been 
reluctant to enter the system due to its requirements for high capitalization and federal auditing. 
The carrot drawing more banks into the Federal Reserve System was membership in the Federal 
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a much larger and more successful system for protecting 
deposits than any state, including Kansas, had been able to enact. Even on the state level, the 
state banking commissioner codified more regulations within a revision to the banking code in 
1947. Bankers themselves led the way on many of these changes, having concluded, according to 




Increasing layers of supervision within the banking structure meant that bankers had to 
learn more and more about financial management. Beginning in the 1940s, the Kansas Bankers 
Association forged ahead in offering professionalization services to bankers. Whereas in the 
early years, “Many Kansas banks had officers and directors who knew little about banking in 
general and less about the specifics,” bank officers now had to attend training programs to learn 
the trade.
6
 Although the number of banks in Kansas—both state- and nationally-chartered—
declined substantially from a peak in 1921 (1,375 banks) to the post-war period (600 banks in 
1956), the volume of business for those that remained increased dramatically, and thus, the 
system needed more trained bankers than ever.
7
  
The banking system in the post-war period, thus, exhibited both continuity and change. 
The professionalization of banking coincided with the greater supervisory role of the federal 
government and with a widening of the field to more bankers. National changes, more than ever 
before, transcended the local community interests. Still, banks in western Kansas remained tied 
to the agricultural credit needs of local communities. Country bankers’ positions at the head of 
rural lending institutions, along with their personal investments in land, continued to give them a 
strong interest in the agricultural future of the regional economy. They would continue to support 
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this central element of their communities’ livelihood financially, politically, and even socially. 
Regionally specific concerns such as the thirst for irrigation water particularly defined the 
experience of country bankers as community representatives in the Great Plains, but in some 
ways their roles in sustaining the agricultural economy as a fundamental basis for rural society 
have been replicated in countless other American communities.
8
 Images of rural bankers 
sponsoring beneficial legislation for their home regions, competing within national fundraising 
campaigns to demonstrate their communities’ dedication to patriotic causes, and more recently, 
sponsoring local 4-H or Future Farmers of America (FFA) programs to aid generations of 
hopeful future farmers in learning the business side of the family vocation, supplant the popular 
stereotypes about disinterested bankers within rural society. Country bankers continue to 
exercise substantial economic, political, and social power as leaders within rural communities 
endeavoring to remain relevant in the modern era.   
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